Clark v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 23 November 2021
• Docket Number: Record No. 0017-21-1
• Parties: Eric Torez CLARK v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

73 Va.App. 695

865 S.E.2d 421

Eric Torez CLARK

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

Record No. 0017-21-1

Court of Appeals of Virginia.

NOVEMBER 23, 2021

Tiffany T. Crawford (Morris, Crawford & Currin, P.C., on brief), for appellant.

Rosemary V. Bourne, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Judges Huff, Ortiz and Lorish

OPINION BY JUDGE DANIEL E. ORTIZ

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures only competent defendants are subject to criminal prosecution. A criminal defendant's fitness to stand trial is a critical consideration in administering justice and complying with the constitutional mandate of prosecuting only those competent to understand the proceedings and participate in their own defense. When a trial court analyzes whether a defendant may be incompetent, it must appreciate how mental health may impact proceedings to guarantee a fair criminal justice system.

In this appeal, Eric Torez Clark ("Clark") challenges his conviction and sentence in the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake ("trial court"). On appeal, Clark argues the trial court erred when it abused its discretion by denying his two motions for a competency evaluation on November 18, 2019, and June 25, 2020.² Clark argues that he was entitled to a competency evaluation because there was probable cause to believe he did not understand the proceedings against him, and he was unable to assist his counsel. We agree with Clark that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his second motion on June 25, 2020. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court convicting Clark.

BACKGROUND

On January 25, 2019, Chesapeake police officers executed a search warrant for Clark and his car based on information that Clark was involved in a drug transaction. In executing the warrant, officers found cocaine in Clark's pockets and a gun and cocaine distribution paraphernalia in Clark's car. The officers arrested Clark. On June 4, 2019, a grand jury indicted Clark for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm by a felon, and use of a firearm in connection with distributing controlled substances.

On November 8, 2019, Wm. Joshua Holder ("Holder"), Clark's first appointed counsel, filed a motion for a competency evaluation. In support of this motion, Holder proffered difficult counsel-client communication, Clark's argumentative behavior, Holder's previously denied motion to withdraw, Clark's belief in conspiracy theories surrounding his case, and Clark's documented mental health history of schizophrenia

and paranoia.

At the hearing on November 18, 2019 ("November hearing"), before Judge Rufus A. Banks, Jr. ("Judge Banks"), Holder explained that Clark "comes across as very intelligent," seems to understand each party's role in the process, and knows some legal terminology. Even so, he asserted Clark's continuous talk of conspiracy theories made it difficult for them to work together to prepare a defense. Holder further questioned Clark's competence based on Clark's mental health history, partially confirmed by Clark's sister, including schizophrenia

and paranoia diagnoses. Overall, Holder argued Clark's behaviors indicated he was "living in a delusional state" from which he could not understand the nature of the charges or reasonably assist Holder in preparing a defense.

The Commonwealth objected to this motion. The Commonwealth argued defense counsel's statements alone were insufficient evidence of probable cause for an evaluation and Clark's irrational behavior, past mental health problems, and insistence on a conspiracy defense did not indicate present incompetence. Judge Banks denied the motion.

After this, Holder withdrew as Clark's counsel and Tiffany T. Crawford ("Crawford") replaced him. Within months, Crawford also moved for a competency evaluation. At the hearing on June 25, 2020 ("June hearing"), before Judge Randall D. Smith ("Judge Smith"), Crawford said she felt "ethically bound" to seek a competency evaluation because Clark's mental problems had deteriorated to the point she no longer believed he understood what was happening in the case. As evidence, she presented recent letters Clark sent to his sister detailing a conspiracy that he believed the FBI needed him to investigate.³

Crawford pointed to the letters and Clark's paranoia and schizophrenia

diagnoses to corroborate her concern that Clark's mental health problems were affecting his case. She proffered that Clark was currently receiving Seroquel, a medication used to treat certain mental illnesses, at the jail. Crawford represented Clark was "having trouble differentiating between fantasy and reality" and she could not "get him to stay in reality long enough to help [her] or to understand what[ ] [was] going on."⁴ Crawford also mentioned Holder's previous motion for a competency evaluation and how she believed Clark's condition had worsened since the November hearing. She argued "the fact that two separate defense attorneys, who are both very experienced in dealing with clients" have made similar motions casts sufficient doubt on Clark's competency.

In opposition to Clark's motion, the Commonwealth introduced a recorded phone conversation from April 2019 between Clark and his girlfriend. On this call, Clark's girlfriend told him he was likely to spend only a year in psychiatric treatment rather than prison due to his mental health history. Specifically, Clark's girlfriend said, "you don't have to play crazy because you're already on paper for that." Clark did not speak at length on the call but agreed when his girlfriend insisted he undergo psychiatric treatment as an alternative to prison time, if available.

Throughout the June hearing, Judge Smith repeatedly asked Crawford to present evidence of Clark's inability to understand the proceedings or assist counsel. As Clark's counsel, Crawford related her impressions of Clark's incompetence along with the other facts illustrating Clark's incompetence. While Crawford stated she could not divulge the specifics of her conversations with Clark due to attorney-client privilege, she insisted these privileged conversations concerned her. However, Judge Smith dismissed Crawford's representations as "conclusions" or "opinion" and continued to ask Crawford for "evidence."⁵ Judge Smith then denied the motion, stating the evidence Crawford did present, such as the letters, did not support a finding of probable cause for a competency evaluation.⁶

At a bench trial, Clark was convicted on all charges. This appeal followed. Clark argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying defense counsel's motions for a competency evaluation at the November and June hearings. Clark argues a competency evaluation was warranted because his counsel demonstrated probable cause he did not understand the proceedings against him and was unable to assist his counsel at each hearing.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

A defendant is competent to stand trial when he has the present ability to understand the proceedings against him and consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of understanding.

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam); United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 1971). Under Code § 19.2-169.1(A), a court is required to order a competency evaluation if there is "probable cause to believe" the defendant "lacks substantial capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in his own defense."

Because a trial court is in the best position to weigh the evidence presented on a defendant's competency, we will reverse a trial court's decision denying a competency evaluation under Code § 19.2-169.1(A) only if the trial court abused its discretion. Dang v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 132, 146, 752 S.E.2d 885 (2014) ; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 79, 93, 669 S.E.2d 368 (2008). A trial court abuses its discretion when it (1) does not consider a "relevant factor" that should have been given "significant weight," (2) considers an "irrelevant or improper factor" and gives it significant weight, or (3) considers all relevant factors but makes a "clear error of judgment" in weighing the factors. Dang, 287 Va. at 146, 752 S.E.2d 885 (quoting Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., 282 Va. 346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 134 (2011) ).

We can find an abuse of discretion has occurred only when "reasonable jurists could not differ" as to the proper result. Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634 (2009) (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753, 607 S.E.2d 738, adopted upon reh'g en banc, 45 Va. App. 811, 613 S.E.2d 870 (2005) ). While we cannot substitute our judgment for the trial court's, the abuse of discretion standard requires us to determine "whether the record fairly supports the trial court's action." Id. (quoting Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 385, 484 S.E.2d 898 (1997) ). In this review, "[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth," the prevailing party below. Id. at 617, 685 S.E.2d 634.

B. Competency Evaluations and Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of an incompetent defendant. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2574, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992) ; Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903-04, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) ; Dang, 287 Va. at 144, 752 S.E.2d 885. Therefore, states must guarantee that there are procedural safeguards in place to ensure a defendant is competent. Medina, 505 U.S. at 449, 112 S.Ct. at 2579 ; Dang, 287 Va. at 144, 752 S.E.2d 885.

In Virginia, the General Assembly enacted Code § 19.2-169.1 to this aim. Dang, 287 Va. at 145, 752 S.E.2d 885. Under Code § 19.2-169.1(A), a court is required to order a competency evaluation if there is "probable cause to believe" the defendant "lacks...