Clark v. Donahue, IP 92-237-C-B/S

• Court: United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Southern District of Indiana)
• Writing for the Court: BARKER
• Citation: 885 F. Supp. 1159
• Parties: Elizabeth A. CLARK, individually, and Elizabeth A. Clark, as Personal representative of The Estate of June Christy Highsaw, Plaintiffs, v. James M. DONAHUE, M.D., Ruth Stanley, Carolyn Mott, R.N., Joyce Currens, R.N., Garner Johnson, and Obie Turner, Defendants. Annabelle WOODS, by her Guardian Sandra SCHAFFER, and Norma Shane, as Personal Representative of The Estate of Lydia Kay Shelby, Plaintiffs, v. James M. DONAHUE, M.D., Ruth Stanley, Joyce Currens, R.N., Nasser M. Shinwarie and Paula Smith, Defendants.
• Docket Number: No. IP 92-237-C-B/S,IP 92-238-C-B/S.,IP 92-237-C-B/S
• Decision Date: 31 March 1995

885 F. Supp. 1159

Elizabeth A. CLARK, individually, and Elizabeth A. Clark, as Personal representative of The Estate of June Christy Highsaw, Plaintiffs,
v.
James M. DONAHUE, M.D., Ruth Stanley, Carolyn Mott, R.N., Joyce Currens, R.N., Garner Johnson, and Obie Turner, Defendants.
Annabelle WOODS, by her Guardian Sandra SCHAFFER, and Norma Shane, as Personal Representative of The Estate of Lydia Kay Shelby, Plaintiffs,
v.
James M. DONAHUE, M.D., Ruth Stanley, Joyce Currens, R.N., Nasser M. Shinwarie and Paula Smith, Defendants.

Nos. IP 92-237-C-B/S, IP 92-238-C-B/S.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

March 31, 1995.

885 F. Supp. 1160

C. Dennis Wegner, C. Dennis Wegner & Assoc., P.C., Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiffs.

John Laramore, Deputy Atty. Gen., John T. Hume, III, Randall C. Helmen, Hume Smith Geddes & Green, Bruce L. Kamplain, Norris Choplin & Schroeder, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.

CONSOLIDATED ENTRY

BARKER, Chief Judge.

These two cases involve claims based upon the deaths of two patients at Central State Hospital. Currently before the Court are various defense motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motions are denied.

I. Background

June Christy Highsaw was admitted to Central State Hospital ("CSH") in July, 1970, as a result of a voluntary admission agreement signed by her mother, Elizabeth Clark. At the time she was admitted, Highsaw was approximately 14 years old. Highsaw died at the age of 35 while still a patient at CSH. Lydia Kay Shelby was admitted to CSH in December, 1971, at the age of approximately 15 years old. Shelby remained at CSH until her death at 40 years of age. Plaintiffs allege that Highsaw and Shelby died as the result of severe medical and physical mistreatment.

II. Discussion

Defendants James M. Donahue, M.D., Garner Johnson, Obie Turner, Ruth Stanley, and Paula Smith (collectively, "Defendants") argue that they are entitled to summary judgment

885 F. Supp. 1161

on Plaintiffs' claims because Plaintiffs were not involuntarily admitted to CSH. That is, Defendants contend that voluntarily admitted mental patients have no substantive due process rights to be protected from mistreatment while patients at a state hospital. Additionally, Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment in the Highsaw case because Highsaw's mother, Elizabeth Clark, signed a "hold harmless agreement" at the time Highsaw was committed to CSH

Summary judgment is proper where:

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(c). In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the judge's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but it is instead to decide whether there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The burden rests squarely on the party moving for summary judgment to show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If doubts remain as to the existence of a material fact, then those doubts should be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party and summary judgment should be denied. See Wilson v. Williams, 997 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir.1993); Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989).

Defendants base their main argument on DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), and its progeny. DeShaney addresses the duty of the state "to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors." 489 U.S. at 195, 109 S.Ct. at 1003. At issue in DeShaney is under what "circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to certain individuals" such that the state is obligated to protect such individuals from themselves and others (i.e., non-state actors). DeShaney concludes that the state does owe such a duty where certain "`special relationships' are created or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals." Id. at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1004.

In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf — through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty — which is the "deprivation of liberty" triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause....

Id. at 200, 109 S.Ct. at 1006. Therefore, the "special relationships" exist with respect to incarcerated prisoners and involuntarily committed mental patients. Id. at 199, 109 S.Ct. at 1005 (citations omitted).

Relying on DeShaney, several courts have held that voluntarily committed mental patients are not owed any constitutional duty to substantive due process rights by the state. See, e.g., Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Center, Inc., 770 F.Supp. 43 (D.Mass.1991), aff'd, 961 F.2d 987 (1st Cir.1992) (claims of voluntarily committed mental patient who was injured when he jumped from a van driven by a state employee while being transferred from a state mental health center to a state group home); Ridlen v. Four County Counseling Center, 809 F.Supp. 1343 (N.D.Ind.1992) (claims on behalf of person who, while receiving outpatient mental treatment, killed himself); Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459 (3d Cir.1990), reh'g denied (1991) (claims on behalf of resident of community living facility who choked to death while eating); Jordan v. Tennessee, 738 F.Supp. 258...