Clark v. Dussault
| Decision Date | 04 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-451,93-451 |
| Parties | David K. CLARK, Missoula County Justice of the Peace, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Ann Mary DUSSAULT, Barbara Evans and Janet Stevens, Missoula County Commissioners, Respondents and Appellants, and Anne P. Guest, Intervenor and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Larry Jones, Missoula, for intervenor and appellant.
Stacey Weldele-Wade, Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, Missoula, for petitioner and respondent.
Nancy K. Moe, Ellingson & Moe, Michael W. Sehestedt, Deputy County Atty., Missoula, for respondents and appellants.
Jim Nugent, City Atty., City of Missoula, Missoula, for amici curiae Missoula and League of Cities and Towns.
Anne Guest (Guest) and the Missoula County Board of Commissioners (County Commissioners) appeal from the grant of summary judgment to David Clark (Clark) by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County. The summary adjudication was based on the court's conclusion that Clark was not bound by the grievance procedures applicable to county employees because of his inherent authority as Justice of the Peace and the doctrine of judicial immunity. Clark cross-appeals the court's denial of his motion to amend the judgment to add an award of attorneys' fees. We reverse the court's grant of summary judgment and affirm its denial of the motion to amend the judgment.
Guest was employed by Missoula County as office manager for the Missoula County Justice Court (Justice Court). The Justice Court is comprised of Courts 1 and 2, presided over by Clark and Michael Morris (Morris), respectively. In May of 1991, Clark presented a "supervisory plan" to Guest, setting forth new guidelines and priorities to be followed by her and the clerical staff in Court 1. Morris declined to implement the plan in Court 2.
Several weeks later, Clark felt that Guest was not attempting to institute the desired changes and verbally reprimanded her. Guest submitted a six-page memorandum responding to the verbal reprimand and, while Clark was on vacation during the last part of June, detailed her role as manager under the supervisory plan to the clerical staff.
Early in July, County Commissioners Ann Mary Dussault (Dussault), Barbara Evans (Evans) and Janet Stevens (Stevens) requested Clark to attend a meeting to address concerns raised by his clerical staff. Before that meeting could be held, Clark scheduled a meeting with his staff to resolve their differences. Stevens and Dussault advised Clark that they would attend any such meeting. Two meetings were held; one was attended by Dussault, Stevens, Clark and his clerical staff, including Guest, and the other by all three County Commissioners, Clark, members of the Personnel Department, and Deputy County Attorney John Devore.
Subsequent to the meetings, Clark placed a written reprimand in Guest's personnel file. In the reprimand, Clark stated that Guest was insubordinate because she failed to implement the supervisory plan, made unconscionable misrepresentations in her six-page memorandum, and disrupted the clerical staff. He also indicated that further disciplinary action was being contemplated.
Clark remained unhappy with Guest's implementation of his supervisory plan. On August 12, 1991, he suspended Guest without pay for seven days. Morris refused to acknowledge the suspension and directed Guest to continue working. The Missoula County Personnel Department also directed Guest to ignore the suspension absent an agreement by both justices of the peace.
Guest filed a grievance to contest the suspension on August 16, 1991, pursuant to the Missoula County Personnel Policies Manual (County Manual). She sought to have the notice of suspension and all related documents removed from her file. A grievance hearing before the County Commissioners was scheduled for December 19, 1991. The County Commissioners refused Clark's request to recuse themselves from hearing the grievance.
On December 17, Clark filed separate petitions for a writ of prohibition and an alternative writ of prohibition requesting the District Court to order the County Commissioners to stop interfering with his operation of Court 1. The District Court immediately issued the alternative writ, cancelling the grievance hearing scheduled two days later. The court also ordered the County Commissioners to appear at a January 10, 1992, hearing and show cause why a permanent writ should not be issued. The show cause hearing subsequently was continued and, apparently, never held.
In January of 1992, Guest filed a motion to intervene in the District Court proceeding pursuant to Rule 24(a), M.R.Civ.P. She argued that she was entitled to a hearing regarding Clark's disciplinary action under notions of due process and that her participation in the litigation was necessary to protect that interest in light of the court's cancellation of the grievance hearing. Clark opposed the motion.
While Guest's motion was pending, Clark filed an amended petition. In addition to the permanent writ of prohibition previously requested, Clark sought declaratory relief. He requested the court to determine that he had the inherent authority to suspend Guest under §§ 3-1-111 and 3-1-113, MCA, without interference by the County Commissioners and that judicial immunity, codified at § 2-9-112(2), MCA, precluded Guest's grievance. He also requested reimbursement of his attorneys' fees and court costs.
On February 12, 1992, the District Court granted Guest's motion to intervene. Shortly thereafter, the court issued an order dissolving the alternative writ of prohibition and establishing interim operating procedures for the Justice Court. Pursuant to the order, Guest's employment as office manager continued, but only in relation to the operation of Morris' court. The order prohibited all contact between Clark and Guest.
Following the filing of stipulated facts in October of 1992, Clark moved for summary judgment. Respondents and Guest opposed the motion and, in November, filed separate cross-motions for summary judgment. On May 10, 1993, the District Court granted Clark's motion for summary judgment, concluding that he did not have to comply with the grievance procedures because they interfered with his inherent authority to ensure the proper functioning of the Justice Court. The court also concluded that judicial immunity precluded Guest from maintaining her grievance against Clark.
The judgment entered by the court on its grant of summary judgment did not award attorneys' fees and costs to Clark. He subsequently moved the court to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P., to include such an award. The motion was denied.
Guest and the Commissioners appeal the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Clark. Clark cross-appeals, asserting error in the court's denial of his motion to amend the judgment. The Montana League of Cities and Towns and the City of Missoula appear as amici curiae.
As a threshold matter, we address Clark's contention that this case is moot because Guest left county employment in June of 1993. A case may become moot for the purpose of appeal where it has lost any practical importance to the parties because of a change in circumstances prior to the appellate decision. Matter of T.J.F. (1987), 229 Mont. 473, 475, 747 P.2d 1356, 1357. A party seeking to establish that an issue raised on appeal is moot has a heavy burden. Butte-Silver Bow Local Gov't v. Olsen (1987), 228 Mont. 77, 82, 743 P.2d 564, 567.
Pursuant to Clark's request for declaratory relief, the District Court determined he had the inherent authority to discipline and discharge court personnel without consulting with the County Commissioners. It also determined that judicial immunity barred the filing of a grievance against Clark, the final step of which is a review by the County Commissioners. Guest's departure from county employment does not negate the legal effect of the District Court's judgment on Clark's relationship with the Commissioners and, therefore, does not render the case moot as to them.
Nor is this appeal moot as to Guest. She filed her grievance when she was a county employee pursuant to the grievance provisions of the County Manual. Clark cites no authority for his position that Guest's right to maintain the grievance terminated when she left county employment. Thus, the District Court's judgment barring a grievance against Clark pursuant to judicial immunity remains of practical importance to Guest. We conclude that this case is not moot.
Did the District Court err by granting summary judgment to Clark?
Our standard for reviewing a grant of summary judgment is the same as that used by the District Court. Emery v. Federated Foods (1993), 262 Mont. 83, 863 P.2d 426, 431. We determine whether there is an absence of genuine issues of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minnie v. City of Roundup (1993), 257 Mont. 429, 431, 849 P.2d 212, 214. Here, summary judgment was based on stipulated facts filed by the parties. Thus, we focus on the court's conclusions supporting the summary adjudication. Our review of legal conclusions is plenary. Steer, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603.
According to the District Court, a justice of the peace has the inherent power to take steps necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the justice court, including the authority to make personnel decisions. Although the court recognized established personnel procedures are to be followed "as much as possible," it stated that a justice of the peace could exercise inherent power when the established procedures failed, citing Hillis v. Sullivan (1913), 48 Mont. 320, 137 P. 392, and its progeny.
Applying those principles to the case before it, the District Court determined...
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