Clark v. Erie R. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 February 1916
• Citation: 230 F. 478
• Parties: CLARK v. ERIE R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

230 F. 478

CLARK v. ERIE R. CO.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

February 12, 1916

Vincent N. Elwood, of Hancock, N.Y. (F. W. Welsh, of Binghamton N.Y., of counsel), for plaintiff.

Lyon &amp Painter, of Binghamton, N.Y., for defendant.

RAY District Judge.

This action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant to recover the damages alleged to have been sustained by him while in the employ of the defendant, and while acting as one of the crew of an engine engaged in switching and moving cars in interstate commerce at Deposit, N.Y., by reason of a defective automatic coupler attached to such engine. The action was brought under the provision of the federal Safety Appliance Act (Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531 amended by Act April 1, 1896, c. 87, 29 Stat. 85, and Act March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943 (Comp. St. 1913, Secs 8605-8615)), and also the provisions of federal Employers' Liability Act (35 Stat. 65, c. 149, as amended in 1910).

The plaintiff claimed that a defective automatic coupler was the cause of and contributed to his injury, which consisted in the loss of one hand and a portion of the arm. The evidence was conclusive that the defendant's road is an interstate railroad, and that the cars being moved in the Deposit yards by the engine in question were loaded with interstate freight and had come from some point in western New York into Pennsylvania, and thence into New York and were bound for some point in New Jersey. While this was befogged all that was possible, the conductor, who at first claimed that he did not know whether or not he had any cars in his train while moving from a point in the state of Pennsylvania to Deposit, N.Y., finally admitted that, after leaving the station in Pennsylvania, no stop was made before reaching Deposit, and that these cars in question were there in the train, with a number of others. It was while these cars were being moved in the Deposit yards by a yard engine that the accident happened. The plaintiff was one of the crew of engine No. 2068, and in the night was attempting to couple the head of such engine to one of such cars, No. 50637. There was an automatic coupler on the engine, and a corresponding one on the car. When the engine and car came in contact, in the effort to couple on, the coupling did not make, as was shown by the fact that, when the engine moved away, the cars did not follow. The engine moved away some distance, and Clark went between the head of the engine and the car and attempted to remedy the defect-- make the coupling work-- and while so engaged the cars, or one of them, either of its own weight or moved by another engine, ran down on the engine, and the plaintiff's hand was caught in the coupling and crushed, and amputation followed.

It was shown that there was a slight grade in the yard at this point and that the plaintiff may have known this fact, and it was also shown that he did not block the cars to which the crew was attempting to couple the engine before making his effort to make the defective coupling work. Every act and move of the plaintiff and of the crew working with him and of the cars and engine were proved, and the judge allowed the evidence. The whole situation was fully proved, as were the movements of this engine and of these and other cars prior to the accident, as well as what was done with and to the engine and coupler at the time of and immediately following the accident.

There was some evidence in the case tending to show that these automatic couplers will not work and that the engine will not couple to the car readily when on a curve, or unless the engine and car are brought together with sufficient force to cause the coupling to operate. For an automatic coupler to work or operate when in perfect condition it is necessary that, when standing or moving on a straight track, the car and engine be brought together properly. Inasmuch as it was contended that this coupler on the engine was defective or out of repair, so that it would not work at all times when the engine and cars were properly brought together or into contact, and as the coupler itself was not brought into court, but another one was, which, it was contended, was not like the one on the engine at the time of the accident, much evidence was given as to the construction and operation of automatic couplers, and it became an important consideration whether the failure of the engine to couple to the car was due to improper or inadequate movement or action on the part of the ones operating the engine or to defects in the coupler.

The court received all evidence bearing on the question of the alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, as an act of negligence or failure to perform its duty to the plaintiff on the part of defendant, stood on the proposition that the automatic coupler was out of repair and for that reason did not work, and would not operate at all times when coupler, engine, and car were properly moved and handled, and did not on this occasion, and that this was the cause of the accident and consequent injury; that is, the plaintiff contended, finally, that the car and engine were properly brought together, that the coupling failed to work because of its defective condition, that the plaintiff in the performance of his duty went to the coupler on the engine to make it work, the cars being some 15 or 20 feet away, and that while the plaintiff was engaged in the performance of this duty to the defendant railroad company the cars came down on him in the darkness and his hand was crushed. The plaintiff contended that the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, was of no importance, not in the case; but the court ruled against him on this question and, after receiving all the evidence as to conditions, etc., held and charged the jury that for the plaintiff to recover the evidence must have established and the jury must find that the coupler was out of repair or defective, and that such condition was the proximate cause of the accident and injury-- that is, made it necessary for the plaintiff to go to the coupler, and between the head of the engine and the cars, some 15 or 20 feet away, for the purpose of making the coupler operate, and that while engaged in the performance of this duty the car came upon him and crushed his hand; also, that the plaintiff could not recover if the coupler was not out of repair and defective, or if his own negligence was the cause of the accident and injury; also, that the plaintiff was not chargeable with contributory negligence, under such circumstances and conditions, if they existed, in merely going between the head of the engine and the cars to make the coupler operate, but was chargeable with contributory negligence if, after going between them, he failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety; also, that if the coupler was out of repair and defective, and the proximate cause of the accident and injury, and the plaintiff was guilty of negligence contributing to the accident and injury, then such negligence, while not an absolute defense, would go in diminution of damages.

As I understand the law, a defective automatic coupler must be the proximate cause of the injury complained of. The absence of an automatic coupler, or a defective automatic coupler, does not give rise to a cause of action for injury, unless it occasions the injury or contributes to the injury.

The plaintiff in this case relied finally upon a defective automatic coupler as the act of negligence or omission of duty causing his injury, or a contributing cause, and sought to recover on no other ground. The jury was instructed that plaintiff could not recover on any other ground. The jury found that the automatic coupler was defective or out of repair, and that such defect was the proximate cause of the injury. There was evidence to support the finding, and no evidence bearing on this question was excluded. Every fact and circumstance connected with this accident and injury as stated was gone into and proved, and was competent for the purpose of showing whether the accident and injury was due to a defective coupler, or to some negligent act of the plaintiff, or some act of some third person. It is erroneous to assert in this case that the defendant was not permitted to show contributory negligence or give evidence on that subject. The contrary is the truth. But, however that may be, the rulings and charge of the court were much more favorable to the defendant company than it was entitled to.

As stated, the plaintiff...