Clark v. Field
| Decision Date | 06 January 1880 |
| Citation | 42 Mich. 342,4 N.W. 19 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | JOHN P. CLARK v. MOSES W. FIELD. |
Where in an action of trespass the defendant had not shown himself qualified to speak on the subject, held that the exclusion of his opinion as to damages caused by the trespass was proper though about to be given spontaneously. It is proper for the court to require that the examination proceed by questions and answers. Where evidence has been received as to a particular point, and verdict on such point is in favor of the appellant, the fact that other evidence bearing thereon was rejected is not ground for reversal. Certain evidence held proper to go to the jury on question of good faith of defendant. Declaration held sufficient to support proof of ownership in fee by defendant in error. Treble damages in trespass can only be allowed in case single damages are assessed; the former includes the latter. Whether they can be trebled or not depends on its being made to appear that the trespass was or was not within one of the exceptions in the statute.
Error to Wayne.
Wisner & Speed, for plaintiff in error.
D.C Holbrook, for defendant in error.
Clark caused a number of oak trees to be cut on certain premises claimed by Field, adjacent to the city of Detroit, and the latter sued in trespass, under Comp.L. c. 198, for "three times the amount of damages which should be assessed therefor," and the jury found that the act was a trespass against Field, and assessed the damage at $1,500. They further found, however, that Clark had probable cause to believe, and did believe, that he had a right to cut the trees, and the court thereupon entered judgment for the amount of damages actually assessed. Clark then removed the proceedings here for review. He was not allowed to give his opinion to the jury relative to the depreciation, if any caused to the estate by the trespass. We are not dissatisfied with this ruling. He did not profess to know, or to have the means of judging, of the effect of the cutting upon the value of the estate. So far as appears he was not able to afford any assistance to the jury on this subject, and the record shows that no proper inquiry respecting his competency to shed any light on it was excluded.
The refusal to allow him to give his testimony spontaneously, and without questioning, was a reasonable exercise of discretion. It was regular to require the investigation to proceed by questions and answers, and thereby enable the opposing party to arrest the introduction of matter supposed to be improper by an objection to the question. Undoubtedly cases occur which justify such indulgence as was sought here, and the trial judge may be expected to decide wisely when to allow it and when not, and the case must be a very unusual and extreme one to warrant interference by an appellate court.
The witness Adams may or may not have had an opinion in regard to the effect upon the value of the land caused by the trespass. He was not shown, however, to have any, and did not appear to be qualified to form one of any evidentiary value.
The charges of error based on refusals of evidence to show that Clark acted in good faith, and not in a way to render himself liable for treble damages, are of no force. As evidence on the subject, and to the satisfaction of the jury, was actually received, and they found the fact to be as he contended, he was not injured by the rulings shutting out his further offers of evidence on that question.
The rejected evidence had no tendency to prove a license.
Whether it could be made out or not that one was created depended mainly if not wholly upon the production of proper proof of...
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