Clark v. Gale

Decision Date02 October 1998
Docket NumberNos. 97-312,97-313,s. 97-312
PartiesRobert CLARK, Suzanne Clark, and Robert J. Clark, II, Appellants (Defendants), v. Loren GALE, Personal Representative of the Estate of Leona F. Ganow, Deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff). Loren GALE, Personal Representative of the Estate of Leona F. Ganow, Deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Robert CLARK and Suzanne Clark, Appellees (Defendants).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

William L. Miller of Miller & Fasse, P.C., Riverton, for the Clarks.

Frank Andrews, Riverton, for Loren Gale.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, * JJ.; and NICHOLAS G. KALOKATHIS, D.J.

MACY, Justice.

This case involves a dispute over estate assets. The trial court held a jury trial and entered a judgment and order in accordance with the jury's verdict. The parties cross- We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

appealed from the trial court's judgment and order.

ISSUES

In Case No. 97-312, Appellants Robert Clark (Bob), Suzanne Clark (Suzanne), and Robert Clark II (Robbie) (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Clarks") present the following issues on appeal:

I. Did the trial court err when it allowed testimony regarding what a deceased person had said over the defendant[s'] hearsay objections?

II. Did the trial court err when it allowed a witness to testify that the decedent "appeared to trust" one of the defendants?

III. Did the trial court err when it refused to permit the defendants to inquire into why the plaintiff chose not to pursue the estate of a previously named defendant?

In Case No. 97-313, Appellant Loren Gale (Loren), as the personal representative of the estate, offers the following issues, which he phrased as statements, for our review:

A. There was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support a money judgment for services to a family member in the household[.]

B. The money judgment was contrary to law[.]

FACTS

Leona Ganow (Leona) and Earl Ganow (Earl) had three children: Ramona Gale (Ramona); Delores Clark (Delores); and Wayne Ganow. Loren was Ramona's husband. Delores was married to Bob, and they had two children: Suzanne and Robbie.

Although there were some discrepancies in the record, it appears that Delores and her two children lived with Leona and Earl in their home in Riverton from 1972 until 1977. Bob was working away from Riverton during the weeks, but he spent his weekends in an apartment in the Ganows' garage. Bob and Delores were granted a divorce in 1978, and Earl passed away in December 1981.

Bob filed for bankruptcy in 1985 and again in 1987. In 1989, a creditor bank foreclosed upon Bob's ranch. Bob lived in Leona's garage apartment from October 1990 until the summer of 1991 when he moved to Chicago, Illinois. He returned to Riverton in the summer of 1992, and he resided in the garage apartment from that time forward. Delores apparently lived with Leona again from July 1992 until February 1993. Delores passed away later in 1993.

Bob did not pay rent or for the utilities on the apartment, and Leona paid for most of his food and other expenses. Bob worked around the house, doing odd jobs and helping to care for Leona. In 1994, Bob began helping Leona manage her financial affairs.

In December 1994, Leona executed a durable power of attorney appointing Ramona as her attorney in fact. She also executed a will devising her real property to Ramona and reserving a life estate in the apartment for Bob. Leona prepared a personal property addendum to her will that provided the household goods and furnishings would go to Bob, Suzanne, and Robbie.

In June 1995, Suzanne returned to Riverton to help care for Leona. Suzanne was in the process of obtaining a divorce, and she did not have a place to live or a vehicle to drive. Suzanne lived in Leona's house and did not pay rent.

In July 1995, Leona underwent surgery, and, during the night following the surgery, she became disoriented. The next day, various members of the family had a heated discussion about getting full-time care for Leona. Although the family did not reach an agreement with regard to Leona's care, Suzanne continued to live with her grandmother and to care for her.

On September 27, 1995, Leona revoked the durable power of attorney appointing Ramona as her attorney in fact, and she executed a new durable power of attorney appointing her sister, Bernice Burns (Bernice), as her attorney in fact. On September 30, 1995, Bernice, as Leona's attorney in fact, executed In November 1995, Leona suffered a serious stroke. The district court subsequently appointed Ramona as the conservator of Leona's estate and Suzanne as the guardian of her person. Leona died on December 28, 1995; she was eighty-two years old at the time of her death. In accordance with her will, Loren was appointed as the personal representative for Leona's estate. He filed an action in the district court against Bob, Suzanne, Robbie, and Bernice to have the quitclaim deed set aside that was executed by Bernice on Leona's behalf and to quiet title to the property in the estate. Loren claimed that Leona was incompetent to execute the power of attorney in favor of Bernice and that Bernice did not have the authority to convey Leona's real property. He also asserted claims against Bob, Suzanne, Robbie, and Bernice for conspiracy to defraud.

a quitclaim deed to convey Leona's house to Robbie and Suzanne, as joint tenants.

The defendants answered Loren's complaint, and Bob and Suzanne filed counterclaims for payment from the estate for the services they had rendered to Leona during her lifetime. Bernice died before the case was tried, and Loren elected not to pursue his claims against her estate. The case was eventually tried to a jury, and the jury returned special interrogatories finding that: (1) Leona was competent to execute the durable power of attorney in favor of Bernice; (2) Bob and Suzanne exercised undue influence over Leona; (3) Bernice exceeded her authority as attorney in fact when she executed the quitclaim deed; (4) Leona did not ratify Bernice's conveyance of the property; and (5) Bob was entitled to receive $21,738.36 and Suzanne was entitled to receive $21,738.37 for the services they had provided to Leona. The trial court entered a judgment and order on the basis of the jury's verdict. The Clarks and Loren subsequently perfected their cross-appeals to this Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Evidentiary Rulings--Case No. 97-312

In Case No. 97-312, the Clarks claim that the trial court erred by either allowing improper evidence to be admitted or refusing to admit proper evidence. Loren counters that the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of the evidence were correct and that, even if the trial court erred, the errors were not prejudicial.

1. Standard of Review

The trial court has discretion in determining whether or not evidence is admissible. MMOE v. MJE, 841 P.2d 820, 828 (Wyo.1992). We will reverse a trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence only if the trial court abused its discretion. Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo.1995). "A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could [have] reasonably conclude[d] as it did." Hilterbrand v. State, 930 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wyo.1997).

Our court rules and case law direct us to disregard errors that are harmless and do not affect the parties' substantial rights. W.R.C.P. 61; W.R.A.P. 9.04; W.R.E. 103; see also Waggoner v. General Motors Corporation, 771 P.2d 1195, 1202 (Wyo.1989). "An error warrants reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial rights." Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 439-40 (Wyo.1995). For an error to be prejudicial, it must " 'cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process' [or possess] '... a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.' " Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1188 (Wyo.1994) (quoting Gluckauf v. Pine Lake Beach Club, Inc., 78 N.J.Super. 8, 187 A.2d 357, 366 (N.J.Super.1963)). See also Ahearn v. Tri-County Federal Savings Bank, 948 P.2d 896, 898 (Wyo.1997).

2. Hearsay

The Clarks maintain that, over their objections, the trial court allowed various witnesses to testify concerning Leona's statements. They claim that these statements were inadmissible hearsay and that the admission of the statements was prejudicial to them.

At the trial, Loren related Leona's statement that she did not know where Ramona was. Loren and Ramona both testified that Leona made statements to the effect that she was not aware of how Bob was handling her funds. Ramona also testified that Leona said Bob could live in the apartment for as long as he needed to live there. Loren elicited similar testimony from one of Leona's neighbors who testified concerning the statements Leona made about her loving feelings for Bob and his right to remain in the apartment.

The Clarks contend that the admission of this testimony was prejudicial to them because the testimony showed that confidential relationships existed between Bob and Leona and between Suzanne and Leona and that Bob and Suzanne exercised undue influence over Leona. Bob and Suzanne argue further that the testimony was prejudicial because it showed that Bob was not entitled to Leona's house and that Leona did not, therefore, ratify Bernice's execution of the quitclaim deed.

Hearsay is defined as being "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." W.R.E. 801(c). Hearsay generally is not admissible unless the evidence falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. W.R.E. 802 to 804; see also Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190, 195 (Wyo.1995)....

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