Clark v. Harford Agricultural & Breeders' Ass'n
| Decision Date | 15 November 1912 |
| Citation | 85 A. 503,118 Md. 608 |
| Parties | CLARK, Sheriff, v. HARFORD AGRICULTURAL & BREEDERS' ASS'N. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Harford County; Wm. H. Harlan, Judge.
Suit by the Harford Agricultural & Breeders' Association against William L. Clark, sheriff. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, BURKE, THOMAS PATTISON, and STOCKBRIDGE, JJ.
Edgar Allan Poe, Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Philip H. Close and S. A. Williams, both of Bel Air, for appellee.
On the 24th of September, 1912, the Harford Agricultural & Breeders' Association, a corporation duly incorporated under the general laws of the state, and the plaintiff below filed the bill in this case for an injunction to restrain the defendant Wm. L. Clark, the sheriff of Harford county, from interfering with the plaintiff corporation or any of its officers in the conduct of a race meeting being held at the time near Havre de Grace, in Harford county, and from arresting any person or persons engaged in taking bets or in bookmaking or in betting at this meeting. The application for injunction was set for hearing on the bill, and after argument by counsel for the plaintiff and defendant an injunction was directed on the same day to be issued in accordance with the prayer of the bill. By an agreement of counsel filed in the case, it was agreed that the bill of complaint should be considered as amended by adding to the end of paragraph 11 the following: "And that, in fact the members of said racing commission did not take and subscribe the oath prescribed by section 6 of article 1 of the Constitution." The docket entries as set out in the record contain the following entries: No point, however, was made at the hearing in this court upon the state of the pleadings or the scope of the order for injunction; but as the decision of the case will ultimately turn upon the validity or invalidity of Acts 1912, c. 132, and the validity of the racing commission, as constituted by the act, we shall proceed to consider the questions of law raised on the record, and by the various contentions of the parties to the suit.
The facts of the case appearing from the record that are necessary to be stated for the purposes of this opinion are these:
At the January session, 1912, of the General Assembly of Maryland, an act was passed (chapter 132, Acts 1912), the title of which is as follows: "An act to provide for the regulation, control and licensing of horse racing within Harford county, to create the Harford county racing commission and prescribe its powers and duties, to provide license fees for the conduct of horse racing within said county and to repeal sections 204, 205 and 206 of art. 27, of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, of 1904 title 'Crimes and Punishments' subtitle 'Gaming,' said section 206 having been amended by chapter 127, of the Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland of 1906, so far as said sections apply to Harford county." It appears from the record, and it is admitted by the pleadings in the case, that the plaintiff is a Maryland corporation, and organized for the purpose of conducting, driving, and running races and maintaining a race track in Harford county and other kinds of public exhibitions, not prohibited by law. It further appears that four members of the racing commission named by the act accepted their appointment, and on the 10th of May, 1912, met and duly organized under the law; that one, Robert C. Richardson, named as a member of the commission, declined to serve, but on the 2d day of September, 1912, Lewis J. Williams was elected as his successor, and has since that date acted as a member of the commission; that James T. Jones was elected president and Thomas C. Hopkins was made secretary and treasurer of the commission, and are now acting as such officers, but, in fact, the members of the commission did not take and subscribe the oath prescribed by section 6 of article 1 of the Constitution.
The bill avers that on the 20th day of May, 1912, the plaintiff applied to the racing commission for a license to hold race meetings under the act, and on the 14th day of August a license was granted it to hold meetings on the dates named therein. The bill further avers that the plaintiff, in pursuance of the permission and the privilege granted by the license, and in preparation for the race meeting, purchased a large piece of land in the second election district of Hanford county, and expended a sum in excess of $80,000 in preparing the land for the race meeting, that the meetings were opened on the 24th of August, 1912, and continued successfully until and including the 21st of September, 1912. The bill also avers that amongst other privileges sold during the meeting was the privilege to bookmakers, of whom there are more than 20, to conduct betting or pool selling on the races, and the privilege was to continue during the 30 days of the meetings; that the owners of horses were induced to send their horses to the meetings by the stakes and purses which were advertised by the plaintiff, and the privileges granted to the bookmakers and others were valuable and brought revenues to the plaintiff because of the length of the meeting, and each day of the continuance of the meeting is important in enabling the plaintiff to fill its engagements with the horse owners and renters of the privileges. By the seventh paragraph of the bill it is averred that for the privilege of conducting the meetings the plaintiff has paid to the said racing commission a large sum of money--that is to say, the sum of $4,470--and, in addition thereto, has paid to the treasurer of Harford county the sum of $2,479.05, the same being 5 per cent. of the gate receipts at the meetings up to and including the 21st day of September, as required by the act, and the plaintiff has, in all respects, complied with the law and all other laws of the state of Maryland, and is entitled under the license to complete its meetings and to conduct its races and permit betting up to and including the 30th day of September.
The bill then charges that the law officers of the state have advised the defendant, the sheriff of Harford county, that the racing meetings of the plaintiff are illegally held, and that betting and bookmaking is illegally permitted upon its grounds because the members of the commission failed to qualify by taking the oath required by the Constitution of the state, and that, therefore, the members of the commission refused to accept the office, and all their acts are void; that the defendant has been instructed to cause the arrest of all persons betting, conducting betting, bookmaking, or pool selling at the meeting, and of the officers of the plaintiff who permit the same. The bill also avers that it will work an irreparable injury for reasons alleged in the bill should the plaintiff be prevented from holding the meetings for the remaining six days, and from permitting the exercise of the privileges which have been granted and let by it, and that the plaintiff is without remedy at law as against these threatened wrongs and trespass, and is entitled to the interposition of a court of equity by the writ of injunction to prevent the same.
The prayer of the bill is: (1) that the plaintiff's rights under the license mentioned may be established; (2) that the validity of the acts of the Harford county racing commission may be determined and established; (3) that the defendant and all persons acting by and under him may be restrained by injunction from interfering with the plaintiff or its officers in the conduct of the race meeting, and from arresting any person or persons engaged in taking bets or in bookmaking or in betting at the meeting; (4) and for all such other and further relief as its case may require.
Having thus fully set out the facts of the case as made by the bill, we come now to consider the questions of law as presented on the appeal.
There can be no doubt, it seems to us, upon both principle and authority, that a court of equity has jurisdiction to grant an injunction to stay and restrain a criminal proceeding where it is necessary to protect property rights, and where those rights would be destroyed by such prosecution. In Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 241, 25 S.Ct. 22 49 L.Ed. 169, it is said: The doctrine announced in Dobbins v. Los Angeles, supra, is well-settled law and established by numerous cases and text-writers. Davis F. Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 217, 23 S.Ct. 498, 47 L.Ed. 778; Daly v. Elton, 195 U.S. 242, 25 S.Ct. 22, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial