Clark v. Harry
Decision Date | 13 March 1944 |
Citation | 182 Va. 410,29 S.E.2d 231 |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | CLARK et al. v. HARRY. |
Error to Circuit Court, Giles County; A. C. Buchanan, Judge.
Action of unlawful detainer by Rosel Clark and others against Sid Harry, originally instituted in trial justice court. To review a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs bring error.
Reversed and final judgment.
Before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HUD-GINS, GREGORY, BROWNING, EGGLESTON, and SPRATLEY, JJ.
Sherman Ballard, of Peterstown, W. Va., and W. B. Snidow, of Pearisburg, for plaintiffs in error.
J. L. Dillow, of Narrows, for defendant in error.
On October 8, 1936, Minnie Clark, Bertha Clark and Rosel Clark, the plaintiffs in error, who owned a 250-acre farm in Giles county, Virginia, entered into the following written contract with respect thereto with Sid Harry the defendant in error:
Shortly after the execution of the agreement, Harry moved upon the Clark lands and carried on farming operations, pursuant to the terms of the contract, until the fall of 1942. In the latter part of November of that year, and after Harry had sowed seven acres of wheat, the Clarks orally notified him that they did not wish to renew the contract for another year and that they desired that he vacate the farm. On January 23, 1943, the Clarks notified Harry, in writing, to vacate the property on the following February 28. Harry refused to do so and the Clarks instituted in the trial justice court of Giles county an action of unlawful detainer against him. This action resulted in a judgment for the defendant and the Clarks appealed to the Circuit Court of Giles county. There the case was heard by the court, without a jury, upon the written agreement to which we have referred and a stipulation of facts, the essentials of which have been set out. The lower court likewise found for the defendant, and from that judgment the Clarks have sought and obtained this writ of error.
The Clarks contend that the effect of the contract was to create between them and Harry the relationship of master and servant, or employer and employee, which, theysay, they had the right to terminate at any time.
Harry contends that the contract created the relationship of landlord and tenant between the Clarks and himself; that when he held the premises from year to year he became their yearly tenant; and that this tenancy could be terminated by the Clarks only upon their giving him three months' written notice required by Code, § 5516. Apparently this was the view adopted by the trial court.
Contracts of this character are quite common throughout the United States, and there are innumerable cases dealing with them.1 It is, of course, well settled that there may be a lease of land so as to create the relation of landlord and tenant, although the rent is to be paid in a share of the crops raised. It is equally well settled that a person may be employed to cultivate land, receiving as his compensation a share of the crops, without the relationship of landlord and tenant being created between the parties. Such an employee is termed a "cropper." 15 Am.Jur, Crops, § 49, p. 239; Annotation: 98 Am. St.Rep. 953.
In Smith v. Pavne, 153 Va. 746, 757, 758, 151 S.E. 295, 299, we approved this definition of a lease found in 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d Ed., 597: "A lease is a contract for the possession and profits of lands and tenements on the one side, and the recompense of rent or property on the other; or, in other words, a conveyance to a person for life, years, or at will, in consideration of a return of rent or other recompense." A lease is, as we there pointed out, "an estate for life, for years, or for some lesser term." One who occupies or is in possession of the premises of another under a lease is a tenant.
On the other hand, a cropper is a person employed by the landowner to cultivate the land and to raise a crop thereon. He receives for his labor a share of the crop which he produces and harvests, or the proceeds thereof, but he has no estate in the land and his possession thereof is that of the landowner. He is as much a servant or employee as if his wages were fixed and payable in money, and his possession of the crop is only that of a servant, which in the law is that of the landowner. 15 Am. Jur, Crops, § 45, pp. 236, 237; Annotation: 98 Am.St.Rep. 953-956.
Mr. Graves, in his Notes on Real Property, 1912 Ed, § 50, p. 59, cites with approval this language from Mr. Freeman's note in 37 Am.Dec. 317, 320: See also, 98 Am.St.Rep. 953, 954.
While these legal principles are clear enough, frequently they are...
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