Clark v. Heffner
| Decision Date | 16 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:13CV108 NAB,2:13CV108 NAB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
| Parties | HAROLD CLARK, Plaintiff, v. DON HEFFNER, et al., Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of Harold Clark (registration no. 1083053), an inmate at Maryville Treatment Center, for leave to commence this action without payment of the required filing fee. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $38.70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Furthermore, after reviewing the complaint, the Court will dismiss this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of thegreater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison account statement. A review of plaintiff's account indicates an average monthly deposit of $193.50, and an average monthly balance of less than that. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $38.70, which is 20 percent of plaintiff's average monthly deposit.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). An action is malicious if it is undertaken for the purpose of harassingthe named defendants and not for the purpose of vindicating a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd 826 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009). These include "legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51. This is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the "mere possibility of misconduct." Id. The Court must review the factual allegations in the complaint "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. at 1951. When faced with alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may exercise its judgment indetermining whether plaintiff's proffered conclusion is the most plausible or whether it is more likely that no misconduct occurred. Id. at 1950, 1951-52.
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several officials at Moberly Correctional Center ("MCC") and the Southeast Correctional Center ("SECC"). Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the issuance of a conduct violation for allegedly adding "spit, cock hairs and boogers" to the food at MCC, and his subsequent placement in administrative segregation caused him to lose "good time credits" and his "conditional release date." Plaintiff asserts that as a result of these occurrences he was also transferred to SECC because his custody level increased.
At SECC, plaintiff was again placed in administrative segregation, and he remained there for one year and four months. Plaintiff names defendants Thompson, Buhs, McKay, Seabaugh, Vinson, Clifton, Buchanan, Wallace, Stange, and Clark as the individuals for his placement in administrative segregation and states in a conclusory fashion that his due process rights were denied when he was kept in administrative segregation at SECC.1
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the purported actions of the named defendants violated his constitutional rights because he was found guilty of a violation of the Missouri Department of Correction's rules, "given a conduct violation," had his "good time credits" taken away and this, in turn, caused an extension of his "conditional release date."
Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because judgment in favor of plaintiff would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994); Simmons v. O'Brien, 77 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 1996). When a prisoner seeks damages for an illegal conviction, imprisonment, or other act that would "necessarily" render his conviction or sentence invalid, the prisoner must first prove the conviction or sentence has been invalidated through appropriate channels. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiff's claims are not ripe until his underlying conviction or sentence has been set aside.
Likewise, where a state prisoner seeks damages and declaratory relief in an action challenging the validity of procedures used to deprive him of good-time credits or which otherwise affect his out-date, and the challenge to the procedures necessarily implies that the punishment imposed was invalid (i.e., necessarily implies that the denial of good-time credits was invalid), the claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997); Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002). To challenge his state conviction or sentence in federal court, plaintiff must petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 501 (1973) (). Before seeking federal habeas relief, plaintiff must exhaust all adequate and available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982); Powell v. Wyrick, 657 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981). The state courts must have an opportunity to review the merits of plaintiff's contentions and must be given primary responsibility in their own criminal cases. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391(1963); Tyler v. Swenson, 527 F.2d 877 (8th Cir.1976).
Moreover, the Court notes that inmates do not have a liberty interest in conditional release. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (). Inmates only have a constitutional liberty interest in conditional release if such an interest is created by state statute. Id. Missouri does not by statute create a liberty interest in conditionalrelease. Adams v. Agniel, 405 F.3d 643, 644 (8th Cir.2005); Johnson v. Missouri Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 92 S.W.3d 107, 113-14 (Mo.App.2002); Dace v. Mickelson, 816 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (8th Cir. 1987). Because Missouri inmates have no liberty interest in conditional release, they also have no liberty interest in any condition or conditions imposed as a part of their grant of conditional release. See Patterson v. Webster, 760 F.Supp. 150, 153 (E.D.Mo.1991) (). Further, even if the condition imposed on plaintiff's parole violated state law or the institutional policies and procedures of the Missouri Department of Corrections, plaintiff has no liberty interest in defendants following such state law, policies or procedures. Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir.2003) (citing Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir.1996)). As such, plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted relating to his asserting regarding the loss of his "good time credits" and his "conditional release date."
In order to determine whether plaintiff "possesses a liberty interest, [the Court must] compare the conditions to which [plaintiff] was exposed in segregation with those he . . . could 'expect to experience as an ordinary incident of prison life.'" Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Beverati v. Smith, 120F.3d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1997)). In this context, the Court "do[es] not consider the procedures used to confine the inmate in segregation." Id. (citing Kennedy v. Bankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1996)). For plaintiff "to assert a liberty interest, he must show some difference between [t...
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