Clark v. Ingram-Day Lumber Company
Decision Date | 20 May 1907 |
Citation | 43 So. 813,90 Miss. 479 |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Parties | JESSE B. CLARK v. INGRAM-DAY LUMBER COMPANY |
March 1907
FROM the circuit court of Harrison county, HON. WILLIAM H. HARDY Judge.
The lumber company, the appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; Clark, the appellant, was defendant there. From a judgment in plaintiff's favor defendant appealed to the supreme court.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.
Case reversed and remanded. Case reversed and remanded.
W. G Evans, and H. Bloomfield, for appellant.
The appellee had no right of action against the appellant for the reason that the controlling clause in the timber lease plainly means what it expressly declares, which clause is couched in the following words:
"It is further agreed to give the Gulf Coast Lumber Company three years to remove the saw logs from the above described land from the 21st day of July, 1903"; therefore the time expired on the 21st day of July, 1906, and the proposition contended for by appellees that under the lease appellees had the right to remove the saw logs after the 21st of July 1906, or to claim any property in them is utterly untenable.
There is nothing more certain than that the three years clause mentioned in the timber lease, fixes by a contract the expiration of the right of appellee to remove the saw logs from the land.
It is well settled that "The intention must prevail." Robinson v. Payne, 58 Miss. 692; Hall v. Eastman, etc., Co., 89 Miss. 588; S.C., 43 So. 2.
Money & Graham, for appellee.
The right of appellee to remove personal property consisting of logs cut and manufactured from the land before the time expired, after July 21, 1906, is quite different from the right and title in the logs themselves cut on the land that date. Hoit v. Stratton Mills (N. H.), 20 Am. Rep., 124.
We think counsel mistake the holding of this court in the Hall v. Eastman case, 89. Miss. 588, S.C., 43 So. 2. There was an express provision in that deed that it should be null and void at the expiration of the time mentioned therein, which the court declared was the controlling provision in the instrument, and that no question of forfeiture was involved in the case; beyond the question just stated there was no other in the case except to decide that the grantee in that deed should commence cutting within a reasonable time, the parties not having provided for it. There is no analogy between the instruments in that case and this, a priori, none between the points involved in the two. If the court in that case intended to express any opinion or leaning upon the questions involved in this case, by the citations therein of the cases from Minnesota, Mathews v. Mulvey, Maine, Pease v. Gibson, Michigan, Ferguson v. Arthur, Georgia, McRae v. Stillwell, Perkins v. Peterson, we call attention to the later cases from the same states in favor of our contention, to-wit: Alexander v. Bauer (Minn.), 102 N.W. 387; Erskine v. Savage (Maine), 51 A. 242; Hodges v. Buell (Mich.), 95 N.W. 1078; Johnson v. Truitt (Ga.), 50 S.E. 135; Null v. Elliott (Ga.), 43 S.E. 173.
There is a line of strong authorities in Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Alabama, holding in construing conveyances of standing timber not materially distinguishable from the one at bar, that the title to the timber conveyed is absolute, and remains in the grantee, even as to the standing timber, or trees, after the time limit mentioned in the instrument has passed--though without legal right in the grantee to enter the close of the grantor to take and remove the trees left standing on the land without objection himself to such damages as he might cause should he do so. And while it is possibly not necessary for the court here to hold to the extent these cases have gone, in this case, yet the cases below are cited separately to call the court's attention to the middle ground occupied by appellee in the case at bar, and we believe that there will hardly be found a case wherein, under the same facts and instruments that we have here, it is held against appellee's position. The cases above referred to are the following: Halstead v. Jessup (Ind.), 49 N.E. 821; Hoit v. Stratton Mills (N. H.), 54 N.H. 109, 20 Am. Rep., 119; Irons v. Webb (N. J.), 41 N.J.L. 203, 32 Am. Rep., 193; Hodges v. Buell (Mich.), 95 N.W. 1078; Bennett v. Victor Lumber Co., 28 Pa. Sup. Ct., 495; Magnetic Ore Co. v. Marbury (Ala.), 104 Ala. 465, 16 So. 636, as construed in Zimmerman Mfg. Co. v. Daffin, 42 So. 858 (Ala.)
The leading case cited adversely to the views announced in Zimmerman Mfg. Co. v. Daffin, supra, is the early case of Pease v. Gibson, 6 Me., 81, construed in Webster v. Proctor, 36 A. 631, by the supreme court of Maine in 1896, which uses language as follows:
In McIntire v. Bernard, 1 Sand. Ch., 52 (Me.), decided upon the authority of Pease v. Gibson, there was a grant of all the pine timber standing and lying on a certain tract of land, with the right of entering upon the land until a certain date to cut and remove the timber. It was held that the grantee had no right nor interest in the standing pine timber after that date, and must account for all cut and removed thereafter.
In Donworth v. Sawyer (Me., 1900), 47 A. 521, which was a case in trover, it is said:
Citing Dunn v. Burleigh, 62 Me. 24; Hoit v. Stratton Mills, 54 N.H. 109; Howe v. Bachelor, 49 N.H. 204; Pulmer v. Prescott, 43 N.H. 277; Heflin v. Bingham, 56 Ala. 566; Clap v. Draper, 4 Mass. 2666; White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 375.
In Emerson v. Shore, 49 A. (Me.), 1051, decided in 1901, the same doctrine is announced as that stated in Erskine v. Savage, 51 A. 242 (Me., 1901), as follows:
The Case of Pease v. Gibson, with a number of others, is cited, and it will therefore be seen that while the case of Pease v. Gibson may be considered as holding contrary to the cases above cited by use, it is not against our contention in this case that the timber, having been severed from the soil by the appellee within the period mentioned in the Cowart deed, had become its property by converting the same into personalty.
The question at bar is not as to standing timber, however, but to the logs in controversy in this suit, which were cut down and manufactured into saw logs by appellee before July 21, 1906.
Cutting the trees from the land and converting them into saw logs constitutes a "removal" within the terms of the deed. Macomber v. Detroit L. & N. R. Co. (Mich.), 66 N.W. 376; Hodge v. Buell, 95 N.W. (Mich.), 1078; Golden v. Glock (Wis.), 15 N.W. 12; Hicks v. Smith (Wis.), 46 N.W. 133. And they became appellee's property. Heard v. James, 49 Mass. 236.
The title has never been divested out of appellee, unless the expiration of the three years' provision in the deed divests it. That provision is totally unlike the provision in the instrument in the case of Hall v. Eastman, Gardiner & Co., supra, as before stated.
That the title has never divested out of appellee as to said logs is fully sustained by the following authorities: Pulmer v. Prescott, 43 N.H. 277 (N. H.); Hoit v. Stratton Mills, 20 Am. Rep., 119 (N. H.); Iron v. Webb, 32 Am. Rep., 193 (N. J.); Alexander v. Bauer, 102 N.W. 387 (Minn.); Hodges v. Buell, 95 N.W. 1078 (Mich.); Macomber v. Detroit L. & N. R. Co., 66 N.W. 376 (Mich.); Golden v. Glock, 15 N.W. 12 (Wis.); Halstead v. Jessup, 49 N.E. 821 (Ind.); Erskine v. Savage, 51 A. 242 (Me.); Johnson v. Truitt, 50 S.E. 135 (Ga.); Giles v. Simmonds, 15 Gray, 44, 77 Am. Dec., 373 (Mass.), and especially Zimmerman Mfg. Co. v. Daffin, 42 So. 358 (Ala.). This is the latest...
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