Clark v. Jeter
Decision Date | 06 June 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 87-5565,87-5565 |
Citation | 486 U.S. 456,108 S.Ct. 1910,100 L.Ed.2d 465 |
Parties | Cherlyn CLARK, Petitioner v. Gene JETER |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Ten years after her illegitimate daughter's birth, petitioner filed a support complaint on the daughter's behalf in a Pennsylvania state court, naming respondent as the father. Although a blood test showed a 99.3% probability that respondent was the father, the court entered judgment for respondent on the basis of a state statute providing that actions to establish the paternity of an illegitimate child ordinarily must be commenced within six years of the child's birth. The court rejected petitioner's contentions that the statute violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. While petitioner's appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania was pending, the State adopted an 18-year statute of limitations for paternity actions, in order to comply with a requirement of the federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 (federal Act). The Superior Court concluded, however, that the new 18-year statute of limitations did not apply retroactively, and that the 6-year period would continue to apply in cases like petitioner's. The court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the 6-year statute of limitations was constitutional.
Held:
1. Petitioner's contention that the 6-year statute of limitations is invalid because it conflicts with an asserted retroactivity requirement in the federal Act will not be addressed by this Court, since the question of federal pre-emption was not adequately presented to the Superior Court by petitioner's state-law retroactivity argument, and was not decided by that court. Pp. 459-460.
2. The 6-year statute of limitations violates the Equal Protection Clause. Under the heightened scrutiny analysis used in evaluating equal protection challenges to statutes of limitations that apply to illegitimate children's paternity suits, the period for obtaining support must be sufficiently long to present a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in illegitimate children to assert claims on their behalf, and any time limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially related to the State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 102 S.Ct. 1549, 91 L.Ed.2d 770; Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2199, 76 L.Ed.2d 372. Under this analysis, it is questionable whether Pennsylvania's 6-year period is reasonable, since a mother may for years after her child's birth be unwilling to assert a claim due to her relationship with the natural father, the emotional strain of having an illegitimate child, or the desire to avoid community and family disapproval; since such a mother might realize only belatedly a loss of income attributable to the need to care for the child; and since financial difficulties are likely to increase as the child matures and incurs additional expenses. Moreover, that the 6-year period is not substantially related to an interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims is established by a number of Pennsylvania statutes, including the 18-year statute of limitations, that permit paternity to be litigated more than six years after an illegitimate child's birth; and by the fact that increasingly sophisticated scientific tests facilitate the establishing of paternity regardless of the child's age. Pp. 460-465.
358 Pa.Super. 550, 518 A.2d 276, reversed and remanded.
Evalynn Welling, Pittsburgh, Pa., for petitioner.
Craig A. McClean, Pittsburgh, Pa., for respondent.
Under Pennsylvania law, an illegitimate child must prove paternity before seeking support from his or her father, and a suit to establish paternity ordinarily must be brought within six years of an illegitimate child's birth. By contrast, a legitimate child may seek support from his or her parents at any time. We granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of this legislative scheme.
On September 22, 1983, petitioner Cherlyn Clark filed a support complaint in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas on behalf of her minor daughter, Tiffany, who was born out of wedlock on June 11, 1973. Clark named respondent Gene Jeter as Tiffany's father. The court ordered blood tests, which showed a 99.3% probability that Jeter is Tiffany's father.
Jeter moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was barred by the 6-year statute of limitations for paternity actions.* In her response, Clark contended that this statute is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the alternative, she argued that the statute was tolled by fraudulent and misleading actions of the welfare department, or by threats and assaults by Jeter.
The trial court upheld the statute of limitations on the authority of Astemborski v. Susmarski, 499 Pa. 99, 451 A.2d 1012 (1982), vacated, 462 U.S. 1127, 103 S.Ct. 3105, 77 L.Ed.2d 1360 (1983), reinstated on remand, 502 Pa. 409, 466 A.2d 1018 (1983). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court there had considered and rejected constitutional challenges similar to Clark's. The trial court also rejected Clark's argument that the statute should be tolled, specifically finding that any fear that Clark may have had of Jeter had subsided more than six years before she filed her support complaint. Therefore, the trial court entered judgment for Jeter.
Clark appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, again raising her constitutional challenges to the 6-year statute of limitations. Before the court decided her case, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted an 18-year statute of limitations for actions to establish paternity. Act of Oct. 30, 1985, No. 66, § 1, subch. C, 1985 Pa.Laws 270, codified at 23 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 4343(b) (1985). Pennsylvania thereby brought its law into compliance with a provision of the federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 that requires all States participating in the federal child support program to have procedures to establish the paternity of any child who is less than 18 years old. 98 Stat. 1307, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). The Superior Court concluded, however, that Pennsylvania's new 18-year statute of limitations did not apply retroactively, and that it would not revive Clark's cause of action in any event. 358 Pa.Super. 550, 518 A.2d 276 (1986). It affirmed the trial court's conclusions that the 6-year statute of limitations was constitutional, and that Clark's tolling argument was without merit. Thereafter, the Superior Court denied Clark's motion for reargument. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied her petition for allowance of appeal. We granted Clark's petition for certiorari. 484 U.S. 1003, 108 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed.2d 646 (1988).
Clark's first argument to this Court is that Pennsylvania's 6-year statute of limitations is invalid because it conflicts with the federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, which she says require States to adopt retroactive 18-year statutes of limitations in paternity cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). Because this argument raises an issue of statutory interpretation, we ordinarily would address it before reaching the constitutional claims. Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 2359, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982); see Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 285, 291, 92 S.Ct. 502, 507-08, 30 L.Ed.2d 448 (1971). Having reviewed the record, however, we find that Clark did not adequately present a federal pre-emption argument to the lower courts. It is our practice, when reviewing decisions by state courts, not to decide federal claims that were not "pressed or passed upon" below. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 79-80, 108 S.Ct. 1645, ----, 100 L.Ed.2d 62 (1988).
The Pennsylvania Legislature passed the 18-year statute of limitations on October 30, 1985. At that time, Clark already had filed her brief on appeal to the Superior Court. Clark immediately suggested a remand to determine the retroactivity of the new Pennsylvania statute. But the Superior Court instead itself decided that the 6-year statute of limitations would continue to apply to cases like Clark's. The court reasoned that, under Pennsylvania law, a statute is retroactive only if the legislature clearly and manifestly so intends, and it found insufficient evidence of such an intent. The decision did not address the relevance of the federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments to the continuing validity of the 6-year statute of limitations. 358 Pa.Super., at 553-555, 518 A.2d 278.
In her application for reargument in the Superior Court and in her petition for appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Clark argued that the Superior Court had overlooked Pennsylvania cases which had applied similar statutes of limitations retroactively, as well as indications that the federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments required States to adopt retroactive 18-year statutes of limitations or their equivalent. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5) (1982 ed., Supp. III); 50 Fed.Reg. 19608, 19631 (1985). But Clark did not expressly assert that the 6-year statute of limitations was pre-empted by the new federal law. We interpret Clark's argument to be that the Pennsylvania Legislature intended to comply with the new conditions on the federal spending program, which arguably showed that it clearly and manifestly intended its new statute to be retroactive. This question of how to interpret the Pennsylvania statute ultimately is a matter of state law. We find that Clark's argument below was not adequate to raise a federal pre-emption claim. Accordingly, we do not address it here and proceed to her equal protection claim.
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