Clark v. Johnson
| Citation | 202 F.3d 760 |
| Decision Date | 28 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-11113,98-11113 |
| Parties | (5th Cir. 2000) JACK WADE CLARK, Petitioner-Appellant, V. GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Jack Wade Clark, a Texas death row inmate, whose petition for habeas corpus relief and request for a Certificate of Appealability ("COA") from the denial thereof were both denied by the federal district court below, now seeks a COA from this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). For all of the reasons set forth below, we deny the request for a COA.
According to his own written confession, which was admitted at trial, Clark observed the decedent, Melisa Ann Garcia, making a telephone call at a public telephone in the early morning hours of October 15, 1989. He approached her, asked her for a light, walked around the corner to wait for her to finish her call, and then stabbed her in the shoulder as she completed her call. He then forced her into her own car, drove it away, and subsequently sexually assaulted her. All the while, the decedent was passing in and out of consciousness. After sexually assaulting her, he stabbed her again in the heart, drove her car and parked it near his house, cleaned the knife, and hid it in the attic.
Clark's confession was also supported by the testimony of a high school honor roll student, who was incarcerated with Clark while he was in the Lubbock County Jail, and in whom Clark had confided regarding his involvement in the murder. The witness testified that Clark, in a bragging tone, described how he had asked the victim for a lighter, stabbed her, forced her into the car, drove her somewhere, and "screwed her through her mouth, her ass, and her pussy." Clark further explained to the witness that he stabbed her again so that she could not identify him, and that he had ground the knife down so that it could not be identified as the murder weapon. There was no evidence that the witness received any benefit for coming forward with Clark's jailhouse confession some six weeks after the witness was released from jail.
The state's pathologist confirmed both of the stab wounds as well as the injuries which were indicative of sexual assault, i.e. traumatized external genitalia, a laceration on the remainder of the hymen, and abrasions, contusions, and swelling of the vaginal area. Additionally, the pathologist testified that the decedent's anus was dilated, indicating post mortem distention. The evidence presented at trial also included testimony that the knife later retrieved from Clark showed evidence of recent grinding.
The defense presented no evidence whatsoever during the guilt phase of the trial and waived argument.
Clark pleaded not guilty and was tried before a jury on the charge of capital murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit sexual assault. On February 15, 1991, the jury returned a guilty verdict and on February 21, 1991, during the sentencing phase, the same jury returned answers in the affirmative to the two special issues in the applicable version of article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the trial court imposed upon Clark the sentence of death.
Clark's conviction and sentence were automatically appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On March 9, 1994, that court affirmed Clark's conviction and sentence. See Clark v. State, 881 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc). And on February 21, 1995, the Supreme Court denied Clark's petition for writ of certiorari. See Clark v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1114 (1995).
Clark then filed an application for state habeas relief. The same judge who had presided over Clark's criminal trial entered findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending denial of Clark's state habeas petition. On June 10, 1998, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied Clark's application for state habeas corpus relief. Clark then filed his petition for habeas corpus relief in federal district court. The Texas Attorney General answered Clark's federal petition and moved for summary judgment. On August 25, 1998, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed Clark's petition for writ of habeas corpus with prejudice. On September 25, 1998, the district court denied Clark's request for a COA on each of the issues raised herein.
Clark seeks a COA from this Court on each of the following issues: (1) whether summary judgment is an appropriate mechanism for the disposition of petitions for habeas corpus relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254; (2) whether Clark was afforded an adequate opportunity to develop the factual basis underlying his claims for relief, i.e. whether he was entitled to discovery and an evidentiary hearing before summary judgment would have been appropriate; (3) whether the district court erred in deferring to state court findings regarding his claims A, B, C, E, and F, because he had not been afforded the opportunity to develop the underlying factual basis for those claims at an evidentiary hearing; (4) whether the district court erred in failing to grant a continuance so as to permit Clark to develop the underlying factual basis of his claims; (5) whether the district court erred in denying Clark the appointment of an expert in forensic pathology to help develop his claims; (6) whether the district court erred in deferring to as reasonable the state habeas court's findings regarding his claims that a juror failed to disclose the extent of her relationship with the prosecutor thus violating his due process rights; and (7) whether the trial court's failure to define "mitigating evidence" in the punishment charge to the jury unconstitutionally denied Clark an appropriate vehicle for consideration of such evidence.
Clark's petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on June 22, 1998, and is thus governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997); United States v. Carter, 117 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 1997). Under AEDPA, before an appeal from the dismissal or denial of a 2254 habeas petition can proceed, the petitioner must first obtain a COA, which will issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). We have held that a petitioner makes a "substantial showing" when he demonstrates that his petition involves issues which are debatable among jurists of reason, that another court could resolve the issues differently, or that the issues are suitable enough to deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 755 (5th Cir. 1996) overruled in part on other grounds, Lindh, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The same standards which governed issuance of the pre-AEDPA version of the COA, the certificate of probable cause ("CPC"), apply to requests for a COA. See id. at 756.
The post-AEDPA version of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) provides as follows:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. 2254(d). We review pure questions of law under the "contrary to" standard of subsection (d)(1), mixed question of law and fact under the "unreasonable application" standard of subsection (d)(1), and pure questions of fact under the "unreasonable determination of facts" standard of subsection (d)(2). See Lamb v. Johnson, 179 F.3d 352, 356 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 767-69), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 522, 145 L.Ed.2d 401(1999).
An application of law to facts will not be deemed unreasonable, unless reasonable jurists "would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect." Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 769. And under this standard, we will grant habeas relief "only if a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists." Id. Additionally, under 2254(e)(1), a state court's determination of a factual issue must be presumed correct, and the habeas petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. The presumption is especially strong when the state habeas court and the trial court are one in the same. See Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 347 (5th Cir. 1995); James v. Collins, 987 F.2d 1116, 1122 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Buxton v. Lynaugh, 879 F.2d 140, 146 (5th Cir. 1989)).
And while the nature of the penalty in a capital case is an appropriate consideration for determining whether to issue a COA, the severity of the penalty at issue does not, in and of itself, require the issuance of a COA. See Lamb, 179 F.3d at 356. However, in capital cases, doubts as to whether a COA should issue must be resolved in favor of the petitioner. See id.; see also Buxton v. Collins, 925 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1991). Bearing the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to consider those issues raised by Clark in his request for a COA.
Clark first contends that he is entitled to a COA on the basis that summary judgment is not contemplated by 28...
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