Clark v. Langenbach
Decision Date | 14 May 1904 |
Docket Number | 1,273. |
Citation | 130 F. 755 |
Parties | CLARK v. LANGENBACH et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
The court below gave to the jury the following charge:
'Gentlemen of the Jury: The first question submitted to you is this When this action was brought, did the property sought to be recovered exceed in value the sum of two thousand dollars? If you believe from the preponderance of the evidence that the said property was then of the value only of two thousand dollars or less, you will return your verdict in this form: 'We of the jury find that the property sued for did not, when this action was brought, exceed in value the sum of two thousand dollars.' And if that is your verdict it will conclude your labors. I have so charged you because, unless the value of the property sued for then exceeded two thousand dollars, this court will have no evidence that the value of the property sued for did then exceed in amount the sum of two thousand dollars, then and in that event, but only in that event, the court instructs and charges you to find for the plaintiffs, and if you do find for the plaintiffs the form of your verdict can be simply: 'We of the jury find for the plaintiffs.'
'I have stated in an opinion in writing, heretofore filed in the case, my views as to the proper construction of the terms of the plaintiffs' lease, and nothing has occurred to change the views then expressed. The lease by Mann to John A. Moore, A. C. Moore, and James & James, through whom the defendants claim, was made on September 2, 1901. The defendants' pleadings show conclusively, and the testimony is definite and positive, that the two leases covered the same tract of land; that it is located in the state of Kentucky, notwithstanding the word 'Ohio' in the plaintiffs' lease; and, speaking generally, both leases were for the mining and mineral privileges on that land. The defendants' pleadings manifest in the clearest way the immateriality of such use of the word, 'Ohio,' and that it was regarded and treated by the defendants as immaterial. See, on this point, the very satisfactory language of the court in Smith v. Brown, 34 Mich. 459. It is too late to change that position now.
'It is contended on behalf of the defendants that the covenants of the plaintiffs' lease have not been performed by the lessees, and therefore that Mann had the right to lease to Moore & James, although Mann has not been heard to make any complaint of any breach of those covenants, nor any claim to a right to re-enter therefor. The court is of opinion that all questions as to the payment of rents, royalties, and penalties, and also all questions as to the performance of the covenants of the contract of lease between plaintiffs and W. H. Mann, are matters to which the defendants are strangers, and with which they have nothing to do. Those questions could properly arise only between the plaintiffs and the person with whom such covenants were stipulated. It is obvious that the defendants are not parties to any of those stipulations. These are matters which we speak of as 'res inter alios acta.' They are transactions between persons other than any of the defendants, and therefore are not available for them.
'The court is furthermore of opinion that the lease to the plaintiffs was not capable of being annulled merely by a subsequent lease from Mann to other persons without the consent of the plaintiffs, and there is no sufficient proof that the witness Cox had any authority, orally or otherwise, to consent to any surrender or release of plaintiffs' interests in or possession of the land. There was no evidence of any re-entry by Mann for breach of any condition subsequent in the lease to plaintiffs, and merely making a later lease to others was not equivalent in law to a re-entry. The court, moreover, is of opinion that there was no sufficient evidence to show that Mann either desired or had the right to re-enter. I think the defendants have not shown any right of entry as against the plaintiffs, and, if so, and their entry was tortious.
Campbell & Campbell and C. L. & H. E. Jewett, for plaintiff in error.
Greer & Reed, for defendants in error.
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Casper Wyoming Theaters Co. v. Rex Inv. Co.
...(Ind.) 107 N.E. 484; Sec. 6621 C. S.; Judy v. Citizen, 101 Ind. 18; McIntyre v. Murphy, 153 Mich. 342. The entry was forcible, Clark v. Lagenbach, 130 F. 755; Donovan v. Chapter, (Mich.) 30 N.W. 329. The injunction operated to transfer the possession from plaintiffs in error to defendant in......
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