Clark v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 28 April 1919
• Docket Number: 296
• Parties: Clark, Appellant, v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

107 A. 858

264 Pa. 529

Clark, Appellant, v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co

No. 296

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

April 28, 1919

Argued April 14, 1919

Appeal, No. 296, Jan. T., 1919, by plaintiff, from judgment of C.P. Luzerne Co., May T., 1917, No. 811, dismissing appeal from Workmen's Compensation Board reversing an award of a referee in favor of a claimant in case of Bridget Clark v Lehigh Valley Coal Company. Reversed.

Appeal from decision of Workmen's Compensation Board.

The court dismissed the appeal. Claimant appealed.

Error assigned was the judgment dismissing the appeal.

The judgment of the common pleas and the order of the compensation board are both reversed; the award of the referee is reinstated and affirmed.

Roger J. Dever, for appellant, cited: Gurski v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 262 Pa. 1; Dzikowska v. The Superior Steel Co., 259 Pa. 578.

P. F O'Neill, with him F. W. Wheaton, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., MOSCHZISKER, FRAZER, SIMPSON and KEPHART, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE MOSCHZISKER:

Bridget Clark, widow of Patrick Clark, sought compensation for the death of her husband; the referee found in her favor, but the Workmen's Compensation Board reversed; the Common Pleas of Luzerne County affirmed the board, and claimant has appealed to this court.

The referee reported, inter alia, as follows: "The testimony in this case shows that Patrick Clark, the claimant's husband, was employed by defendant company in looking after a line of pipe used for the purpose of conveying silt from the surface into its mine; his duties were to keep that line in repair, and, in order to enable him to examine it under ground, he carried an open lamp; on the morning of February 23, 1916, his lifeless body was found inside the mine, a short distance from this pipeline, and his lighted lamp about two feet away from him; his clothing was burning and he had severe burns upon his body; he was in a kneeling position, on his hands, and apparently had been vomiting; that he was on the premises of his employer and engaged in the performance of his duty at the time of his death, is undisputed; that his duties required him to carry an open lamp is not denied, and no theory is advanced for the burning of his clothes and body other than that they were burned by this lamp; the medical testimony establishes the fact that death was due to a rupture of the aorta, which is a large blood vessel leading from the heart."

The report also contains these further findings: (1) "The vomiting was due to probably one of three causes, either noxious gases, the smell of the burning clothing, or fright from discovery of his clothing being on fire"; (2) deceased was afflicted with a "syphilitic condition, in which he might have lived four or five years, or his death might have occurred at any time"; (3) although this condition rendered deceased more susceptible to a rupture of the aorta, than he otherwise would have been, yet, in point of fact, the rupture was immediately "caused by extra effort in vomiting"; finally (4), deceased "met with an accident and sustained injuries which caused his death," while engaged in "discharging his duties" as an employee of defendant.

Defendant asked review by the compensation board upon the ground of lack of evidence to sustain the referee's finding of fact that "the death of decedent was due to a rupture of the aorta . . ., caused by extra effort in vomiting, due to one of three causes," etc.; and its appeal was classed by the board, not as raising a question of fact as to whether the evidence warranted, or justified, this finding, but rather as involving a pure point of law concerning the presence of any evidence to sustain the finding. The board decided there was no such evidence; and, therefore, set aside the referee's compensation order.

We say the appeal was classed as involving a question of law, and not of fact, because the referee was reversed without a hearing de novo, such a hearing being essential whenever the intention is to disturb findings of fact (McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa. 312, 318-19); but, notwithstanding this classification, when considering the report of the referee, instead of merely searching to see if there was any evidence capable of sustaining that official's findings of fact, the board substituted its own inferences and deductions for those already upon the record; which, on such a review, it lacked power to do: McCauley v. Imperial Co., supra, page 319; Dainty v. Jones & L.S. Co., 263 Pa. 109, 113.

As some explanation of the erroneous course thus pursued, the report of the board indicates a fundamentally wrong idea of its powers and duties. For instance, it is there stated "[1] We have no evidence that will justify us in connecting the vomiting with the death, nor [2] the burnt clothing with the vomiting"; whereas,...