Clark v. Louisa County School Bd., Civ. A. No. 79-0403-R.

• Court: United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Virginia)
• Writing for the Court: WARRINER
• Citation: 472 F. Supp. 321
• Parties: Rebecca L. CLARK v. LOUISA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD.
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 79-0403-R.
• Decision Date: 15 July 1979

472 F. Supp. 321

Rebecca L. CLARK
v.
LOUISA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD.

Civ. A. No. 79-0403-R.

United States District Court, E. D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

May 25, 1979.

As Amended July 15, 1979.

472 F. Supp. 322

Harold R. Bailes, Francis L. Buck, Bailes & Buck, Ltd., Charlottesville, Va., for plaintiff.

D. Patrick Lacy, Jr., David H. Worrel, Bell, Ellyson, Lacy & Baliles, Richmond, Va., Stephen C. Harris, Louisa County Atty., Louisa, Va., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

WARRINER, District Judge.

Plaintiff has filed a complaint alleging that she was discharged from a position as a teacher in the Louisa County public school system because she, a white woman, is married to a Negro man. Though the jurisdictional statement of the complaint is not free from confusion it appears that she

472 F. Supp. 323

believes the facts alleged state claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. and 2000e et seq.) as a result of violations of rights secured to plaintiff by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiff also appears to have alleged a pendent State claim for a denial of certain rights and procedures granted her under Virginia Code §§ 22-217.1 through 217.8

On 7 May 1979 defendants filed their joint motion to dismiss the complaint. Though the motion called for dismissal of the complaint in its entirety the brief in support thereof did not address the pendent State claim. The time within which plaintiff was required by Local Rule 11(F) to respond to the motion has expired and plaintiff has failed to respond. The Court will consider the motion on the present state of the pleadings taking up each basis for dismissal in the order presented in defendants' brief.

Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964

Defendants' motion to dismiss claims grounded under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is supported by an exhibit consisting of a copy of the charge filed by plaintiff with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Considering the exhibit the Court must view the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment with respect to Title VII. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).

It is clear from the reading of the complaint and an examination of the charge that plaintiff failed to file the charge within the time required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and it is also clear that no right to sue letter required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) has been issued. Both requirements are jurisdictional and plaintiff's non-compliance ousts the Court of jurisdiction of her Title VII claim. Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1329 (4th Cir. 1976). Accordingly, defendants will be granted summary judgment with respect to those counts alleging a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964

Though plaintiff asserts a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 she fails to allege any factual basis for such a claim. Though it might be assumed that a public school system is a "program or activity receiving federal financing assistance" one would have to assume it since plaintiff failed to allege it. She further fails to allege that the "primary objective of the federal financial assistance is to provide employment." This latter requirement of Title VI is not a fact which might readily be assumed even if it had been alleged. Finally, Title VI contains detailed provisions for administrative proceedings which must be exhausted before funding may be terminated. Plaintiff alleges no such administrative exhaustion. In the absence of any factual basis for a Title VI claim, plaintiff's Title VI claim must be dismissed.

There is a further reason for dismissing the claim asserted under Title VI. It is most doubtful that Congress intended a private right of action under Title VI. In University of...