Clark v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 July 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:09-CV-556-MEF
• Parties: Candis CLARK, Plaintiff, v. MACON COUNTY GREYHOUND PARK, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

727 F.Supp.2d 1282

Candis CLARK, Plaintiff,

v.MACON COUNTY GREYHOUND PARK, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 3:09-CV-556-MEF.

United States District Court,

M.D. Alabama,

Eastern Division.

July 23, 2010.

Elizabeth Peyton Faulk, Joseph Brady Lewis, Lewis, Bush & Faulk, LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Joseph Brady Lewis, Patrick Ladd Wheeler Sefton, Sasser, Sefton, Connally, Tipton & Davis, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARK E. FULLER, Chief Judge.

This case is an employment discrimination case in which the plaintiff, Candis Clark ("Clark") challenges the termination of her employment with Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc. ("MCGP"). She contends the termination of her employment violated her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (hereinafter "FMLA"). MCGP has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 16), which Clark has opposed. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the Court finds that the motion for summary judgment is due to be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as set out below.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over Clark's FMLA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds adequate allegations supporting both.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissionson file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of the non-movant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party's favor. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir.2003) (the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant). After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000)( en banc ) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.1995) (internal marks and citations omitted)).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Court has carefully considered all deposition excerpts and documents submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion. The submissions of the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, establish the following facts:

MCGP hired Clark in November of 1994. Initially, she worked as a maintenance secretary. Clark was very comfortable in this position. She enjoyed the working conditions it presented and her co-workers.

In January of 2007, MCGP began moving employees into different jobs. In the middle of April of 2007, MCGP moved Clark into a new job as a money sorter. As a money sorter, Clark worked with other money sorters in the money room. This was a small, noisy, and crowded room, which was kept locked.¹ The room had a single door with a window in it. Clark also found her new job responsibilities of counting and sorting money to be stressful. Clark has bipolar disorder.²She found that her new working environment was making her bipolar disorder harder to manage. It was causing her to suffer panic attacks and to feel as if she no longer wanted to live.

After she had been working in the money room for about six weeks, Clark accompanied her mother to a doctor's appointment. While examining Clark's mother, Dr. Russell noticed Clark's distress. Dr. Russell told Clark she needed to take FMLA leave and wrote her two excuses on his stock "Certificate to Return to Work/School" form, each for a period of one month. Dr. Russell also told Clark to come back to see him the next day and to go back to see Dr. Shaw ³ because Dr. Russell couldn't help Clark himself. Evidence in the record indicates that Dr. Russell saw Clark on June 14, 2007. The last day that Clark worked in MCGP's money room was June 12, 2007. The record contains no evidence indicating the next date on which Clark was scheduled to work.

According to Clark, she called her supervisor on that day and told her that when she had taken her mother to the doctor, the doctor had told her that she was in worse shape than her mother.⁴ Clark also went to see Jeanette Bowling ("Bowling"), the personnel manager for MCGP. She gave Bowling one of the excuses ⁵ that Dr. Russell had written for her. This excuse was a "Certificate to Return to Work/School" signed by Dr. Russell which indicated that Clark had been under Dr. Russell's care from June 12, 2007 to July 16, 2007 and that she could return to her regular duties on July 16, 2007.

According to Clark's testimony, Bowling gave her certain forms to be completed by Clark and her doctor. One set of forms was an application for short term disability and the other set of forms related to an application for FMLA leave. According to Clark's testimony, Bowling told Clark to send all the completed forms to the insurance company in Birmingham which managed the short term disability insurance.⁶ Clark had the impression that at some point the forms would be returned to her and she would then take them to Bowling. Clark never took the completed FMLA paperwork to MCGP because she did not receive them back from the insurance company until weeks after the termination of her employment.

Clark and her doctor completed the forms and mailed them to the insurancecompany just as Bowling had instructed. It appears that Dr. Russell signed the Physician's statement that was part of the claim for short term disability insurance on June 21, 2007. In that statement, Dr. Russell indicated that Clark's symptoms began in late March of 2007 and that he had last seen Clark on June 14, 2007. He also indicated that the expected date for Clark's return to work was unknown. Similarly, on Clark's request form for FMLA leave, it indicates that the requested leave would begin on June 14, 2007 and that her expected date of return was unknown. Moreover, the Certification of Health Care Provider completed by Dr. Russell on June 21, 2007 in support of Clark's application for FMLA leave indicates that Clark was incapacitated and needed to be absent from work because she was unable to perform work of any kind, that the condition commenced on June 14, 2007, and that probable duration of the condition was unknown.

On July 2, 2007, MCGP terminated Clark's employment. The personnel paperwork indicates that the reason for the termination of Clark's employment was "job abandonment." The personnel form recording the termination action stated that Clark had called the office and spoken with Zach Griffin on June 15, 2007. She told him that she had paperwork from her doctor to place her on medical leave, but according to the form, she did not turn it in.

A MCGP employee told Clark that news that she had been fired was circulating at work. Clark called Bowling and said that she had heard this rumor, but that she was on FMLA leave. Bowling told Clark that her employment had been terminated. According to Clark, Bowling said that Clark had failed to do her FMLA paperwork properly. After hearing of the termination decision, Clark delivered a copy of the second excuse from Dr. Russell to bowling so that it would be in her file. This excuse was the Certificate to Return to Work/School signed by Dr. Russell which indicated that she was under his care from July 16, 2007 to August 31, 2007 and that she could return to work on August 31, 2007.

At the time of the termination of her employment on July 2, 2007, Clark admits that she had not delivered the completed FMLA application and certification forms to MCGP. According to her testimony,...