Clark v. Mann

Decision Date31 August 1977
Docket NumberNo. 76-1022,76-1022
Citation562 F.2d 1104
Parties17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1790, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7811 Irma CLARK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Lon MANN et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Henry L. Jones, Jr., John W. Walker, Walker, Kaplan & Mays, P. A., Little Rock, Ark., for appellants; Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit, III, and James C. Gray, Jr., New York City, on appendix and on brief.

Jimason J. Daggett, Daggett, Daggett & Van Dover, Marianna, Ark., made argument for appellees; Daddridge M. Daggett, Marianna, Ark., on appendix.

Before HEANEY and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and VAN PELT, Senior United States District Judge. *

ROSS, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises out of a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various officials of the Marianna, Arkansas School District. Plaintiffs, a number of black teachers and administrators presently or formerly employed by the Marianna District, challenged various District policies, practices and actions relating to teacher recruitment, retention, promotion and salaries as being violative of equal protection, due process and the first amendment. They sought injunctive relief and back pay. Following a trial on the merits, the district court denied relief in all respects. On appeal, plaintiffs raise numerous challenges to the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I.

The Marianna School District encompasses the entire geographical area of Lee County, Arkansas. Included within its boundaries are the city of Marianna and a number of rural areas. During the 1974-75 school year, the District had an enrollment of approximately 4,800 students and employed approximately 250 teachers.

Prior to the 1970-71 school year, Marianna operated dual school systems racially segregated as to both faculty and students. During part of this period the District also maintained dual salary structures whereby black teachers and administrators were paid less than their white counterparts.

In 1970-71, Marianna commenced operation as a unified desegregated school district. Its first year of operation as a unified district was relatively uneventful. During the latter half of the following year, however, racial tensions erupted. On January 13, 1972, a sizeable group of black students at Lee High School staged a protest against what they perceived to be preferential treatment being accorded white students. The protest resulted in a number of the students being beaten and arrested. Thereafter, black students in the Marianna District engaged in a massive boycott of classes, which lasted for the remainder of the semester. At one time or another, 85 to 90 percent of the black students participated. The boycott also engendered a boycott of white businesses in Marianna by school segments of the black population. Finally, the period in question was marked by various acts of violence directed at both whites and blacks.

At the close of the 1971-72 school year, there was substantial turnover in the Marianna teaching staff. The school board voted to not renew the contracts of ten teachers, eight of whom were black. A number of other teachers, both white and black, left the District of their own accord.

On June 8, 1973, six black teachers 1 whose contracts were not renewed at the close of the 1971-72 school year commenced the instant litigation as a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as defendants were Lon Mann, President of the Marianna School Board; Bob McGinnis, Secretary of the School Board; and Everett Kelly, Superintendent of the Marianna Schools. Plaintiffs alleged that their terminations were motivated by racial considerations and by their support of the boycott, and that their dismissals thus denied them equal protection and infringed their first amendment rights. They further alleged that the defendants had engaged in racial discrimination with respect to teacher recruitment, promotion and salaries. Plaintiffs later raised the additional contention that failure to afford them pretermination hearings denied them procedural due process. They sought reinstatement, back pay, and various forms of injunctive relief.

The case was tried to the district court, sitting without a jury. Each side produced substantial testimonial and documentary evidence. During trial, the court indicated that the applicable period of limitations was five years. Pursuant to an apparent stipulation by plaintiffs' counsel, the court also ruled that the class of plaintiffs would be limited to the named plaintiffs and those who testified at trial. Following the conclusion of trial, the district court ruled that plaintiffs had failed to sustain their burden of proof on any of their allegations. Specifically, the court found that the terminations of teachers in question were not motivated by racial or other unconstitutional considerations; that the school board's failure to afford the terminated teachers pretermination hearings did not deny them due process; and that the evidence failed to establish discrimination against black teachers and administrators with respect to salary, promotions or working conditions. The court further stated:

The School District has, by direction of the Court, modified its policies of salary schedule to include schedule of pay for administrative and specialty employment and has established objective criteria for filling vacancies, assignment of teachers and other employees, promotion and other employment practices in the operation of the Marianna Schools. The Court, therefore, concludes that even though the School System operated a completely segreated (sic) school prior to 1970, the school policies toward a fully integrated system has, prior to the trial of the case, been brought into compliance making it unnecessary for an injunction to be issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

Accordingly, judgment was entered for the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed.

On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's findings that the School District's employment practices were not racially discriminatory, that plaintiffs were not denied due process, and that the refusal to renew their contracts was not motivated by unconstitutional considerations. With respect to the last claim, plaintiffs further contend that the district court improperly allocated the burden of proof and employed an erroneous standard of proof. Finally, plaintiffs attack the court's ruling as to the definition of the class. Defendants take issue with the district court only on the statute of limitations question. They argue that the applicable limitations period is three years.

II.

We first address the threshold questions pertaining to the definition of the class and the statute of limitations.

A. Class action

As noted above, this action was brought as a class action on behalf of all black teachers and potential teachers in the Marianna School District. At the conclusion of trial, the district court limited the class to those who were named plaintiffs or who testified at trial, believing that plaintiffs' counsel had stipulated thereto. Plaintiffs now contend that the court's limitation of the class was the product of a misunderstanding between plaintiffs' counsel and the court, and that the class should be viewed as encompassing the broader group which plaintiffs purported to represent in their complaint.

The stipulation relied on by the district court arose out of the following colloquy between the court and plaintiffs' counsel, which occurred at the conclusion of the trial:

THE COURT: Do I understand that the only ones that are in contention here for any claimed relief are those names who have been of course, those who are a part of the proceedings and named plaintiffs in the case and those other who are not named plaintiffs who have testified and the claim has been made for this particular record?

MR. JONES: That's right.

THE COURT: And you are not claiming for anybody else outside of those?

MR. JONES: No.

THE COURT: Well, narrow it down to that, then. So keep that in mind.

Plaintiffs contend that this interchange occurred in the context of a discussion over the issues to be covered in post trial briefs, after the court had stated that the only issues it saw were whether the dismissed teachers were terminated for racial reasons and without being afforded due process. On that basis, plaintiffs maintain that they agreed to limit the class only with respect to the issues of racially motivated discharges and due process.

In view of the unrestricted language employed by both the court and plaintiffs' counsel in discussing the class issue, we cannot agree that plaintiffs' stipulation was limited only to certain claims for relief. If there was a misunderstanding, the responsibility therefor rests with plaintiffs. Accordingly, we hold that the class of plaintiffs is limited to the named plaintiffs: Irma Clark, Lula Tyler, Robindale Robinson, Douglas Fears and Bob Cain; 2 two other black teachers whose contracts were not renewed and who testified at trial: Rebecca Fears and Gladine Gregory; and three black present or former administrators in the Marianna District who also testified: Emma Davis, A. L. Johnson and Larthell Young. Davis and Young, at the time of trial, were still employed at Marianna. Johnson resigned at the end of the 1971-72 school year.

This determination is, of course, without prejudice to the right of other members of this or any other class to initiate a new action if they see fit.

B. Statute of Limitations

During trial, the district court ruled that this case would be governed by a five-year statute of limitations; however, the need for a formal ruling on that point at the conclusion of trial was obviated by the court's finding that plaintiffs had failed to prove their claims. On appeal, defendants contend that the proper period of limitations is three years, and that we...

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