Clark v. Marfield
| Decision Date | 31 January 1875 |
| Citation | 1875 WL 8299,77 Ill. 258 |
| Parties | RICHARD CLARK et al.v.SAMUEL MARFIELD. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Champaign county; the Hon. C. B. SMITH, Judge, presiding.
This was a bill in chancery, exhibited by Samuel Marfield against Richard Clark and Frederick Miller.
Messrs. SWEET & LOTHROP, for the plaintiffs in error.
Mr. A.J. GALLAGHER, and Mr. J.S. JONES, for the defendant in error.
The facts alleged to have cast a cloud upon the title of complainant's land, are, a forged deed from complainant to Reuben H. Simpson, and a deed from a party representing himself to be Simpson, to defendants. Although defendants filed their answer to the bill, denying all material allegations, no defense was made on the final hearing in the circuit court. Evidence taken in the cause shows conclusively the deed which purports to have been made by complainant to Simpson was a base forgery, and that he had never parted with his title to the land to any one. The principal error insisted upon is, the court improperly heard the cause on a different day from the one set by the clerk previous to the session of the court. Prior to the convening of the court, the clerk, as was his duty under the statute, had apportioned the causes for as many days of the term as he thought necessary. The apportionment was made without any direction from the judge of the court. In the allotment made, the chancery causes were all set for the 40th day of the term.
The final hearing of this cause, for reasons deemed sufficient in the mind of the court, was had in advance of the day set by the clerk, viz: on the 35th day of the term. It is insisted the court had no jurisdiction to try the cause on that day, or at least that it was error to do so.
The statute makes it the duty of the clerk of the circuit court, previous to or at the convening of any session, to set and apportion the causes on the docket for as many days of the term as he shall think necessary, or as he shall be directed by the judge, and when that is done, all subpœnas for witnesses in such causes shall be returnable on the day the cause is set for trial. It is then provided, “all causes shall be tried or otherwise disposed of in the order they are placed on the docket, unless the court, for good and sufficient cause, shall otherwise direct.” R. S. 1874, p. 777, secs. 16, 17.
Whether these provisions of the statute have any reference to chancery causes, is a matter of great doubt, but conceding they are applicable to chancery causes as well as common law actions, the objection to hearing the case on a day different from the one fixed by the clerk, can not be maintained.
What is “good and sufficient cause” for changing the day of trial, is a matter to be determined by the court in the exercise of a sound legal discretion. Its discretion in such matters, when exercised, can not be reviewed in this court, unless where there has been some flagrant abuse of that discretion that works manifest injustice. The apportionment of the causes on the docket was not made under any rule of court, or by any direction of the judge, but it was done under the statute. The court, by the same statute, for “good and sufficient cause,” of which it is to be the judge, has authority given it to try any cause out of the order it may have been placed on the docket.
In the case before us, it does not appear there has been any abuse of that discretion with which the court is clothed in matters of this kind.
On the 27th day of the term, the judge announced in open court the call of the chancery docket would commence on the 34th day of the term. As to what reasons there may have been for making the change, we need not inquire, inasmuch as it does not appear any injustice has been done. It may have been, in the opinion of the judge, the convenience in the transaction of the public business required this change to be made. If so, it was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Jansen v. Grimshaw
...A party cannot allege errors which relate exclusively to other parties, who are not complaining and who are not before the court. Clark v. Marfield, 77 Ill. 258;Henrickson v. Van Winkle, 21 Ill. 274;Horner v. Zimmerman, 45 Ill. 14;Cromine v. Tharp, 42 Ill. 121;Richards v. Greene, 78 Ill. 52......
-
Pyle v. Pyle
... ... Tibbs v. Allen, 27 Ill. 119;Richards v. Greene, 78 Ill. 525;Clark v. Marfield, 77 Ill. 258;Van Valkenburg v. Trustees, 66 Ill. 103. At the most, there was simply judicial error, of which James Thompson and Mamie ... ...
-
Fabbri v. Cunio
... ... Hibernian Banking Ass'n, 78 Ill. 596; VanValkenberg v. Trustees of Schools, 66 Ill. 103; Clark et al. v. Marfield, 77 Ill. 258; Horner v. Zimmerman, 45 Ill. 14; Cromine v. Tharp, 42 Ill. 120; Tibbs v. Allen 27 Ill. 119; Henrickson v. Van ... ...
-
White v. Gray
... ... 493.As to rule for construing statutes: C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 260.Interest should not have been allowed: Sammis v. Clark, 13 Ill. 544; Hitt v. Allen, 13 Ill. 592.Messrs. JORDAN & STOUGH, for appellee; that the plea of defendant was not in abatement of the writ, cited ... Van Winkle, 21 Ill. 274; Horner v. Zimmerman, 45 Ill. 14; Greenman v. Harvey, 53 Ill. 386; Havighorst v. Lindberg, 67 Ill. 463; Clark v. Marfield, 77 Ill. 258.The affidavit for continuance was not sufficient: McBain v. Enloe, 13 Ill. 76; Shirwin v. The People, 69 Ill. 55; Slade v. McClure, 76 ... ...