Clark v. McDonald's Corporation, CV 02-0247 (RBK) (D. N.J. 3/3/2003)
| Decision Date | 03 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | CV 02-0247 (RBK) |
| Parties | ROBERT CLARK, an individual, and A.D.A. ACCESS TODAY, a non-profit pennsylvania corporation, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. McDONALD'S CORPORATION and YGRAINE, LLC, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
BRODSKY & SMITH LLC, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, By: Jason Brodsky, Esq., Evan Smith, Esq., BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, By: Todd S. Collins, Esq., pro hac vice, Douglas M. Risen, Esq. pro hac vice Jacob A. Goldberg, Esq., pro hac vice, for Plaintiffs.
BROWN RAYSMAN MILLSTEIN, FELDER & STEINER LLP, Morristown, New Jersey, By: Joel L. Finger, Esq. HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLC, Chicago, Illinois, By: Mark L. Shapiro, Esq., pro hac vice, for Defendant McDonald's Corporation.
LEE & McFARLAND, Camden, New Jersey, By: Robert B. McFarland, Esq., Craig R. Annunziata, Esq., pro hac vice, BAKER & McKENZIE, Chicago, Illinois, By: Kevin S. Simon, Esq., pro hac vice, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. Esq., pro hac vice, for Defendant Ygraine, LLC.
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189, prohibits discrimination "on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns . . . or operates a place of public accommodation." Id. § 12182(a). The fast food restaurants owned and operated by Defendants McDonald's Corporation ("McDonald's") and its franchisee Ygraine, LLC ("Ygraine") are places of public accommodation that are alleged by Plaintiffs Robert Clark, a wheelchair-bound paraplegic, and A.D.A. Access Today ("Access Today"), a non-profit association, to contain "architectural barriers" that discriminate against disabled persons in violation of Title III, as well as the anti-discrimination laws of nine States. This suit for injunctive relief and damages was commenced as a bilateral class action on January 22, 2002, by the filing of Plaintiffs' original complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. After McDonald's moved to dismiss, Plaintiffs amended their pleading as of right on September 20, 2002. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Pending before the Court are the motions of McDonald's (1) to dismiss the amended complaint, or in the alternative, to dismiss or strike its class action allegations, and (2) for a more definite statement. Ygraine has joined in McDonald's motions without submitting separate moving papers. The Court heard oral argument on the motions on January 28, 2003, and for the reasons that follow, grants in part and denies in part both motions.
Plaintiff Clark resides in Pennsylvania and has "visited numerous McDonald's brand restaurants, within the State of New Jersey and elsewhere." (Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) Specifically, Clark is alleged to have visited each of 23 corporate-owned McDonald's restaurants in New Jersey, (id. ¶ 38(1)-(23)), as well as some (the amended complaint does not specify which) of 38 franchised restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, (id. ¶ 38(1)-(38)). As to these 38 franchises, if Clark himself has not visited the franchise, then "at least one member" of Access Today has done so. (Id.) The McDonald's restaurant in Blackwood, New Jersey, which is the only facility identified in the amended complaint to be operated by franchisee Ygraine, (see id. ¶ 21), has been visited by "at least one member" of Access Today, (see id. ¶ 38(23)), but it is not alleged that Clark himself was the visitor. The amended complaint also identifies 32 corporate-owned McDonald's restaurants in Wisconsin, (id. ¶ 39(1)-(32)), but it is not alleged that Clark, or any other member of Access Today, has actually visited these restaurants. As to the Wisconsin restaurants, it is only alleged as it is with all McDonald's brand restaurants nationwide that Access Today's members "and other similarly situated persons either regularly enter and/or use [such] restaurants, would like to enter and/or use [such] restaurants, or may enter and/or use [such] restaurants in the future." (Id. ¶ 51 (emphasis added).)
Plaintiff Access Today is a non-profit national advocacy organization headquartered in the Delaware Valley, the "purpose" of which "is to educate persons and businesses on accessibility issues and to ensure full participation of all people with a broad range of physical disabilities in every community." (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) The organization's members include disabled and non-disabled persons who live throughout the United States. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 17.) In furtherance of its purpose, Access Today is alleged "to monitor places of public accommodation for compliance with the ADA, [to] disseminate that information to its members and other disabled persons, and [to] ensure that people with disabilities have equal access to, and do not encounter discrimination in, places of public accommodation." (Id. ¶ 14.) Access Today claims that it enjoys "organizational standing" to bring this action in its own right, as well as "associational standing" to bring this action on behalf of its disabled members.
The gravamen of the amended complaint is that McDonald's brand restaurants throughout the United States discriminate against disabled persons (1) in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) by "fail[ing] to remove architectural barriers, and communication barriers that are structural in nature, in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable," (2) in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2) by, with respect to altered facilities, "fail[ing] to make alterations in such a manner that, to the maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs," and (3) in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) by "fail[ing] to construct and design [new] facilities . . . that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, except where . . . structurally impracticable." (See id. ¶ 42.) Plaintiffs rely principally upon the Defendants' alleged non-compliance with certain of the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (ADAAG), found at 28 C.F.R. part 36 Appendix A. (See id. ¶ 46(a)-(z).) Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants' violations of the ADA constitute per se violations of certain anti-discrimination statutes of the States of New Jersey, California, Vermont, Arizona, Wisconsin, Idaho, Ohio, Nevada and Michigan, each of which are said (unlike Title III) to permit recovery in damages.
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief under the ADA on behalf of a class of disabled individuals against a class of "owner/operators of McDonald's brand restaurants" of which individual Defendants McDonald's and Ygraine are said to be representative. The "Plaintiff Class" is defined in the amended complaint as "all disabled persons, as that term is defined by the ADA, residing throughout the United States of America."1 (Id. ¶ 2.) The "Defendant Class" consists of "all owner/operators of McDonald's brand restaurants throughout the United States." (Id. ¶ 4; see id. ¶ 28.)
Plaintiffs also seek damages and injunctive relief under the anti-discrimination statutes of the States of New Jersey, California, Vermont, Arizona, Wisconsin, Idaho, Ohio, Nevada and Michigan on behalf of a subclass of disabled patrons against a subclass of restaurant "owner/operators" in those States, of which individual Defendants McDonald's and Ygraine are again said to be representative. (Id. ¶ 5.) The Plaintiff Subclass consists of "disabled persons . . . residing in the States of New Jersey, California, Vermont, Arizona, Wisconsin, Idaho, Ohio, Nevada, and Michigan (the 'Subclass States')."2 (Id. ¶ 3.) The Defendant Subclass consists of "all owner/operators of McDonald's brand restaurants throughout the Subclass States." (Id. ¶ 5; see id. ¶ 28.)
In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs specify Rule 23(b)(2) as the appropriate basis for the class certifications they propose. However, in a footnote in their memorandum of law opposing Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs have also proposed certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
The principal argument raised by the Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss is that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit. Even if Plaintiffs enjoy standing, say the Defendants, they cannot satisfy the requisites of Rule 23 for maintenance of the suit as a class action, such that, at a minimum, the class action allegations must be dismissed or stricken. Although Plaintiffs respond to both of these arguments, they argue that the latter is "improperly premature" in a Rule 12 posture. (Pls.' Mem. Law Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Dismiss Am. Compl. at 17.) Instead, contend Plaintiffs, whether a class action may be maintained is a question properly deferred until such time as Plaintiffs move, under Rule 23, for class certification. A preliminary issue, therefore, is whether, or to what extent, the Court may consider Defendants' Rule 23 arguments under the procedural posture of this case.
In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), the Supreme Court observed that in cases where class certification issues are "'logically antecedent' to Article III concerns and themselves pertain to statutory standing," then the issue of Rule 23 certification should be treated before standing. Id. at 831 (citation omitted). This is an exception to the usual rule that standing is a threshold question that must be decided prior to class certification issues. The Ortiz exception appears "to rest on the long-standing rule that, once a class is properly certified, statutory and Article III standing requirements must be assessed with reference to the class as a whole, not simply with reference...
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