Clark v. Melody Bar, Inc., 171A11

Decision Date19 July 1971
Docket NumberNo. 1,No. 171A11,171A11,1
CourtIndiana Appellate Court
PartiesHoward CLARK, Appellant, v. MELODY BAR, INC., Appellee

Kenneth A. King, Kendallville, for appellant.

Phyllis G. Poff, Auburn, F. LeRoy Wiltrout, Elkhart, for appellee.

LOWDERMILK, Judge.

This cause arises out of a certain contract, as follows, to-wit:

'THIS AGREEMENT, made in the city of Kendallville, Indiana State of Indiana, this 1 day of July, 1967; between Howard Clark (hereinafter referred to as Company) and Ron Linnie (sic), dba/Melody Bar (hereinafter referred to as Proprietor), WITNESSETH:

'In consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements herein contained, the parties agree as follows:

'1. Proprietor hereby grants unto Company the exclusive rights for one year to install and maintain automatic music equipment upon the premises located at 121 South Main St., Kendallville, Indiana.

'2. Company shall install upon said premises the following music equipment:

1--Rowe AMI Music Merchant-coin operated photograph

1--Rowe AMI Phon-Vue Film machine.

'3. During the term and any continuation thereof:

'a. Company shall open the coin containers of such equipment weekly.

The Company shall be entitled to a weekly minimum of forty dollars ($40). The excess, in the contents thereof, shall be divided equially (sic) between the Company and the Proprietor.

'b. * * *

'c. * * *

'd. * * *

'e. * * *

'4. Unless either party shall receive written notice of termination no less than sixty days prior to the end of the term thereof, this agreement shall automatically continue for an additional period of one year and from year to year thereafter until written notice of termination is received by either party no less than sixty days prior to the end of any such year. Except as provided herein and except for a breach hereof, this agreement shall be irrevocable by the parties hereto.

'5. * * *

'6. The parties hereby certify their authority to enter into this agreement.

'7. * * *

'8. The relationship between the parties created by this agreement is that of independent contractors and neither party may directly or indirectly act as agent or representative of the other nor bind the other in any way.

'9. * * *

Ron Timmons L.S.

Proprietor

_ _ L.S.

121 South Main St., Kendallville, Ind. Address

Howard Clark L.S.

Company.'

The defendant is a corporation doing business as a tavern in Kendallville, Indiana, with the sole shareholders being Norman and Doris Gillian. In April of 1967, there was a conditional sales contract entered into between the Gillians and one Ronnie Timmons, by the terms of which Timmons was to purchase the shares of stock owned by the Gillians. However, this transfer was not to take place until a certain part of the purchase price was paid and the Gillians remained the sole shareholders at all times for purposes of this appeal.

Ronnie Timmons was made secretary-treasurer of the corporation, and also a member of the Board of Directors. His duties immediately became those of agent of the corporation and manager of the tavern. He managed the tavern, which management included taking care of the money and receipts, making purchases and selling merchandise, as well as purchasing other necessities to maintain the business in good operation. Timmons determined the tavern needed new music equipment and made mention of this fact to the president, Norman J. Gillian, who replied 'That's very good.' With this authority, Timmons then contacted Howard Clark, the plaintiff-appellant, and entered into the aforesaid contract for the installation of automatic music equipment.

The record discloses this automatic music equipment remained in the place of business from the date of installation to December 12, 1967, on which date the collection report of the corporation's share of the profits from the box was signed by the then-president, Norman Gillian. This took place after Timmons resigned as treasurer of the corporation on November 16, 1967, which resignation apparently was precipitated by the corporation of which Norman Gillian was president refusing to assign shares of stock to Timmons, as part of the agreement entered into at the time Timmons took over the operation and management of the business.

Appellant Howard Clark brought his action for breach of contract against the appellee corporation on February 19, 1968. The tavern was closed for remodeling purposes in January, 1968, and Norman Gillian informed the appellant that he should remove the automatic music equipment so it would not be damaged. During the time the tavern was closed appellant talked with Norman Gillian, requesting him to put the automatic music equipment back in the tavern, and was informed by Gillian that he did not want to talk about it. However, the corporation later authorized the installation of other automatic music equipment by another company.

The complaint was in one paragraph for breach of contract, and alleged that on July 1, 1967, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a certain contract of writing for the installation of the automatic music equipment for a period of one year and appellee was to pay a weekly minimum of $40.00 for the use of said equipment, with the parties to split evenly the proceeds exceeding $40.00.

The complaint alleges further that the plaintiff-appellant had fully complied with his terms of the contract and the corporation had refused to perform.

And further, the appellee corporation had accepted the property under the terms of the contract for a period of nineteen weeks, at which time they cancelled and now refuse to permit appellant to perform his part of the contract, and further alleged appellant's damage in the amount of $1,310.00.

The contract was made an exhibit and a part of the complaint and was executed by Ron Timmons as proprietor and Howard Clark, 'Company'.

Defendant-appellee filed answer in two paragraphs, the first being under Trial Rule 8(B) and the second being under Trial Rule 9.2(B).

The case was tried to the court without a jury and at the close of appellant's evidence, appellee filed a motion for judgment on the evidence, which motion was sustained by the court.

Thereafter appellant filed a motion to reconsider ruling on motion for judgment on the evidence, which was overruled by the court on September 21, 1970.

The trial court decided the issues adversely to the appellant and entered the following judgment:

'JUDGMENT

'This cause having been submitted to the Court for trial, and the Court having sustained the Motion for Judgment on the Evidence made by the defendant at the close of plaintiff's evidence;

'IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff take nothing by his complaint.

/s/ John C. Hagen

John C. Hagen, Judge

Noble Circuit Court

September 29, 1970'

On September 29, 1970, appellant filed a written motion to correct errors and on the 2nd day of November, 1970, filed an amended motion to correct errors. The motion and amended motion to correct errors were by the court overruled on December 9, 1970. Each of appellant's motions to correct errors have been certified by the Clerk separately in the transcript, the amended motion reading as follows:

'AMENDED MOTION TO CORRECT ERRORS

'The plaintiff moves the court to take such steps as may be required to correct the errors herein shown:

'1. The Court erred in sustaining the Motion for Judgment on the evidence after plaintiff had made out a prima facie case and was not rebutted by defendant;

'2. The plaintiff, Howard Clark, should have been granted a judgment against the defendant on the evidence presented at the trial;

'3. That the decision of the court was not supported by sufficient evidence and is contrary to the evidence presented in that plaintiff made out a prima facie case which was not rebutted by defendant;

'4. That the weight of the evidence is over-whelmingly in support of the plaintiff, and judgment is therefore against the weight of the evidence;

'5. The plaintiff, if evidence had been presented by the defendant, would have been entitled to judgment against the defendant;

'6. That the decision of the court is contrary to law in that the weight of the evidence is over-whelmingly in favor of plaintiff;

'Statement of Facts

'a. Ronnie L. Timmons testified that he had purchased the Melody Bar, Inc., as shown by Exhibit B, and was treasurer of the Corporation when he signed the agreement with Howard Clark, and the agreement was approved by Norman Gillian, president of Melody Bar, Inc., That Ronnie L. Timmons further testified that Howard Clark had a good contract as shown by Exhibit C and should be paid, he further testified that he operated the Melody Bar, Inc., and made all purchases.

'b. Howard Clark testified as to the transactions and the amount due him.

'c. On May 27, 1969, after plaintiff rested, Motion for Judgment on Evidence was filed and sustained. Motion to Reconsider Motion for Judgment on the Evidence was filed June 2, 1970, and over-ruled September 21, 1970. That judgment on the evidence was entered against plaintiff on the 29th day of September, 1970. This was an error after plaintiff had made out a prima facie case.

'Plaintiff asks that a new trial be granted on all issues.' The Clerk's certificate was duly executed and affixed thereon on December 17, 1970.

On November 25, 1970, appellee filed verified motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended motion to correct errors. The court overruled this motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended motion to correct errors on the same date that it also overruled the amended motion to correct errors.

This brings this court face to face with the problem of determining the new Rules of court and their application to certain cases. It has been said that 'fools rush in where angels fear to tread' and yet, with this in mind, this court is going to write on questions not mentioned nor raised by either party to this litigation.

Our Supreme Court...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Puckett v. Miller
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • October 31, 1978
    ...Ind.App., 297 N.E.2d 463.1 Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Verzele, (1971) 148 Ind.App. 429, 267 N.E.2d 193; Clark v. Melody Bar, Inc., (1971) 149 Ind.App. 245, 271 N.E.2d 481; Miller v. Griesel, (1973) Ind.App., 297 N.E.2d 463; Powell v. Powell, (1974) Ind.App., 310 N.E.2d 898; Building......
  • Stath v. Williams
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • October 3, 1977
    ...The motion was granted for all defendants. See, Powell v. Powell (1974), 160 Ind.App. 132, 310 N.E.2d 898; Clark v. Melody Bar, Inc. (1971), 149 Ind.App. 245, 271 N.E.2d 481. Accordingly this court must determine whether there was in fact substantial evidence of probative value which could ......
  • Hoosier Ins. Co. v. Ogle, 471A72
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • December 30, 1971
    ...Trial Rule 41(B), however, is applicable to such non-jury cases when a motion similar to that here involved is made. Clark v. Melody Bar Inc. (1971) Ind.App., 271 N.E.2d 481; Flynn v. Reberger (1971) Ind.App., 270 N.E.2d 331. We, therefore, deem a waiver provision such as that contained in ......
  • Tilton v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • February 24, 1981
    ...clearly delineated between jury trials and court trials and held TR 50 applicable to the former. See, e. g., Clark v. Melody Bar, Inc. (1971), 149 Ind.App. 245, 271 N.E.2d 481. However, the bare language of TR 50(A)(5) is, at least, fairly susceptible to interpretation as recognizing an alt......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT