Clark v. Mincks
| Decision Date | 20 March 1985 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 83-343,83-1164,s. 83-343 |
| Citation | 364 N.W.2d 226 |
| Parties | Michael James CLARK and Shirley J. Clark, Individually, and Michael James Clark, Administrator of the Estate of Michelle Lynn Clark, Deceased, Appellants, v. Robert G. MINCKS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Nancy Mincks, Deceased, and Gale Bogle, Defendants, and William E. Mincks and Larry Rex Mincks, Appellees. Michael James CLARK and Shirley J. Clark, Individually, and Michael James Clark, Administrator of the Estate of Michelle Lynn Clark, Deceased, Appellees, v. Robert G. MINCKS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Nancy Mincks, Deceased, Defendants, Gale Bogle, Appellant, and William E. Mincks and Larry Rex Mincks, Defendants. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Tom Riley, Peter C. Riley, and Mary K. Hoefer of Tom Riley Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, for appellants Clark.
James R. Snyder and Gregory M. Lederer of Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Ellwood, Cedar Rapids, for appellant Bogle.
Stephen A. Richardson, Bloomfield, for appellees William E. and Larry Rex Mincks.
Considered en banc.
Plaintiffs Clark assert three claims growing out of an alleged wrongful death: one against the owner and the estate of the deceased driver of the van which was involved, another against the hosts of a cookout which the deceased driver had attended, and the third against a passenger in the van. These two consolidated appeals involve the latter two claims.
The appeals present two basic tort liability questions, and come to us on the pleadings and results of discovery. One appeal is founded on the hosts' alleged giving alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated guest (the driver of the van). The other appeal is founded on an alleged duty of care by a passenger in a motor vehicle for the safety of another passenger.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants William E. and Larry Rex Mincks (the Mincks) hosted a rural party during the late afternoon and evening of October 1 and into October 2, 1982, and gave beer or other intoxicants to (now) decedent Nancy Mincks when she was intoxicated. Plaintiffs had their children at the party, one of whom was Michelle Lynn Clark. Nancy Mincks and others, including Michelle, entered a van owned by Nancy's husband, and Nancy operated it. The van flipped onto its side and continued rolling over, and Nancy and Michelle were killed. In one count plaintiffs ask damages of the Mincks for Michelle's death.
The Mincks moved to dismiss plaintiffs' petition for failure to state a claim, on the ground that a cause of action against social hosts does not arise from injuries flowing from the hosts' giving intoxicants to a guest. The district court sustained the motion, and we granted plaintiffs' application to appeal.
In another count plaintiffs asserted a claim against defendant Gale Bogle for Michelle's death. Bogle moved for summary judgment as to this count. We thus look to the documentation in the case which was before the district court. Viewing that documentation in plaintiffs' favor, Tasco, Inc. v. Winkel, 281 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa 1979), findings could be made that Nancy Mincks began drinking about noon on October 1st before she came to the cookout, and then drank again in the evening at the cookout until late that night; that she drank over ten twelve-ounce cups of beer at the cookout, had difficulty standing, and spilled beer on one of the hosts; that Bogle knew she was too drunk to drive and at one point in the evening held her up to prevent her from stumbling; and that at the time of the mishap her blood-alcohol level was .222 milligrams percent.
The following additional findings could be made. Nancy and Mrs. Bogle had brought quarters for their children to use in playing video games. About midnight Nancy and Bogle decided that at least some of the people remaining at the party should take the children into town to a tavern which had video games. Mrs. Bogle loaded the Bogle car with girls, and departed for town. She did not have room, however, for Michelle or for the boys. Nancy brought her husband's van around to the picnic site, and urged others to climb in and go to town. Bogle got into the van--the only adult beside Nancy--as well as plaintiffs' small son and another boy. Michelle was playing on the van steps.
Plaintiff Shirley J. Clark, aware of Nancy's condition, asked Nancy's husband, Robert G. Mincks, not to let her drive, and requested plaintiff Michael J. Clark to remove their son from the van. Robert made the request of Nancy, and Michael assured Shirley that Nancy would not drive. Plaintiffs then removed their son from the van; the other boy remained in the vehicle. A finding could reasonably be made that Bogle knew plaintiffs did not want their children to ride with Nancy.
At some point Michelle also entered the van, and the van departed. Plaintiff Michael J. Clark thought Michelle was in the first carload, but plaintiff Shirley J. Clark knew the girl was in the van.
Plaintiffs soon left in a third vehicle for the tavern. On the way they came upon the wrecked van, and found that Nancy and Michelle had been killed.
The district court overruled Bogle's motion for summary judgment in material part.
1. Hosts' giving intoxicants. We first take up plaintiffs' claim that a common-law cause of action for negligence exists against the Mincks for Michelle's death, arising from the Mincks' giving Nancy intoxicants when she was intoxicated. Plaintiffs claim the negligence arises here from violation of a statute. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965) (). They rely on section 123.49(1) of the Iowa Code of 1983:
No person shall sell, dispense, or give to any intoxicated person, or one simulating intoxication, any alcoholic liquor or beer.
As the question arises from a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we take plaintiffs' allegations in their petition as true and construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the pleaders. Salsbury Laboratories v. Iowa DEQ, 276 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Iowa 1979).
Most of the cases which have come before this court involving the furnishing of intoxicants to another person arose in the dramshop context. This one however involves social hosts. Two problems arise: whether a cause of action can exist at all outside the dramshop context and, if so, whether we should reject such a cause of action in the social setting for policy reasons.
A. Our present statute involving liability for providing liquor to another, whereby a third person is injured, does not create liability in the present context; it is limited to liability of a licensee or permittee of a liquor or beer establishment. Iowa Code § 123.92 (1983). Can a common-law cause of action arise in the non-licensee or non-permittee setting? Two of our recent decisions, one of which was decided after the district court's ruling here, so indicate.
Formerly this court and courts in general held that a person who furnished intoxicants to another, who in turn injured a third person, was not liable to the third person, because the consumption of the liquor and not the furnishing of the liquor was the proximate cause of the injury. Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958). That decision, however, came into question in Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977). In Lewis a state liquor store employee sold liquor to a minor in violation of a statute prohibiting such sales. Iowa Code § 123.43 (1971). Lewis did not rely on the dramshop statute but on common-law negligence arising from violation of section 123.43, and made a frontal attack on Cowman. We said:
We therefore hold the sale or furnishing of intoxicating liquor in violation of section 123.43 may well be the proximate cause of injuries sustained as a result of an intoxicated individual's tortious conduct and liability may thus be imposed upon the violators in favor of the injured, innocent third party. The question of proximate cause under such facts and circumstances would be for the trier of fact.
Consequently, the trial court correctly overruled the State's motion for summary judgment insofar as it relied upon absence of proximate cause as a matter of law.
To the extent that any of our prior decisions are inconsistent with this conclusion, they are hereby overruled in this respect.
We note, however, that our holding was in the context of a commercial sale of liquor in a store and not in the social setting we have here. Moreover, Nancy was an adult, and the sale in Lewis was to a minor. In the Lewis opinion, however, we predicated negligence on violation of statute, and we cited the Restatement sections on statutory violations as negligence. We did not restrict that rationale to statutes dealing with minors.
The other recent decision is Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1984). One part of Haafke involved sales of intoxicants to a minor or to an intoxicated person, by employees of the licensee or permittee. A question in the case was whether those employees would be liable to an injured person on a common-law basis. The vote of this court was somewhat splintered, but a majority of the court held that such liability would arise. The court stated:
Applying the principles of common-law liability discussed above, we hold that these employees may be held liable under common law for negligence in furnishing liquor to Miller, and such negligence may be based upon violations of statute or ordinance as alleged here, under the authority of Lewis. This liability is not preempted by the dram shop act.
Id. at 388. Nowhere in the opinion did the court limit the employee's liability for sales to an intoxicated person to cases in which the intoxicated person was also a minor.
We thus hold as in Haafke that a common-law cause of action can arise from a sale in violation of section 123.49(1). We note again, however, that the dispensing of intoxicants in Haafke took place in the frame of reference...
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