Clark v. Moore

• Decision Date: 30 September 1872
• Citation: 1872 WL 8306,64 Ill. 273
• Parties: HARVEY S. CLARK et al.v.IMLAY MOORE et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

64 Ill. 273

1872 WL 8306 (Ill.)

HARVEY S. CLARK et al.

v.IMLAY MOORE et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1872.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. EDWIN S. LELAND, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. CROOKER & HUNTER, and Messrs. ELDRIDGE & LEWIS, for the appellants.

Messrs. BUSHNELL & BULL, for the appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

It appears that one George Wells, of the city of Mendota, in the year 1869, erected and put into operation an oil mill in that place; that appellees furnished $10,000 worth of machinery for the purpose of completing the factory; that Clark, Davis and Dawson furnished materials for the structure, and Gilmore and Price held mortgages on the property. Clark and Davis filed a petition against Wells to enforce a mechanic's lien, and Dawson became a party, he filing a bill of interpleader; and at the February term, 1870, of the circuit court of LaSalle county, a decree was rendered in their favor, and against the lots, and ordering their sale. In that decree the court found and established their rights, and those of Price and Gilmore as mortgagees of the property. To that proceeding appellees were in nowise made parties.

Under that decree the premises were sold and bid in by appellants' attorney on the 15th of April, 1870, and the certificate of purchase was assigned by him to them subsequent to that time.

After the decree and sale, appellees, with the assent of Wells, were proceeding to remove the machinery from the oil mill in which Wells had placed it, but were prevented by an injunction issued out of and under an order of the county court of LaSalle county.

Appellees, on the 27th of January, 1871, filed this petition, in which they set up their lien as material-men; charge they were not made parties to the proceeding instituted by appellants, and had no notice thereof; charge that they were purposely kept ignorant of the proceeding, and that appellants fraudulently obtained a decree for more than was due them, and that the property sold for a sum greatly less than its value. They made appellants and others defendants, pray for answers not under oath, and that the liens of appellants be declared subordinate to theirs; that an account be taken, and it be ascertained how much was due to appellants; that their lien be decreed subject to that of appellees; that the decree in the former mechanic's lien suit be set aside, and if necessary they be permitted to interplead; that the sale be set aside, or if that could not be done, then they be allowed to participate pro rata in the proceeds of the sale under the former decree, and for general relief.

On a hearing in the court below, a decree was rendered setting aside the sale, and appellees were found to hold a lien on the premises to the extent of their claim; the rights of all the parties were established and the property ordered to be sold to satisfy the several liens; and the record is brought to this court on appeal, and a reversal is asked.

It is urged that the circuit court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a bill, under the statute, to set aside a former decree for any reason, and to let in parties in interest to participate in the fund upon which they have a mechanic's or other lien. This case is unembarrassed with any question as to the rights of third parties purchasing at the master's sale, as the property was purchased for and is held by the complainants in the former suit. The parties holding the certificate of purchase are the same persons who were parties to the first suit. The question is, whether their rights have been so far changed by that proceeding that the purchasers have acquired an advantage against which the court is powerless to afford relief.

The 23d section of the Mechanic's Lien Law declares that in proceedings under that act the courts are vested with all powers of courts of chancery, and shall be governed by the rules of proceeding and decisions thereof, so far as the same are applicable and may be necessary to carry into full and complete effect the provisions of that statute. This is a broad and comprehensive delegation of power to the courts. In carrying into effect the provisions of the statute, they may entertain any bill or proceeding, and render any decree, that a court of chancery might, to secure and enforce the rights of parties. Then if a court of equity has power, after a sale on the foreclosure of one of two mortgages which are equal liens, and the other mortgagee has not been made a party to the suit for foreclosure, to afford relief and to adjust the equities of the parties; or if a court of chancery may adjust the rights of two persons holding equal equitable liens on the same property where one, without making the other a party to a suit, has obtained a decree establishing and enforcing his equity, then the court unquestionably has equal power in a case arising under this statute. It is a rule of uniform application of courts of justice that a party can not be deprived of his rights without a hearing, or at least an opportunity to be heard, in defense of his rights. This lies at the very foundation of all just jurisprudence, and is the reason why courts of equity always require all persons interested in the subject matter of the litigation to be made parties and to be before the court before their rights are or can be affected. It is a rule of chancery practice and of equity law that a person who is not a party to a suit is wholly unaffected by its decree, unless he is a privy. The rights of a person not a party or privy to a judgment or decree remain as wholly unaffected as if it had not been rendered. It would be useless to cite authorities on so elementary a proposition, as the books abound in them and the rule is familiar to all persons in the profession.

There can be no question that if a person holding a junior or even an equal equitable lien were to obtain a decree enforcing his lien, without making the person holding the superior lien a party, he would hold subject to the superior lien as though he had not obtained his decree; or if he failed to make one holding an equal lien a party, they would hold precisely as they did before. A decree to which a person is not a party or privy has no binding force upon him, and a court of equity will recognize and enforce his rights as though the decree had not been rendered, unless a sale has been had under it and the rights of innocent bona fide purchasers have intervened, which in some cases would be protected. But even in that case the person obtaining the decree would be required by a court of equity to recognize the equities of the other equal lien holder; and the court has the same power, and it is made its duty under the statute, to adopt the same rule of decision in this class of cases that is acted upon by courts of chancery.

If, then, appellees held an equal or superior lien on this property with other lien holders, and they, in endeavoring to enforce theirs, failed to make appellees parties to...