Clark v. Paul Gray

• Decision Date: 17 April 1939
• Docket Number: No. 534,534
• Parties: CLARK, Director of Motor Vehicles, et al. v. PAUL GRAY, Inc., et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

306 U.S. 583

59 S.Ct. 744

83 L.Ed. 1001

CLARK, Director of Motor Vehicles, et al.

v PAUL GRAY, Inc., et al.

No. 534.

Argued March 27, 1939.

Decided April 17, 1939.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.

[Syllabus from pages 583-585 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Amos M. Mathews, of Chicago, Ill., and Frank W. Richards, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellants.

Mr. Everett W. Mattoon, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees.

Mr. Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The principal questions for decision are whether the California Caravan Act of 1937, exacting fees aggregating $15 for each automobile driven into the state for sale, imposes a forbidden burden on interstate commerce or infringes the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const.

This is an appeal under §§ 238(3), 266 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §§ 345(3), 380, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 345(3), 380, from a final decree of the district court for southern California, three judges sitting, enjoining appellants, officers of the State of California, from enforcing the license and fee provisions of Chapter 788, p. 2253, California Statutes of 1937. Gray v. Ingels, D.C., 23 F.Supp. 946.¹

The statute, known as the Caravan Act, was enacted as a substitute for the Caravan Act of 1935, c. 402, p. 1453, Cal.Stat.1935, held invalid in Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290, 57 S.Ct. 439, 81 L.Ed. 653, as an infringement of the commerce clause. 'Caravaning' is defined in § 1 of the present Act as the 'transportation of any vehicle * * * operated on its own wheels, or in tow of a motor vehicle, for the purpose of selling or offering the same for sale * * * within or without this State.' Sections 4, 5 and 6 exact in lieu of all other fees two license fees, each of $7.50 for a six months permit for caravaning a vehicle on the state highways. One of these is 'to reimburse the State for expense incurred in administering police regulations pertaining to the operation of vehicles moved pursuant to such permits and to public safety upon the highways as affected by such operation'; the other is declared to be 'compensation for the privilege of using the public highways'. Section 8, excepts from the operation of the statute vehicles moving wholly within either of two zones which are approximately the northern and southern halves of the state. Other sections of the Act make provision for the issuance of licenses and the collection of fees. Section 12 provides for the collection of fees by seizure and sale of vehicles transported in violation of the Act, and § 13 prescribes criminal penalties for violation.

Appellees, numerous individuals, copartnerships and corporations, joined in bringing the present suit against appellants, state officers charged with the duty of enforcing the Act, alleging that each appellee had driven and would in the course of business drive automobiles into California for the purpose of sale. They prayed an injunction restraining appellants from collecting the fees and enforcing the provisions of the statute in aid of their collection. The district court's findings state that the amount involved in the action is in excess of the sum of $3,000; that each of appellees, in the course of business of selling motor cars, purchases cars previously registered in other states and 'caravans' them into the state of California; that cars for sale are often moved between points in a state zone; that the operation of cars in caravans does not create an additional hazard or a traffic problem necessitating special policing of the caravans and that the caravaning of cars does not create undue wear and tear on the highways of the state; that the fees charged are excessive and bear no relation to the added expense to the motor vehicle department of policing the highways of the state of California; and that they are disproportionate to other taxes or license fees charged by the state for the use of the highways. The court concluded that the statute discriminated against interstate commerce, deprived appellees of their property without due process, and denied to them equal protection of the laws, in that it applies only to those using the highways for the transportation of motor vehicles for the purposes of sale and does not apply to other persons using the highways under comparable circumstances.

Appellants assail here the findings of fact of the court below on which it predicated its conclusion of unconstitutionality, and insist that upon the evidence there is no basis for the conclusion that the fees exacted are excessive or that there is discrimination against interstate commerce or a denial of equal protection or due process.

Jurisdiction of the District Court.

A motion of appellants in the court below to dismiss the bill of complaint for want of the jurisdictional amount was withdrawn, and the jurisdiction of the district court is not challenged here. But on the argument, it appearing doubtful whether the 'matter in controversy' exceeded 'the sum or value of' $3,000, § 24(1) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(1), we raised the question whether the jurisdictional amount was involved, as was our duty. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511, 28 L.Ed. 462; Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 282 U.S. 10, 13, 51 S.Ct. 8, 9, 75 L.Ed. 135; St. Paul Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 287, 58 S.Ct. 586, 589, 82 L.Ed. 845, note 10. The bill of complaint alleges generally that 'the amount involved in this litigation is in excess of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs'. But it is plain that this allegation is insufficient to satisfy jurisdictional requirements where there are numerous plaintiffs having no joint or common interest or title in the subject matter of the suit. As the bill of complaint shows on its face, and as the findings establish, each appellee maintains his own separate and independent business, which is said to be affected by the challenged fees. No joint or common interest of appellees in the subject matter of the suit is shown. Cf. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L.Ed. —-, decided this day.

It is a familiar rule that when several plaintiffs assert separate and distinct demands in a single suit, the amount involved in each separate controversy must be of the requisite amount to be within the jurisdiction of the district court, and that those amounts cannot be added together to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379, 21 S.Ct. 402, 45 L.Ed. 583; Rogers v. Hennepin County, 239 U.S. 621, 36 S.Ct. 217, 60 L.Ed. 469; Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 36 S.Ct. 416, 60$L.Ed. 817; Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243, 40 S.Ct. 503, 64 L.Ed. 883. The general allegation in the bill of complaint that 'the amount involved in this litigation is in excess of' $3,000 and the finding of the court that 'the amount involved in the within action' exceeds the jurisdictional amount, give no indication that the amount in controversy with respect to the claim of any single plaintiff exceeds the jurisdictional amount and are insufficient to show that the district court had jurisdiction of the cause. Pinel v. Pinel, supra.

Examination of the record shows that only in the case of a single appellee, Paul Gray, Inc., is there any allegation or proof tending to show the amount in controversy. As to it the bill of complaint alleges that 'it causes to be caravaned into the said state * * * approximately one hundred fifty (150) automobiles each year.' This allegation is supported by evidence that this appellee is regularly engaged in the business and tending to show that its volume exceeded that amount when the act went into effect July 2, 1937. Since the amount in controversy in a suit to restrain illegal imposition of fees or taxes is the amount of the fees or taxes which would normally be collected during the period of the litigation, Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 54 S.Ct. 700, 78 L.Ed. 1248, we cannot say, upon this state of the record, that jurisdiction was not established as to appellee Paul Gray, Inc.

We ignore affidavits filed here for the purpose of supplementing the record by showing the amount in controversy as to another appellee. While it has been the prac- tice of this Court to receive affidavits for the purpose of establishing its own appellate jurisdiction under statutes prescribing that a specified amount in controversy is prerequisite to the appeal, Williamson v. Kincaid, 4 Dall. 20, 1 L.Ed. 723; Rush v. Parker, 5 Cranch 287, 3 L.Ed. 103; Roura v. Government of Philippine Islands, 218 U.S. 386, 31 S.Ct. 73, 54 L.Ed. 1080; see Red River Cattle Co. v. Needham, 137 U.S. 632, 11 S.Ct. 208, 34 L.Ed. 799, that procedure is inapplicable here. Our review of the action of the district court in assuming jurisdiction is confined to the record before the district court. Henneford v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 303 U.S. 17, 58 S.Ct. 415, 82 L.Ed. 619.

Proper practice requires that where each of several plaintiffs is bound to establish the jurisdictional amount with respect to his own claim, the suit should be dismissed as to those who fail to show that the requisite amount is involved.² Otherwise an appellate court could be called on to sustain a decree in favor of a plaintiff who had not shown that the claim involved the jurisdictional amount, even though the suit were dismissed on the merits as to e other plaintiffs who had established the jurisdictional amount for themselves. Although it appears that such a result could not follow here, we think it better practice to dismiss the suit for want of the jurisdictional amount as to all appellees except Paul Gray, Inc. See Rich v. Lambert, 12 How. 347, 13 L.Ed. 1017; Ex parte Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 106 U.S. 5, 1 S.Ct. 35, 27 L.Ed. 78; Hassall v. Wilcox, 115 U.S. 598, 6 S.Ct....