Clark v. People of State
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
| Writing for the Court | WILSON |
| Citation | 1833 WL 2696,1 Scam. 117,2 Ill. 117 |
| Parties | REUBEN CLARK, plaintiff in error,v.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, defendants in error. |
| Decision Date | 31 December 1833 |
1 Scam. 117
2 Ill. 117
1833 WL 2696 (Ill.)
REUBEN CLARK, plaintiff in error,
v.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, defendants in error.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
December Term, 1833.
THIS action was tried at the March term, 1833, of the Hamilton Circuit Court, before the Hon. Thomas C. Browne.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty against Reuben Clark, the plaintiff in error, and the Court gave sentence that he should be imprisoned in the county jail three weeks, pay a fine of $360 and the costs of the prosecution, and that he should be publicly whipped thirty-nine lashes on his bare back.
The errors assigned are:
1. The refusal of the Court to grant a change of venue.
2. The refusal of the Court to quash the indictment.
WALTER B. SCATES, for the plaintiff in error, made the following points, and cited the annexed authorities:
1. The indictment does not charge the crime to have been committed with a felonious intent.
2. It does not state the value of the property burned.
3. There is error in the judgment of the Court in overruling the defendant's motion for a change of venue.
At common law the venue must be laid where the offense was committed. 1 Chit. C. L. 177, 178; 4 Blac. Com. 303. And at common law the venue was matter of substance. 1 Chit. C. L. 177. And so strict was the law in this respect, that where an offense was commenced in one county and consummated in another, it could be tried in neither (except some crimes, as larceny in some cases). 1 Chit. C. L. 178; 4 Blac. Com. 303.
But this strictness has been remedied by statutes, so that the defendant may be tried where the death happened, or the guilt was contracted, or the offense consummated, or where the offender was apprehended, or in the adjacent county, or in any county. 1 Chit. C. L. 179, 180, 181, 182. But notwithstanding
[2 Ill. 118]
this great strictness of the common law, the Court possessed a discretionary power to change the venue when a fair and impartial trial could not be had in the county. 1 Chit. C. L. 201, 327, 494, 495. The courts at common law possessed the like power in civil cases. 1 Tidd's Pr. 548-9. A certiorari lay at common law to remove an indictment at any time before trial, which was one mode of changing the venue. 1 Chit. C. L. 327, 371, 378. 4 Blac. Com. 320, 321. See further as to venue, 2 John. Dig. 276, 278.Penal statutes must be construed strictly, and in favor of life and liberty. 4 Blac. Com. 86, 89, and notes; 4 Blac. Com. 373, 240 (note 10), 375-6, 397, 401; 1 Chit. C. L. 218; Foster's C. L. 78, 355-8. 1 Am. Dig. 269; 2 Am. Dig. 285, 495; 2 East, C. L. 592-3, 614-15, 629; Stat. 10, 11 Wm. 642-3, 1099.
In capital cases, the defendant stands upon all his rights, and can not consent to his prejudice. Breese, 109. Foster, 126, 355-6; and by the Constitution of this State, an impartial trial by jury is secured to every man. § 9, Article 8. See also Foster C. L. 398. And the statute providing the mode of changing the venue is peremptory that the court shall award a change when the application is made in the mode and for the causes set out in the statute. (R. L. 607; Gale's Stat. 682.)
There is error in the judgment of the Court in overruling the defendant's motion to quash, and sustaining the indictment.
Arson is felony at the common law, 4 Blac. Com. 94, 221-2; 2 East C. L. 1015, 1021, and must be malicious. 4 Blac. Com. 222; 2 East, C. L. 1019, 1033.
The criminal intention must accompany the act, and from the intention alone is it determinable whether the act be criminal or innocent. It is alone punishable, being the very gist of the charge, and certain technical words alone express that intention according to the different degrees of guilt, and they can not be supplied by any circumlocution or inference. 1 East, C. L. 446-7. As in burglary, a mere breaking and entry does not constitute and complete the offense, but it is necessary to charge and prove a felonious intent; and that charge is contained alone in the words burglariously and feloniously. 1 Chit. C. L. 172, 242-3; 4 Blac. Com. 307, 338-9; Foster's C. L. 108; 2 East, C. L, 513-14, 778, 816, 1015, 1021, 1028-9, 1033.
The same doctrine applies to other felonies.
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S. Union Co. v. United States, No. 11–94.
...of treble damages for all stolen items in larceny prosecution when indictment alleged value of only some of the items); Clark v. People, 2 Ill. 117, 120–121 (1833) (arson indictment must allege value of destroyed building because 567 U.S. 355statute imposed "a fine equal in value to the pro......
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S. Union Co. v. United States, No. 11–94.
...of treble damages for all stolen items in larceny prosecution when indictment alleged value of only some of the items); Clark v. People, 2 Ill. 117, 120–121 (1833) (arson indictment must allege value of destroyed building because statute imposed “a fine equal in value to the property burned......
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Glos v. Garrett
...to one who brings himself within the provisions of the statute is imperative and admits of the exercise of no discretion. Clark v. People, 1 Scam. 117. But the statute requires reasonable notice, and what is reasonable notice in a particular case must be left to the discretion of the judge ......
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Dunn v. People of State
...requirements of the statute, the obligation of the judge is imperative, and admits of the exercise of no discretion. Clark v. The People, 1 Scam. 117; McGoon v. Little, 2 Gilm. 42. It is only when the material facts are disputed that the court can pass upon the facts, as alleged. This right......
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S. Union Co. v. United States, No. 11–94.
...of treble damages for all stolen items in larceny prosecution when indictment alleged value of only some of the items); Clark v. People, 2 Ill. 117, 120–121 (1833) (arson indictment must allege value of destroyed building because statute imposed “a fine equal in value to the property burned......
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Glos v. Garrett
...to one who brings himself within the provisions of the statute is imperative and admits of the exercise of no discretion. Clark v. People, 1 Scam. 117. But the statute requires reasonable notice, and what is reasonable notice in a particular case must be left to the discretion of the judge ......
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Dunn v. People of State
...requirements of the statute, the obligation of the judge is imperative, and admits of the exercise of no discretion. Clark v. The People, 1 Scam. 117; McGoon v. Little, 2 Gilm. 42. It is only when the material facts are disputed that the court can pass upon the facts, as alleged. This right......
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Burke v. Mayall
...of venue; and it was error to deny the granting of it. McGoon v. Little, 7 Ill. 42, cited in 7 U. S. Digest, 479; Clark v. The People, 2 Ill. 117. Page Points and authorities for respondent: — 1. The affidavit to procure a change of venue is wholly insufficient in not stating any facts upon......