Clark v. Peugh

• Decision Date: 25 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 1048 WDA 2020,1048 WDA 2020
• Parties: Claude D. CLARK, Appellant v. Walter R. PEUGH
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

257 A.3d 1260

Claude D. CLARK, Appellant

v.Walter R. PEUGH

No. 1048 WDA 2020

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted May 24, 2021

Filed: June 25, 2021

Stanley Booker, New Castle, appellant.

Joran Shuber, Butler, appellee.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.^*

OPINION BY COLINS, J.:

Appellant Claude D. Clark appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Civil Division ("trial court") sustaining the preliminary objections of Appellee Walter R. Peugh and dismissing Clark's complaint. We affirm.

Clark initiated this action by filing a complaint against Peugh on January 22, 2020. According to the complaint, Clark and Peugh were both present at the Brick House Bar in Butler, Pennsylvania on December 27, 2017. Complaint ¶3. Peugh, who was "extremely intoxicated," insulted several female patrons of the bar, including Clark's sister. Id. ¶¶4-6. Clark took offense and pushed Peugh out of the bar, which resulted in Peugh striking his head on a gate or on the ground. Id. ¶7. Peugh was taken to the hospital after the incident and was released the next day with no further treatment. Id. ¶¶8-9.

Clark was ultimately sentenced in connection with his attack on Peugh, and was ordered to pay $27,000 in restitution to Peugh for lost wages based on Peugh's representations that he was unable to work at his employer, Folse Land Services, LLC, from the date of the incident through March 19, 2018. Id. ¶¶10-13. However, Clark alleged that Peugh did not in fact miss any work but instead that he formed a limited liability company, Peugh Land Services, LLC, through which he received income during the period when he claimed to have been unable to work. Id. ¶¶14-15. The complaint included two counts: first, Clark contended that Peugh was unjustly enriched in the amount of $27,000, and, second, that Peugh fraudulently misrepresented that he incurred $27,000 in lost wages, which Clark relied upon in agreeing to the restitution amount. Id. ¶¶16-26.

On May 12, 2020, Peugh filed preliminary objections to the complaint, asserting two objections. First, Peugh argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the claims were legally insufficient because Clark's sole recourse in obtaining relief from the restitution order was to seek amendment of the sentencing order in the court where he was sentenced, the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County ("sentencing court"). Preliminary Objections ¶¶11-19. Second, Peugh argued that Clark failed to state a claim with respect to the fraudulent misrepresentation count because Peugh's alleged misrepresentations were not made to Clark personally. Id. ¶¶20-26.

On September 2, 2020, the trial court heard oral argument on the objections. At the conclusion of argument, the court entered an order sustaining both preliminary objections and dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Order, 9/2/20. On October 1, 2020, Clark filed a timely appeal of this order and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

On November 23, 2020, the trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court first found that Clark waived his appellate arguments by failing to file a brief in response to the preliminary objections as directed by the court's June 2, 2020 order. Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/20, at 3-4. With respect to the merits of the preliminary objections, the trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the complaint based on the fact that Clark had an appropriate remedy to challenge his restitution in the sentencing court under the Crimes Code. Id. at 6-7 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(c)(3) ). The court reasoned that permitting Clark's civil suit to proceed would allow him to unilaterally alter his sentence and thereby circumvent the criminal punishment that was imposed upon him. Id. at 7-9. The trial court further found that Clark's fraudulent misrepresentation claim was legally insufficient because the alleged misrepresentations by Peugh were not made directly to Clark but rather to the district attorney's office, which then communicated this information to the sentencing court. Id. at 10-12.

Clark raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the common pleas court err in dismissing [Clark's] complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction?

1. Did the common pleas court err in dismissing [Clark's] complaint with prejudice for legal insufficiency of a pleading?

Clark's Brief at 10 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).¹

Prior to reaching Clark's appellate arguments, we first review the trial court's determination that Clark waived his appellate issues by failing to file a response to Peugh's preliminary objections. In reviewing the question of whether a party waived an appellate issue, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Jones v. Ott , 648 Pa. 76, 191 A.3d 782, 787 n.7 (2018).

Generally, "[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). However, with respect to preliminary objections, this Court has held that the "[f]ailure of the trial court to consider the sufficiency of the complaint before sustaining preliminary objections and dismissing the case without leave to amend is an abuse of discretion." Schuylkill Navy v. Langbord , 728 A.2d 964, 968 (Pa. Super. 1999). Therefore, "an order sustaining preliminary objections based solely on the failure of a party to file timely a responsive brief or memorandum of law, without considering whether the complaint sufficiently pled a cause of action, amounts to an abuse of discretion." Id. As our Supreme Court explained in Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. Roberts , 576 Pa. 231, 839 A.2d 185 (2003) :

There is no requirement in the Rules of Civil Procedure that the non-moving party respond to a preliminary objection, nor must that party defend claims asserted in the complaint. Failure to respond does not sustain the moving party's objections by default, nor does it waive or abandon the claim.

Id. at 190.

Recently, in Murray v. American Lafrance, LLC , 234 A.3d 782 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc ), this Court distinguished Uniontown Newspapers as that case concerned a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, whereas in Murray the objection was to personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 787. In Murray , this Court highlighted that when a party challenging personal jurisdiction brings forth evidence in support of the objection, the burden shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate that jurisdiction is proper and discovery may be required to resolve the objection. Id. at 787-88. Therefore, we held that the plaintiffs’ failure to assert a basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant in their response to the preliminary objections resulted in waiver of that issue for the purpose of appeal. Id. at 787-89.

In the present case, Appellants’ preliminary objections were based on the "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action," Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(a)(1), and the "legal insufficiency of the pleading (demurrer)." Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(a)(4). As stated above, Clark's failure to respond to Peugh's demurrer does not lead to the sustaining of the objection by default or the waiver of Clark's appellate arguments. Uniontown Newspapers , 839 A.2d at 190 Schuylkill Navy , 728 A.2d at 968.

With respect to the jurisdictional objection, while subject matter jurisdiction is similar to personal jurisdiction in that it concerns "a trial court's fundamental authority to enter judgment against a defendant," Murray , 234 A.3d at 787, unlike personal jurisdiction, the subject matter jurisdiction analysis does not require that the lower court take discovery or engage in fact-finding. Rather, the question of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action is a "pure question of law" focusing solely on "whether that tribunal is competent to determine controversies of the general class to which the case presented for its consideration belongs." Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5, of Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia , 634 Pa. 326, 129 A.3d 1221, 1228 n.6 (2015) ; Mazur v. Trinity Area School District , 599 Pa. 232, 961 A.2d 96, 101 (2008) (citation omitted). Moreover, it is well-established that a court's subject matter jurisdiction to hear a controversy is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings or even by a court sua sponte . Mazur , 961 A.2d at 101 ; Cobbs v. SEPTA , 985 A.2d 249, 255 (Pa. Super. 2009). Accordingly, we find Murray distinguishable and conclude that Clark's failure to respond to Peugh's subject matter objection does not support the sustaining of the objection by default nor does it result in the waiver of Clark's arguments in opposition to the objection. Mazur , 961 A.2d at 101.²

In his first appellate issue, Clark argues that the trial court erred in sustaining Peugh's subject matter jurisdiction objection because the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over the fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment causes of action asserted in Clark's complaint. As stated above, the pertinent inquiry in determining whether a court has subjection matter jurisdiction is "whether that tribunal is competent to determine controversies of the general class to which the case presented for its consideration belongs." Lutz Lodge No. 5 , 129 A.3d at 1228 n.6. Our analysis focuses on whether the court "had power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether it might ultimately decide that it was unable to grant the relief sought in the particular case." Heath v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole) , 580 Pa. 174, 860 A.2d 25, 29 (2004) (citation omitted).

Under Section 931(a) of the Judicial Code, Pennsylvania courts of common pleas have "unlimited original jurisdiction [over] all actions and proceedings,...