Clark v. Robison
| Decision Date | 28 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 27744,27744 |
| Citation | 944 P.2d 788,113 Nev. 949 |
| Parties | Mark Bryan CLARK, Appellant, v. Kent ROBISON, Individually and d/b/a Robison, Belaustegui, Robb and Sharp, and David McElhinney, Individually and as Partner, Employee and Agent of Robinson, Belaustegui, Robb and Sharp, Respondents. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Mark Bryan Clark was convicted of murder with use of a deadly weapon in 1986, and the conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in 1987. In 1988, Clark petitioned the district court for post-conviction relief on the ground that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because, at the time of his murder trial, his defense counsel was suing him in an unrelated civil action. In 1990, the district court denied Clark's petition. This court, in 1992, reversed the order of the district court and granted Clark post-conviction relief. In 1993, Clark was acquitted on retrial.
Clark subsequently brought a legal malpractice action against his trial counsel. The district court granted the trial counsel's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the four-year statute of limitations had expired. Clark now appeals from the order granting summary judgment.
Summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact remain for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bird v. Casa Royale West, 97 Nev. 67, 624 P.2d 17 (1981). Summary judgment is proper when a cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Charleson v. Hardesty, 108 Nev. 878, 839 P.2d 1303 (1992).
NRS 11.207 outlines the statute of limitations period for legal malpractice as four years from the time the plaintiff sustains damages and discovers or should have discovered the material facts contributing to the cause of action. In determining whether a statute of limitations has run against an action, the time must be computed from the day the cause of action accrued. White v. Sheldon, 4 Nev. 280, 288-89 (1868). A cause of action "accrues" when a suit may be maintained thereon. Black's Law Dictionary at 19 (5th ed. 1979). Damages for attorney malpractice are premature and speculative until the conclusion of the underlying lawsuit in which the professional negligence allegedly occurred; therefore, the statute of limitations begins to run when the underlying litigation is concluded. K.J.B. v. Drakulich, 107 Nev. 367, 811 P.2d 1305 (1991).
In a legal malpractice case arising from criminal defense, however, proximate cause does not exist until post-conviction or appellate relief is granted. Morgano v. Smith, 110 Nev. 1025, 1029, 879 P.2d 735, 737 (1994). "[T]he plaintiff must plead that he or she has obtained appellate or post conviction relief in order to overcome a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss." Id.
Robison argues that Clark had discovered the malpractice at least by the time he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing and on direct appeal. Robison contends that this discovery coupled with the damages Clark sustained by being convicted and imprisoned commenced the running of the statute of limitations under NRS 11.207.
Criminal defendants claiming attorney malpractice are in a distinct circumstance with regard to statutes of limitation in that their causes of action do not accrue or become actionable until they are granted appellate or post-conviction relief. 1 See Morgano, 110 Nev. 1025, 879 P.2d 735. Prior to gaining such relief, a cause of action for legal malpractice lacks the essential element of proximate causation and therefore would not survive a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.
Other states have addressed this issue, holding that a litigant's malpractice claim is not ripe until post-conviction or appellate relief is granted. Once relief is granted, the statute of limitations for legal malpractice begins to run. Shaw v. State, Dept. of Admin., PDA, 816...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mashaney v. Bd. of Indigents' Def. Servs.
...of malpractice action; desirable bright line rule undercut if made contingent on whether State decides to retry); Clark v. Robison, 113 Nev. 949, 951, 944 P.2d 788 (1997) (once relief from conviction granted, statute of limitations for legal malpractice claim begins to run); Stevens v. Bisp......
-
Dunn v. Christensen
...even though he reasonably believes counsel committed errors or omissions during the course of the proceedings. Clark v. Robison, 113 Nev. 949, 951, 944 P.2d 788, 790 (1997) (noting that a " 'no relief-no harm' approach" was specifically adopted because "proximate cause does not exist until ......
-
Urban Outfitters, Inc. v. Dermody Operating Co.
...actions. See NRS 11.190(1)(b). Limitations periods are computed "from the day the cause of action accrued." Clark v. Robison , 113 Nev. 949, 944 P.2d 788, 789 (1997). "A cause of action ‘accrues’ when a suit may be maintained thereon." Id. Nevada applies the discovery rule to contract actio......
-
Christensen v. Nguyen
...even though he reasonably believes counsel committed errors or omissions during the course of the proceedings. Clark v. Robison, 113 Nev. 949, 951, 944 P.2d 788, 790 (1997) (noting that a " 'no relief-no harm' approach" was specifically adopted because "proximate cause does not exist until ......
-
The Innocence Checklist
...Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a malpractice action accrued on the date on which post-conviction relief was granted); Clark v. Robison, 944 P.2d 788, 790 (Nev. 1997) (same); Humphries v. Detch, 712 S.E.2d 795, 801 (W. Va. 2011) (holding that a defendant had to prove actual innocence of both t......