Clark v. Sec'y

• Decision Date: 14 August 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:10-cv-547-J-39PDB
• Parties: RONALD D. WAYNE CLARK, JR., Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLA. DEP'T OF CORR., et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

RONALD D. WAYNE CLARK, JR., Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLA. DEP'T OF CORR., et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:10-cv-547-J-39PDB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

August 14, 2014

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Ronald D. Wayne Clark, Jr., who is represented by counsel,¹ filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) (Doc. 26) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and a Memorandum of Law in Support of Habeas Corpus Petition (Memorandum) (Doc. 27) on April28, 2011. He also filed an Appendix (Appendix) (Doc. 30).² Petitioner challenges a 1991 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for first degree murder and armed robbery. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition, see Respondents' Response to Order to Show Cause Why a Writ of Habeas Corpus Should Not be Granted (Response) (Doc. 36), and Respondents' Habeas Corpus Checklist [Exhibits] (Doc. 39).³ Petitioner submitted a brief in reply on November 16, 2011. See Petitioner's Reply to Response to Order to Show Cause Why a Writ of Habeas Corpus Should Not be Granted (Reply) (Doc. 48).

The Court, on August 24, 2012, granted Petitioner's Motion to Submit Supplemental Briefing on Martinez v. Ryan.⁴ See Order (Doc. 51). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Supplement to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 52), and Respondents filed a Response to Petitioner's Supplement to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 53).

The Court has considered all of the above and finds the case ripe for review as presented by counsel for Petitioner. Thus, theclaims raised in the Petition will be addressed by the Court. The claims are:

GROUND ONE: Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial, contrary to the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

GROUND TWO: The trial court erred in failing to properly evaluate, consider, find, and weigh mitigating factors.

GROUND THREE: The trial court erred in allowing the state to present the facts of Petitioner's prior murder conviction during the penalty phase solely through hearsay testimony of the lead police investigator.

GROUND FOUR: Petitioner was deprived of his rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, because the state withheld material, exculpatory evidence, and/or presented misleading evidence.

GROUND FIVE: Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of his trial, in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

GROUND SIX: Newly discovered evidence establishes that Petitioner's death sentence stands in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits the arbitrary or irrational imposition of the death penalty.

GROUND SEVEN: Petitioner was denied the right to a fair and impartial judge during his postconviction proceedings, in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

II. Procedural History

Petitioner was booked by the Office of Sheriff, Jacksonville, Florida, on February 16, 1990, for the offense of murder. Ex. 0 at 1-2.⁵ The trial court allowed the Public Defender to withdraw, and appointed Henry E. Davis, Esquire, as counsel for Petitioner.⁶ Id. at 5. On February 23, 1990, Petitioner was charged by information with second degree murder and armed robbery. Id. at 12-13. On March 22, 1990, by indictment, Petitioner was charged with murder in the first degree and armed robbery with a firearm. Id. at 20-22.

Petitioner, on April 3, 1990, filed a Notice of Intent to Rely on Defense of Insanity at Trial. Id. at 23. He also filed a Motion for Examination into the Defendant's Competence. Id. at 24-26. The motion stated that Petitioner is twenty-one years old and charged with first degree murder and armed robbery. Id. at 24. Italleged that he suffers from mood swings, engages in self-mutilation, and made attempts to commit suicide. Id. at 24-25. The motion related that Petitioner has a history of alcohol and drug abuse dating back to the age of six years old. Id. at 25. It stated that Petitioner received mood altering medication in the Duval County Jail. Id. The motion noted that Petitioner's parents may suffer with psychiatric disorders. Id. It also mentioned that he did not receive any significant mental health treatment even though Dr. Manuel M. Chaknis, Ph.D., a Licensed Clinical Psychologist, recommended secure, inpatient treatment on February 7, 1986. Id. Counsel explained that based on his conversations with his client, he had "reason to believe that the Defendant may not be competent to stand trial and that he may have been insane at the time of the offenses alleged in the indictment filed against him." Id. at 25-26.

On April 10, 1990, the state filed a Motion for Psychiatric Examination, requesting that the trial court appoint two experts to examine Petitioner as to his sanity or insanity at the time of the alleged offense. Id. at 29. The court appointed Dr. Ernest Miller, M.D., to examine Petitioner as to his sanity or insanity at the time of the offense. Id. at 32-33. The court appointed Peter M. Macaluso, M.D., to examine Petitioner in order to aid counsel in preparation of the defense. Id. at 34-35.

The record also shows the following. On April 19, 1990, in a pretrial proceeding, Mr. Davis informed the court that he had spoken with a licensed clinical psychologist, Dr. Chakinin [sic], who examined Petitioner back in 1985. Ex. 19, Transcript of April 19, 1990 at 12-13. Counsel notified the court that he would be asking the court to appoint a psychiatrist, but he also wanted the appointment of an individual familiar with Petitioner's history. Id. at 13. Counsel stated: "It's a very unusual case and I think it will take some time." Id. The state informed the court that it was going to try the Nassau County case first, as it happened first. Id. at 20.

On May 16, 1990, Petitioner filed Defendant's Reciprocal Discovery Response listing witnesses that may offer testimony and other evidence at trial, including Petitioner's mother, Shirley Ann Clark; a number of medical professionals and records custodians; Petitioner's father, Ronald Clark, Sr.; and Petitioner's step-mother, Francis Clark. Ex. O at 36-37. Petitioner also filed a Motion to Appoint Second Expert to Examine the Defendant as to Competency. Id. at 40-41. The court appointed George W. Barnard, M.D., to address questions of Petitioner's sanity at the time of the alleged offense and his competency to proceed. Id. at 44-47. Petitioner submitted a Motion for Authority to Incur Expenses for the depositions of Missy Hatch, Vincent Quann, Gary Moody, BobbyWillis, Debra Willis, Tommy Hatch, Joline D. Wescott, Mecca Bailey and Don Lee. Id. at 51-52.

In his June 12, 1990 report, Dr. Miller found Petitioner's functioning to be in the borderline to dull normal intellectual range. Ex. O at 56. Under clinical impression, Dr. Miller wrote Substance Abuse Disorder, Alcohol/Drug; Chronic Dysthymic Disorder; and Personality Disorder (passive/aggressive/sociopathic). Id. at 57. He concluded:

Addressing your specific questions, it is my opinion the patient at present merits adjudication of competence to proceed and does not meet the criteria for commitment. I am also likewise of the opinion at the time of the alleged crime the patient was not insane but able to understand the nature, quality and wrongfulness of his acts.

The antecedents for the patient's personality disturbance, chronic depression, and drug addiction seem evident in history as provided. Summary mediation of these problems could be anticipated with appropriate care.

Id.

Dr. Macaluso, in his July 18, 1990 report, noted that his examination and evaluation were for the purpose of determining whether Petitioner suffers from the Disease of Chemical Dependency, whether Petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the offense, and if intoxicated at that time of the offense, what effect it had on his mental state. Id. at 63. Dr. Macaluso undertook an extensive review of documents. Id. He also undertook a personal evaluation of Petitioner on July 10, 1990. Id. He found Petitioner to betaking Prozac and Thorazine for treatment of depression while incarcerated. Id. at 64. He noted that at the time of the offense, Petitioner used alcohol and drugs throughout the night and early morning hours. Id. at 65. He provided an opinion that Petitioner suffers from the Disease of Chemical Dependency, and that he suffered from the disease at the time of the offense. Id. at 67. He stated that Petitioner is poly-drug addicted. Id. He opined that Petitioner's disease "was so severely advanced at the time of the offense as to produce significant decreases of judgment, perception and insight along with global cognitive impairment." Id. Dr. Macaluso found Petitioner suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome as a direct result of physical and sexual abuse. Id. at 68. He further found that at the time of the offense, Petitioner was in a state of involuntary intoxication. Id.

Dr. Macaluso opined that the combination of Petitioner's Disease of Chemical Dependency in conjunction with severe intoxication, sleep deprivation, paranoid delusional thinking, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and Idiosyncratic Alcohol Intoxication Disorder caused him to be unable to plan and formulate goals and formulate the specific intent to commit first degree murder. Id. He further opined that Petitioner lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the standards of the law. Id. at 69. He concluded that Petitioner wassuffering from an extreme mental and emotional disturbance at the time of the incident. Id. Dr. Macaluso found this condition rendered Petitioner substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the...