Clark v. Shop24 Global, LLC

• Decision Date: 16 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2:12–cv–802.,2:12–cv–802.
• Citation: 77 F.Supp.3d 660
• Parties: Joseph M. CLARK, Plaintiff, v. SHOP24 GLOBAL, LLC, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

77 F.Supp.3d 660

Joseph M. CLARK, Plaintiff

v.SHOP24 GLOBAL, LLC, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:12–cv–802.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed Jan. 16, 2015.

Gregory R. Mansell, Carrie J. Dyer, Mansell Law LLC, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff.

Gary Steven Batke, Sabrina Christine Haurin, Bailey Cavalieri LLC, Columbus, OH, Brian E. McGovern, Bryan M. Kaemmerer, McCarthy Leonard & Kaemmerer, L.C., Town & Country, MO, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

JAMES L. GRAHAM, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment (docs. 66 & 67). For the reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 66) and DENY the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 67).

I. Background

The Plaintiff, Joseph Clark, is a former employee of the Defendants.¹ Defendant Shop24 USA, the predecessor to Defendant Shop24 Global, supplied customers with “self-contained, totally automated and refrigerated convenience store[s].”² In 2008, Defendant Shop24 USA hired Matthew Reckner as its first American employee. Reckner Dep. at 7, doc. 67–2. Reckner worked to develop Defendant Shop24 USA's infrastructure and expand its business. Id. at 7–9.

As Defendant Shop24 USA expanded its business, management recognized the need to hire a repair technician to perform maintenance on its vending machines. Id. at 9. After an interview with Reckner, Defendant Shop24 USA hired the Plaintiff in May 2009. Clark Dep. at 22, doc. 67–1. Shortly after being hired, the Plaintiff traveled to Belgium to Defendant Shop24 USA's headquarters where he attended training on the maintenance and repair of the vending machines. Id. at 25–26. Following his training, the Plaintiff returned to his home office in Columbus, Ohio. Id. at 27. Reckner also worked in the Columbus office and was the Plaintiff's supervisor. Defs.' Answer to Interrogs. 9, doc. 67–3.

The Plaintiff's job responsibilities are the subject of dispute in this case. It is clear from the record that he performed a wide variety of tasks, including: repairing and installing vending machines, training other repairmen, responding to customer service calls, creating a user manual for the vending machines, and maintaining an inventory of mechanical and electronic components. Clark Dep. at 43, 46, 63–66, 89, 96, 172, 178. The Plaintiff often traveled around the country to perform these responsibilities. Reckner Dep. at 30.

The Plaintiff's work hours were long and variable. He estimated that his average work week was 70 hours, but that some weeks he worked 100 hours, up to 18 hours a day. Clark Dep. at 125. As Defendant Shop24 Global's employee manual explained:

The normal work day is eight (8) hours, and forty (40) hours represents a normal work week .... While you are generally expected to work the number of hours stated above, Company does not guarantee that you will actually be able to perform all of your work duties in this amount of time. You are expected to put in the amount of time over 40 hours per week necessary to complete your job duties and occasionally, in rare circumstances, substantial extra work will be required. If you are overburdened with work and unable to complete your assignments with a moderate amount of additional work each week, please speak to your supervisor; however, with more responsibility and increased pay, usually comes a greater work load and more time spent working.

Exempt employees are not paid overtime for hours worked above 40 hours per week; a moderate amount of expected overtime is built into your compensation package as a salaried employee.

Def.'s Manual at 8–9, doc. 66–3.

In July 2009, following a long service trip, the Plaintiff questioned Reckner regarding his entitlement to overtime and his classification as an exempt employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Clark Dep. at 337. Reckner initially stated that the Plaintiff was a nonexempt employee, but later clarified that the Plaintiff was actually exempt. Id. at 337–38. Consequently, the Plaintiff did not receive overtime pay.

In June 2010, Defendant Shop24 USA sold its assets to Defendant Shop24 Global. Setness Aff. at ¶ 8, doc. 66–6. Defendant Shop24 USA's employees, including the Plaintiff, became employees of Defendant Shop24 Global. At that time, Ken Horner became CEO of Defendant Shop24 Global. Horner Dep. at 6, doc. 67–4. Although corporate ownership changed, the Plaintiff's job responsibilities did not. Clark Dep. at 83.

The Plaintiff continued to work long hours over the next year. In the summer of 2011, Defendant Shop24 Global decided to hire an additional technician. Id. at 28–29. Reckner hired Anthony Weygandt as a service technician. Weygandt Dep. at 7–8. Clark trained Weygandt in maintaining and repairing the vending machines. Id. at 11–12.

In early 2012, the Plaintiff began researching laws concerning overtime payment. Clark Dep. at 256. After reviewing information regarding exemption classifications under the FLSA, the Plaintiff emailed Marvin Setness, an administrator for Defendant Shop24 Global,³ concerning his exempt classification under the FLSA. Id. at 163, 255–56. The Plaintiff made a similar enquiry to Reckner. Id. at 256. Reckner informed the Plaintiff that he was unaware of the FLSA's classification system, but, after speaking with management, opined that the Plaintiff was exempt because of his job title. Id. at 256–59.

Following this exchange, Defendant Shop24 Global presented the Plaintiff with the opportunity to switch from a salaried position to an hourly position. Id. at 259–60. Reckner explained that, if the Plaintiff transitioned to an hourly position, he would no longer receive a salary or be considered a manager, his hourly base pay would decrease, and he would be ineligible to receive a bonus. Id. at 259–61. The Plaintiff decided to continue his position as a salaried employee. Id. at 261.

In early September 2012, while still employed by Defendant Shop24 Global, the Plaintiff filed his Complaint (doc. 1) in which he alleged the Defendants violated the FLSA and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act. Around the same time, Defendant Shop24 Global hired an additional service technician, Leland Palmer, to keep up with its expanding business. Weygandt Dep. at 32.

Later that September, Weygandt and Palmer traveled to Oklahoma City to install a vending machine. Clark Dep. at 102. Clark traveled to Oklahoma City several days later to assist with the installation. Id. The three men went to dinner together after work. Id. at 103–04. With Palmer's prompting, the Plaintiff described to his co-workers his contentious relationship with Reckner. Id. at 107–09. According to Weygandt, the Plaintiff stated that he was going to try to “oust or overthrow” Defendant Shop24 Global's management, including Reckner. Weygandt Dep. at 36–37. Further, according to Weygandt, the Plaintiff indicated that he would destroy his laptop and other technical documents if Defendant Shop24 Global “trie[d] to do anything to him.” Id. Weygandt reported these comments to Reckner. Id. at 40.

After confirming the details of the conversation with Weygandt, Reckner informed Horner, Defendant Shop24 Global's CEO, of the Plaintiff's comments. Horner Dep. at 22, doc. 67–4. Based on the Plaintiff's comments, Horner fired the Plaintiff. Id. at 22–23.

The Plaintiff filed his Complaint (doc. 1) on September 4, 2012. The Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (doc. 55) alleges multiple violations under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, and the Ohio Constitution. Count One alleges that the Defendants misclassified the Plaintiff as an exempt employee and failed to pay him overtime as required by the FLSA. Count Two alleges that the Defendants violated the FLSA when they retaliated against him for engaging in “protected activity” under the FLSA. Count Three alleges that the Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff overtime wages under § 4111.03 of the Ohio Revised Code, the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act. Count Four alleges that the Defendants failed to maintain wage and hour records as required by Article II, Section 34(a) of the Ohio Constitution.

The parties' motions for partial summary judgment are fully briefed and ripe for resolution.

II. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper if the evidentiary material in the record show that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ; see Longaberger Co. v. Kolt, 586 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir.2009). The moving party bears the burden of proving the absence of genuine issues of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, which may be accomplished by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case on which it would bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Walton v. Ford Motor Co., 424 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir.2005).

The “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; see also Longaberger, 586 F.3d at 465. “Only disputed material facts, those ‘that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,’ will preclude summary judgment.” Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 702 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Accordingly, the nonmoving party must present “significant probative evidence” to demonstrate that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (...