Clark v. State
Decision Date | 17 June 2022 |
Docket Number | 82996 |
Citation | 511 P.3d 319 (Table) |
Parties | William Ronald CLARK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Sufficiency of the evidence
Appellant William Clark argues that insufficient evidence supports his burglary conviction because the State did not prove he had felonious intent when he entered the casino that he later robbed. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, we consider "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) ; see also Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998).
At trial, the State presented evidence that Clark entered the casino and passed a note to a cashier that demanded she give him money. After the cashier told Clark that she could not read the note, Clark motioned as if he had a weapon and threatened the cashier to give him the money so "nobody gets shot." The cashier then gave Clark about $4,700 from her drawer. The jury received photographic evidence from which the jury could infer that Clark wrote the robbery note before entering the casino. Forensic testing found Clark's DNA on a discarded sweatshirt that matched the victim's description of the perpetrator's clothing. The State also presented surveillance video showing Clark's movements outside and inside the casino. While Clark testified that he never entered the casino, it is the jury's prerogative to resolve conflicting evidence. United States v. Hubbard, 96 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1996) ( ); cf. Fritz v. State, 86 Nev. 655, 657, 474 P.2d 377, 378 (1970) ( ). Therefore, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that Clark intended to rob the casino when he entered. See NRS 193.200 ; NRS 205.060(1) ; Sharma v. State, 118 Nev. 648, 659, 56 P.3d 868, 874 (2002) ( ).
Suppression of incriminating statements
Clark argues that his incriminating statements should not have been admitted because a portion of his recorded statements violated NRS 179.500, and his confession was not voluntary. When considering challenges to the denial of a motion to suppress, "we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error," Lamb v. State, 127 Nev. 26, 31, 251 P.3d 700, 703 (2011).
First, the admission of Clark's recorded statements did not violate NRS 179.500, which prohibits the admission of intercepted oral communications obtained without a court order.2 The interviewing detectives took Clark outside to smoke a cigarette but continued to record the interview with a pocket recording device. The detectives kept Clark handcuffed, reiterated they were acting in their official capacity, and told Clark that they would relay what he said to the primary detectives. Thus, under these circumstances, Clark had no justifiable expectation that his statements were "not subject to interception," NRS 179.440 (defining "oral communication"), by the interviewing detectives. Moreover, even assuming error in the admission of Clark's recorded statements, we conclude that it is harmless because the interviewing detectives could have testified about the substance of the interview. See NRS 178.598 ( ).
Second, Clark has not shown any coercive police conduct during his interrogation. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) ( ); see also Allan v. State, 118 Nev. 19, 24, 38 P.3d 175, 178 (2002) (), overruled on other grounds by Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 191 & n.10, 111 P.3d 690, 694 n.10 (2005). And Clark's contention that his feeling tired, hot, sweaty, and nauseated is insufficient to show that his statements were involuntary. See Passama v. State, 103 Nev. 212, 214, 735 P.2d 321, 323 (1987) ( ); see also State v. Dobbs, 945 N.W.2d 609, 632-33 (Wis. 2020) ( ). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding Clark's statements were voluntary and admissible.
Clark argues that the district court abused its discretion by adjudicating and sentencing him as a large habitual criminal. Specifically, Clark contends that the recently amended version of NRS 207.010 should have applied and therefore he could not be adjudicated as a habitual criminal because the State introduced only six prior felony convictions. Compare NRS 207.010(1)(b) (2020) ( ), with 2009 Nev., Stat. ch. 156, § 1, at 567 ( ). We disagree because "unless the Legislature clearly expresses its intent to apply a law retroactively, Nevada law requires the application of the law in effect at the time of the commission of a crime." State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Pullin), 124 Nev. 564, 567, 188 P.3d 1079, 1081 (2008) ; see also id. at 571, 188 P.3d at 1083 ( . Clark committed the charged offenses...
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