Clark v. State

• Decision Date: 09 April 1980
• Docket Number: No. 35775,35775
• Citation: 266 S.E.2d 466,245 Ga. 629
• Parties: CLARK v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 466

266 S.E.2d 466

245 Ga. 629

CLARK v. The STATE.

No. 35775.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Argued Feb. 11, 1980.

Decided April 9, 1980.

Howard G. Sokol, Milledgeville, Gina Bailey, Valdosta, Jonathan A. Zimring, John L. Cromartie, Jr., Atlanta, for appellant.

H. Lamar Cole, Dist. Atty., for appellee.

MARSHALL, Justice.

This case is here on certiorari. Presented for decision are questions concerning our procedures under Code Ann. § 27-1503 (Ga.L.1977, pp. 1293, 1295) for committing to mental hospitals persons who have been found not guilty of crimes by reason of insanity. (Such persons will be referred to hereinafter at times as "insanity acquitees.") In Skelton v. Slaton, 243 Ga. 426, 254 S.E.2d 704 (1979), we held that the procedures established under Code Ann. § 27-1503 are constitutional. Although we find it necessary to re-examine these procedures in light of, among other things, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), we adhere to our holding in Skelton that § 27-1503 is constitutional.

1. State Law Concerning Insanity Acquittals. In Georgia, there is a presumption of sanity. Code Ann. § 26-606 (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1270); Durham v. State, 239 Ga. 697(1), 238 S.E.2d 334 (1977). Accordingly, it has been held that where a defendant in a criminal case files a general plea of insanity, ¹ i. e., he argues that he is not guilty of the crime by reason of being insane at the time of its commission, the burden is on the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane. Durham v. State, supra, and cits. Georgia follows the so-called "McNaughton rule," as well as a "delusional compulsion" test, for determining whether one has the mental capacity to commit a criminal offense. "A person shall not be found guilty of a crime, if at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, such person did not have mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act, omission, or negligence." Code Ann. § 26-702 (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1270). "A person shall not be found guilty of a crime when at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, such person, because of mental disease, injury, or congenital deficiency, acted as he did because of a delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime." Code Ann. § 26-703 (Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1270).

Code Ann. § 27-1503(a) requires the trial judge to instruct the jury to specify in their verdict if the accused is being acquitted of a crime because of mental incompetency or insanity at the time of the commission of the act. The court is required to retain jurisdiction over the person so acquitted and immediately inquire into the insanity of the person at the time of acquittal, and "upon a showing of good cause by the prosecutor, (the court) may defer ruling upon the same and order such person to be confined in a State mental hospital, to be selected by the Department of Human Resources for a period of not less than 30 days." Code Ann. § 27-1503(a) further states that such persons who have been committed to the Department of Human Resources shall not be released from confinement unless and until the court which committed them, after notice and hearing, shall find and determine that such persons do not meet the criteria for civil commitment under Code Ch. 88-5 or 88-25.

Subsection (b) of Code Ann. § 27-1503 allows an application for the release of a person who has been committed to the Department of Human Resources under subsection (a), upon the ground that he does not meet the civil commitment criteria under Code Ch. 88-5 or 88-25, to be made to the superior court of the county from which he was committed. However, no hearing upon such application is allowed until the person committed shall have been confined for a period of not less than 30 days from the date of the order of commitment. If the finding of the court is adverse to releasing such person on the ground that such person meets the civil commitment criteria under Code Ch. 88-5 or 88-25, subsection (b) prohibits a further application from being heard until one year has elapsed from the date of hearing upon his last preceding application.

Under Code § 38-118, there is a presumption of the continued existence of a mental state once proved to exist. Accordingly, it has been held in Pennewell v. State, 148 Ga.App. 611(1), 251 S.E.2d 832 (1979); Pitts v. State, 151 Ga.App. 691, 261 S.E.2d 435 (1979) and in this case, that where a defendant who has been acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity is ordered committed to a mental hospital under Code Ann. § 27-1503(a) and files an application for release under Code Ann. § 27-1503(b), there is a continuing presumption of insanity at the time of the release hearing.

2. Course of the Litigation in this Case. The appellant in this case was tried for murder in December of 1977 and found by the jury to be not guilty by reason of insanity. Pursuant to Code Ann. § 27-1503(a), the trial court ordered that he be confined to a state mental hospital. In April of 1979, he filed with the trial court an application for his release under Code Ann. § 27-1503(b), arguing that he did not meet the criteria for civil commitment set forth in Code Chs. 88-5 and 88-25.

In the release proceeding, the appellant also filed a motion for an order declaring Code Ann. § 27-1503 to be unconstitutional, in that: (1) it denies him the full panoply of due process protections accorded a person in civil commitment proceedings, i. e., notice, hearing, right to counsel, appeal, periodic review, etc.; and (2) the release provisions of Code Ann. § 27-1503 are more stringent than those applicable to other persons who have been civilly committed. The appellant filed another motion for an order declaring that the state, being the party seeking treatment of the appellant, has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the appellant meets the statutory criteria for civil commitment.

The trial court ruled that the proceedings in this case are civil in nature, being analogous to habeas corpus proceedings. The trial court further ruled that a presumption of insanity existed in this case at the commencement of the release hearing, and therefore, the burden of proof rested on the appellant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he does not meet the statutory criteria for civil commitment.

At the release hearing, the physician treating the appellant at the mental hospital testified that the appellant is afflicted with schizophrenia, but that he is in a state of remission. The physician testified that, in his opinion, the appellant presents no substantial risk of imminent harm to himself or others and that he is not a mentally ill person requiring involuntary treatment. See Division 4, infra. However, the physician did admit that the appellant could have a relapse at any time if he did not take medication which has been prescribed for him in order to control his psychotic behavior. On cross-examination, the physician admitted that persons suffering from the appellant's condition experience reluctance to take prescribed medication when not under supervision. The only other witness to testify at the release hearing was the appellant's mother, who testified that the appellant had improved and that she did not consider him to be dangerous.

The trial court found that the appellant had committed the killing for which the previous murder charge had been brought after he had quit taking his medication upon being released from a mental hospital. The petitioner testified, "that's how I got in trouble." (The "trouble" was killing his grandmother.) The trial court further found that, as recently as two weeks prior to the release hearing, the petitioner's treating physician had gone on vacation and the petitioner had refused to take his medication. The court ruled that the petitioner continues to meet the criteria for civil commitment, and the application for release was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence supports the trial court's ruling that the appellant continues to meet the standard for involuntary commitment. Citing Pennewell v. State, supra, the Court of Appeals held that there was a presumption of insanity existing at the commencement of the release hearing. Relying on this presumption, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in placing the burden on the appellant to prove his eligibility for release.

The question we must decide is whether it is constitutionally permissible to commit to a mental hospital an individual acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity without requiring the state to bear the burden of proving that he presently meets the criteria for civil commitment. The determination of this question requires a consideration of various decisions of the United States Supreme Court, as well as the procedures in Georgia generally applicable in civil commitment proceedings.

3. United States Supreme Court Decisions. In Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962), the Supreme Court recognized the constitutional validity of a statute of the District of Columbia, under which persons acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity were automatically committed to mental hospitals without a hearing. ² In Lynch, the Court held that the automatic commitment provisions of this statute were unavailable after an acquittal by reason of insanity over the defendant's objection.

However, four years later, in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966), the Supreme Court held that when a proceeding for civil commitment was brought against a person nearing the end of his prison sentence, he could not be denied the right to a jury trial generally available to others in civil commitment proceedings. The basis for this decision was the...