Clark v. State
| Decision Date | 30 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 65199,65199 |
| Parties | ROBERT CLARK, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
An unpublished order shall not be regarded as precedent and shall not be cited as legal authority. SCR 123.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of home invasion and burglary. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Valorie J. Vega, Judge.
The State charged appellant Robert Clark by way of information with home invasion and burglary and a jury convicted him of both charges. The district court sentenced Clark as a habitual criminal and ordered that he serve 5 to 15 years. Clark challenges the following on appeal: (1) the district court's instructions to the jury, (2) the sufficiency of the State's evidence, (3) the court's habitual criminal adjudication, and (4) the district court's jurisdiction to file two amended judgments of conviction following entry of the notice of appeal.
Jury instructions
Clark requested that the district court instruct the jury that if it relies upon circumstantial evidence instead of direct evidence to convict him, it "must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the . . . evidence is that the Defendant is guilty." The court sustained the State's objection and said it would instruct the jury on reasonable doubt according to Nevada law.
Clark claims that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to provide his proposed jury instruction because the court believed the instruction was not supported by Nevada law. He asserts that the instruction is supported by Bails v. State, 92 Nev. 95, 96-97, 545 P.2d 1155, 1155-56 (1976), which permits the district court to allow such an instruction. The State asserts that the court properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt, so the court had the discretion to reject the proposed instruction.
"'The district court has broad discretion to settle jury instructions, and this court reviews the district court's decision for an abuse of that discretion or judicial error.'" Rose v. State, 127 Nev. 494, 500, 255 P. 3d 291, 295 (2011) (quoting Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P. 3d 582 585 (2005)). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court's decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason." Jackson v. State, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001).
In Bails, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. 92 Nev. at 96, 545 P.2d at 1155. The only evidence against him was circumstantial. Id. He requested a specific jury instruction on reasonable doubt, but the district court rejected Bails's specific instruction. Id. at 96-97, 545 P. 2d at 1155-56. This court affirmed the district court's decision and explained that the district court does not err when it "refuse[s] to give the instruction if the jury is properly instructed regarding reasonable doubt." Id. at 97, 545 P.2d at 1156. However, this court also clarified that the district court had the discretion to issue such an instruction. Id.
In the instant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Clark's proposed instruction. Although the district court could have issued the instruction, it was not required to do sobecause it properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt. The court's mistaken belief that the instruction was not supported by Nevada law is of no import. The district court correctly concluded that instruction need not be given, even if it did so, at least in part, based on the incorrect belief that the instruction was not supported by Nevada law. See Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) ().1
Sufficiency of the evidence
Clark next argues that the State did not present any direct evidence that he committed the crimes charged and that it solely relied upon circumstantial evidence. He claims that the State also did not present any evidence that he entered the victim's apartment, only that he was outside the apartment and that he carried a pole. The State concedes that it used circumstantial evidence to prove Clark's guilt, but it argues that Nevada law permits this reliance.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court determines "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008) (internal quotationmarks omitted). "This court will not reweigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses." Id. "[I]t is the jury's function . . . to assess the weight of the evidence and . . . credibility of witnesses." Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 202-03, 163 P.3d 408, 414 (2007) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). Moreover, a jury may rely on circumstantial evidence. Wilkins v. State, 96 Nev. 367, 374, 609 P.2d 309, 313 (1980).
To convict a defendant of home invasion, the State must prove that the defendant (1) "forcibly enter[ed]," (2) "an inhabited dwelling," (3) "without permission of the owner, resident or lawful occupant." NRS 205.067(1). A person "forcibly enters" when he or she enters through "any act of physical force resulting in damage to the structure." NRS 205.067(5)(a). An "inhabited dwelling" is "any structure . . . in which the owner or other lawful occupant resides." NRS 205.067(5)(b).
First, police officers testified at trial that force was used to gain entry to the apartment and the victim described the window as being "completely trashed." Trial testimony also revealed that Clark (or a person for whom he is vicariously liable2) was the person who entered the apartment. Second, the victim testified that he lived with his daughter in the apartment where the crime occurred. Lastly, the victim testified that he did not give anyone permission to be in his apartment at the time the crime occurred and that he did not give anyone permission to take hisDVD player. Therefore, the State presented sufficient evidence to prove home invasion.
To convict a defendant of burglary, the State must prove that the defendant (1) "enter[ed] any house, room, apartment," etc., (2) "with, [ inter alia], the intent to commit grand or petit larceny." NRS 205.060(1). The jury may determine the defendant's intent based upon his or her actions. NRS 205.065.
The same trial testimony that demonstrates that Clark or someone for whom he is vicariously liable forcibly entered the victim's residence for the home invasion charge also demonstrates that Clark or someone for whom he is vicariously liable entered the victim's apartment to commit burglary. Additionally, a police detective testified that he recovered the victim's DVD player from the apartment where Clark lived. Because the victim's property was stolen and one item of property was recovered from Clark's residence, the jury can infer that Clark or someone for whom he is vicariously liable entered the victim's apartment with the intent to commit larceny. Therefore, the State presented sufficient evidence to prove burglary.
Habitual criminal adjudication
At the sentencing hearing, the State presented certified prior judgments of conviction against Clark for being under the influence of a controlled substance, coercion, larceny from the person, and two convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. After testimony and argument, the court announced that it was sentencing Clark under the small habitual criminal statute and sentenced him to 5 to 15 years.
Clark contends that his prior convictions do not justify adjudication as a habitual criminal because three of his five felony convictions were for stale, non-violent, drug offenses. He also contends that the court merely adjudicated him to be a habitual criminal because he had the necessary number of prior convictions. The State argues that the district court appropriately sentenced Clark under the small habitual criminal statute because Clark's criminal history was extensive.3
This court has indicated that "[o]ur habitual criminality statute exists to enable the criminal justice system to deal determinedly with career criminals who pose a serious threat to public safety." Sessions v. State, 106 Nev. 186, 191, 789 P.2d 1242, 1245 (1990). Adjudication of a defendant as a habitual criminal is "subject to the broadest kind of judicial discretion." Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1004, 946 P.2d 148, 152 (1997) (internal quotations omitted).
In determining whether habitual criminal adjudication is proper, "[t]his court looks to the record as a whole to determine whether the sentencing court actually exercised its discretion." O'Neill v. State,123 Nev. 9, 16, 153 P.3d 38, 43 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). So long as "the sentencing court was not operating under a misconception of the law regarding the discretionary nature of a habitual criminal adjudication . . . the sentencing court has met its obligation under Nevada law." Id. (internal quotations omitted). "[A] district court may consider facts such as a defendant's criminal history, mitigation evidence, victim impact statements and the like in determining whether to dismiss such a count." Id.
NRS 207.010 allows the sentencing court to dismiss the habitual criminal count "when the prior offenses are stale or trivial, or in other circumstances where an adjudication of habitual criminality would not serve the purposes of the statute or the interests of justice." French v. State, 98 Nev. 235, 237, 645 P.2d 440, 441 (1982). "NRS 207.010 makes no special allowance for non-violent crimes or for the remoteness of...
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