Clark v. Volpe

Decision Date27 June 1973
Docket NumberNo. 73-1219.,73-1219.
Citation481 F.2d 634
PartiesRoy CLARK, d/b/a City Ambulance Service, and Kanawha Valley Ambulance Service, Inc., a corporation, in their own behalf, and in behalf of all ambulance operators and taxpayers similarly situated, Appellants, v. John VOLPE, Secretary, United States Department of Transportation et al., Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Stephen P. Meyer, Charleston, W. Va., on brief for appellants.

John A. Field, III, U. S. Atty., Robert B. King, Asst. U. S. Atty., Lawrence R. Schneider, Chief Counsel, Frank A. Berndt, Asst. Chief Counsel, Gary R. Allen and Enid Rubenstein, Attys., National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Dept. of Transportation, Washington, D. C., on brief for appellee Volpe.

Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen., William R. Wooton, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief for appellee Coplin.

W. Warren Upton and Michael A. Albert, Sp. Municipal Counsel, Charleston, W. Va., on brief for appellee, City of Charleston, a Municipal Corp.

Before BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WINTER and CRAVEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellants sought to enjoin the use of federal funds by John Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, Richard W. Coplin, Director of the Governor's Highway Safety Administration of the State of West Virginia, and the city of Charleston, West Virginia. By virtue of the Highway Safety Act, 23 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., appellees had obtained funds to povide emergency ambulance service for Charleston and surrounding areas. Appellants alleged that the funds were being used for purposes other than those intended by the Highway Safety Act and had been obtained in violation of standards established by the Secretary of Transportation. Appellees denied these allegations, submitted affidavits and exhibits, and moved for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.

In its memorandum order of December 13, 1972, the court dismissed the case for the reason that "under the facts and circumstances here presented they appellants are without remedy in law". It is obvious from the findings of fact in the court's memorandum order that facts and circumstances mentioned in the affidavits and exhibits were considered by the court in reaching its conclusion, specifically stated in the closing portion of its order, that "the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . ."

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that if, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleadings to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.1 In Evans v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 395 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1968), the court held that if the district judge, in ruling on the motion to dismiss, considers matters ouside the pleadings, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.2

The record before us clearly indicates that the district court was presented with and considered facts outside the pleadings. These facts were not excluded by the court and are specifically mentioned in its memorandum order dismissing the action. Accordingly, the district court should have addressed itself to the appellees' alternative motion for summary judgment rather than their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

The appellate court is not bound by the label that the district court places upon its disposition of the case. Whenever outside matters are presented to and not excluded by the trial court, the motion should be considered on appeal as one for summary judgment even though the trial court characterized its action as a dismissal of the case for failure of plaintiffs to state a claim upon...

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8 cases
  • Pauley v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
    • October 29, 1981
    ...by, the court, then the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. Clark v. Volpe, 481 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1973); Plante v. Shivar, 540 F.2d 1233 (4th Cir. Upon the treatment of defendants' motion as one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 5......
  • Morrissey v. William Morrow & Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • July 26, 1984
    ...that he had a reasonable time in which to present affidavits or other materials in opposition to defendants' motion. In Clarke v. Volpe, 481 F.2d 634 (4th Cir.1973), this court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) where the defendants submitted affida......
  • Dean v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • January 26, 2005
    ...as an appellate court we are not bound by the label that the district court places upon its disposition of the case. Clark v. Volpe, 481 F.2d 634, 635 (4th Cir.1973). "Whenever outside matters are presented to and not excluded by the trial court, [the motion to dismiss] should be considered......
  • Whiteville Oil Co., Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 7:94-CV-108-BR(1).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
    • April 13, 1995
    ...as one for summary judgment if it considers matters outside the pleadings in resolving the motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Clark v. Volpe, 481 F.2d 634 (4th Cir.1973). Because the court did consider matters other than the original pleadings, defendant's motion to dismiss will be treated as a mo......
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