Clark v. Warren Cnty. Prison

• Decision Date: 06 October 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-6174 (FLW)
• Parties: RAMON ANDREW CLARK, Plaintiff, v. WARREN COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

RAMON ANDREW CLARK, Plaintiff, v. WARREN COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 15-6174 (FLW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

October 6, 2016

OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ramon Andrew Clark, a prisoner currently confined at FCI Frackville, seeks to bring this civil action in forma pauperis ("IFP"), without prepayment of fees or security, asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law arising from his arrest and imprisonment in Warren County, New Jersey on February 14, 2012. The Court previously denied his IFP application without prejudice. Plaintiff resubmitted his IFP application, and the Court will now grant his application to proceed in forma pauperis.

At this time, the Court must also review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons explained in this Opinion, the Court will dismiss Complaint in its entirety and provide Plaintiff with 45 days within which to submit an amended complaint with respect to those claims that the Court has dismissed without prejudice.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's Complaint appears to allege claims for false arrest and/or false imprisonment and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as for libel, slander, and "false claims" under state law. He has sued the Warren County Prison, certain unidentified Warren County court officials, Donald Cox, who is identified in the Complaint as the Assistant District Attorney of Warren County, and the Phillipsburg Police Department. He provides the following facts in support of his claims for relief:

On February 14, 2012, I was arrested and charged by the Phillipsburg, NJ Police department on the following offenses (Robbery 1^st degree) (Burglary with a weapon 2^nd degree) (Employing a juvenile in the commission of a crime 1^st degree) (Possession of a firearm for unlawful purpose 2^nd degree) (unlawful possession of a handgun 3^rd degree) (Person not to have weapons 2^nd degree) (conspiracy to commit robbery 2^nd degree). On October 30, 2013, I was acquitted on all charges by a jury of my peers in Warren County Superior Court in Belvidere, NJ. I was imprisoned for 20 months in Warren County Prison until I was release [sic] due to the result of my acquitted [sic] of my trial.

(ECF No. 1. Compl. at 5.) In addition to the 20 months he spent in jail, Plaintiff also alleges that he lost his job and his mother-in-law, and he seeks monetary compensation for his injuries. (Id.)

Plaintiff's Complaint was signed by Plaintiff on August 11, 2015, and it was docketed on August 13, 2015.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a person is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As noted above, the PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. "The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

Here, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), courts first separate the factual and legal elements of the claims, and accept all of the well-pleaded facts as true. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). All reasonable inferences must be made in the plaintiff's favor. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The complaint must also allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

Courts are required to liberally construe pleadings drafted by pro se parties. Tucker v. Hewlett Packard, Inc., No. 14-4699 (RBK/KMW), 2015 WL 6560645, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Such pleadings are "held to less strict standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Id. Nevertheless, pro se litigants must still allege facts, which if taken as true, will suggest the required elements of any claim that is asserted. Id. (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)). To do so, [a plaintiff] must plead enough facts, accepted as true, to plausibly suggest entitlement to relief." Gibney v. Fitzgibbon, 547 F. App'x 111, 113 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012)). "Liberal construction does not, however, require the Court tocredit a pro se plaintiff's 'bald assertions' or 'legal conclusions.'" Id. (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). That is, "[e]ven a pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if the allegations set forth by the plaintiff cannot be construed as supplying facts to support a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Id. (citing Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981)).

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court first considers Plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011); Whitaker v. New Jersey State Prison, No. CV 15-6744 (FLW), 2016 WL 781897, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 29, 2016).

a. Claims Against Entities that are not Amenable to Suit under § 1983

From the outset, the Court will dismiss with prejudice the § 1983 claims against the Warren County Prison and the Phillipsburg Police Department, as these entities are not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is well established that county and/or local jails are not "persons" subject to suit under § 1983. See Thomas v. Wilbert, No. CIV.A. 09-4796 GEB, 2011 WL 91001, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2011) (explaining same and collecting cases). The Court will therefore dismiss with prejudice the § 1983 claims against the Warren County Prison.Furthermore, in New Jersey, a municipal police department is not an entity separate from the municipality. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A: 14-118 (municipal police department is "an executive and enforcement function of municipal government"). As such, Phillipsburg Police Department is not a proper defendant in this action. See Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 F. Appx. 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004) ("In Section 1983 actions, police departments cannot be sued in conjunction with municipalities, because the police department is merely an administrative arm of the local municipality, and is not a separate judicial entity.") (quoting DeBellis v. Kulp, 166 F. Supp. 2d 255, 264 (E.D. Pa. 2001)); Aycox v. City of Elizabeth, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111345, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2009) ("Because the Police Department is merely an arm of the Township, Plaintiff's claim against the department cannot stand."); Godley v. Newark Police Dep't, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5718, at *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2007) (same). Here, Plaintiff has not sued the municipality under a Monell theory of liability and cannot maintain separate § 1983 claims against the Phillipsburg Police Department; as such, the Court will dismiss with prejudice the § 1983 claims against this Defendant.¹

b. Claims for False Arrest/False Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecutions Claims Against Defendant Cox and Unidentified Court Officials

The Court will also dismiss the false arrest and false imprisonment claims against the Defendant Cox and the unidentified court officials because Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to show that these Defendants arrested him without probable cause. "To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and(2) that the arrest was made without probable cause." James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). To establish the absence of probable cause, a plaintiff must show "that at the time when the defendant put the proceedings in motion the circumstances were such as not to warrant an ordinary prudent individual [to believe] that an offense had been committed." Williams v. Northfield Police Dep't, No. CIV.A. 09-6192 (NLH), 2010 WL 2802229, at *4 (D.N.J. July 14, 2010) (citing Lind v. Schmid, 67 N.J. 255, 262 (1975)). "Probable cause ... requires more than mere suspicion; however, it does not...