Clarke v. Redeker
Decision Date | 15 September 1966 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 6-1773-C-1. |
Citation | 259 F. Supp. 117 |
Parties | George CLARKE and Joan Clarke, Plaintiffs, v. S. REDEKER, N. Perrin, W. Molison, Mrs. J. Rosenfield, M. Wolf, J. Richards, C. Loss, T. Louden, W. Quarton and D. Dancer, Iowa State Board of Regents for State Educational Institutions, and W. Cox, Director of Admissions and Registrar, State University of Iowa, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Charles H. Clarke, Detroit, Mich., and Charles R. Coulter, Muscatine, Iowa, for plaintiffs.
Arthur O. Leff, Iowa City, Iowa and Timothy McCarthy, Sol.Gen. of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa, for defendants.
Before MATTHES, Circuit Judge, and STEPHENSON and HANSON, District Judges.
Initially the Court will consider the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint filed against them. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), hearing on the defendants' motion was deferred until the trial. The contentions upon which the motion to dismiss is premised are essentially as follows: (1) There is no basis for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court in this matter; (2) the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) there is no basis upon which the plaintiffs' allegations would entitle them to relief.
The plaintiffs have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1343. This statute grants original jurisdiction to the federal district courts of any civil action authorized by law for the redress of the deprivation, under color of state law, of any right secured by Constitutional provisions or by any act of Congress providing for equal rights of United States citizens. The statute which, in this instance, authorizes the plaintiff to institute an action against the defendants herein is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 The plaintiffs thus clearly have a basis for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court.2
The defendants also contend that the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them and are therefore not entitled to relief in this Court. Although a plaintiff challenging state action is normally required to exhaust state administrative remedies before instituting an action in a federal court, a plaintiff suing under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 for a deprivation of civil rights is not required to exhaust state administrative remedies if his claim is based on federal law. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963). The plaintiffs in this instance are asserting that the policy of the Iowa State Board of Regents concerning the charging of a higher rate of tuition for out-of-state students attending Iowa universities and colleges than for those students classified as residents, violates rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution of the United States. Under these circumstances the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust all available state administrative remedies prior to the time when they instituted the present action in this federal court.
The defendants further contend that the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed because there is no basis upon which the allegations contained therein would entitle them to relief. The Court disagrees. The allegations contained in the complaint, if established, would entitle the plaintiff to appropriate relief. The defendants' motion to dismiss must be denied.
The principal question before the Court involves a determination of whether the plaintiff, George Clarke,3 is being deprived of certain constitutional rights because he is charged a nonresident rather than a resident tuition fee while attending the College of Law at the State University of Iowa. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin state officials from charging him nonresident tuition at the University.
The plaintiff entered the State University of Iowa (hereinafter referred to as SUI) in September, 1961. Prior to that time he had resided in Illinois. Since the plaintiff enrolled at SUI, he has been continuously attending the University and, at the age of 22, is presently a student in the College of Law. During August 1964, the plaintiff married Joan Weaver. Mrs. Clarke has lived in Iowa all of her life.
During his entire tenure as a student at SUI, the plaintiff has been charged the nonresident tuition fee, which is approximately twice as much as the tuition fee charged students who are classified as residents. The plaintiff is now contending that there is no basis for charging him a nonresident tuition fee and seeks to enjoin SUI from doing so. The plaintiff premises his contention upon the following allegations: (1) It is a violation of the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution for a state operated university to charge a nonresident student a higher rate of tuition than that charged a resident student. (2) The tuition regulations applied by SUI unreasonably discriminate between a nonresident male whose wife is a resident of Iowa and a nonresident female whose husband is a resident of Iowa. (3) He is a resident and citizen of the State of Iowa.
The regulations concerning the classification of residents and nonresidents for admission and tuition fee purposes are attached to the application for admission which must be filled out by all individuals seeking admission to SUI. The regulations which resulted in the plaintiff being classified as a nonresident student are as follows.
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides that a state cannot deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. This constitutional provision, however, does not prohibit classifications by the states. Any classification by a state which is not palpably arbitrary and is reasonably based on a substantial difference or distinction is not a violation of the equal protection clause so long as the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state object or purpose. In this instance then, the Court must determine whether the classification of students as residents or nonresidents for the purpose of paying tuition is reasonable and whether that classification is rationally related to a legitimate object of the State of Iowa.
In contending that the classification involved herein is...
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