Clarks Fork Nat. Bank v. Papp
| Decision Date | 30 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-346,84-346 |
| Citation | 215 Mont. 494,698 P.2d 851,42 St.Rep. 577 |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
| Parties | CLARKS FORK NATIONAL BANK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ellak PAPP and Violet Papp, husband & wife, d/b/a Papp Landscaping Co., Defendants and Appellants. |
Joseph E. Mudd, Bridger Law Office, Bridger, for defendants and appellants.
Mouat & Martinson, Billings, for plaintiff and respondent.
Clarks Fork National Bank (Bank) sued in the Thirteenth Judicial District, Carbon County, to recover on a delinquent promissory note. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the Bank against Ellak Papp and Violet Papp, husband and wife, for $24,059.59, plus attorney fees, costs of suit and interest. The Papps appeal from this summary judgment. We reverse.
The only issue is whether there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the promissory note which precluded summary judgment.
The record before us includes an unverified complaint, an unverified answer, and affidavits by the Bank President and both of the individual defendants. The original promissory note on which the complaint was based is attached to the judgment. The top of the note shows the lender to be the Bank and lists the borrowers' names and addresses as "Papp, Ellak and Violet dba Papp Landscaping Co. Fromberg, Montana 59029." The signature lines show individual signatures by Violet A. Papp and Ellak Papp without any further reference to the name Papp Landscaping Co. The note states that the purpose of credit was the "renewal of # 33643" and that the note is secured by a separate security agreement dated June 22, 1978. While a copy of the security agreement was not made a proper part of the record, a purported copy of that agreement was attached to the defendants' brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In addition, the note grants a security interest in various inventory, equipment, accounts and other rights to payment and general intangibles, as well as the following collateral: "all plant materials, inventory, materials inventory, all accounts receivable, all vehicles, miscellaneous tools and equipment now owned or hereafter acquired for use by and for the business."
The affidavit of the Bank President states that the note in question was executed in his presence by Ellak Papp and Violet Papp individually. That affidavit also states that the note was a renewal of an earlier note. In addition, the affidavit states that the note was prepared and was signed as a personal obligation of both individuals, Ellak Papp and Violet Papp.
The affidavits of Violet A. Papp and Ellak Papp state that Ellak is the President of Papp Landscaping Co. and Violet is the Vice-President; that the promissory note in question was executed by the Papps in their corporate capacity as President and Vice-President of Papp Landscaping Co.; that the note was a renewal of a previous note executed by the company; that the defendants believed they were renewing an existing obligation between the Bank and the company; that the Papps were buttressed in their belief that the note was between the Bank and the company by the fact that the note was secured by property owned by the company; that Violet Papp as Vice-President of Papp Landscaping Co. had provided the Bank with a list of corporate officers which named Ellak Papp as President and Violet A. Papp as Vice-President.
Summary judgment allows a court to dispose of those actions where there is no genuine issue of material fact, thereby eliminating the burden and expense of an unnecessary trial. Morales v. Tuomi (Mont.1985), 693 P.2d 532, 534, 42 St.Rep. 60, 62, citing Van Uden v. Hendricksen (Mont.1980), 615 P.2d 220, 222, 37 St.Rep. 1431, 1433.
The burden upon the party moving for summary judgment is stated in Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.:
"... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law...."
The burden upon the party opposing summary judgment is stated in Rule 56(e), M.R.Civ.P.:
"......
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Carelli v. Hall
...we refer only to § 30-3-403, MCA (1985), in discussing the cases on which Carelli relies. Carelli argues that Clarks Fork Nat'l Bank v. Papp (1985), 215 Mont. 494, 698 P.2d 851, and Accounts Management Corp. v. Lyman Ranch (1987), 230 Mont. 35, 748 P.2d 919, are factually similar to the pre......
-
Evans v. Montana Nat. Guard, Dept. of Military Affairs of State of Mont.
...are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Clarks Fork National Bank v. Papp (Mont.1985), 698 P.2d 851, 42 St.Rep. 577; Cereck v. Albertsons, Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 409, 637 P.2d 509. The issues of fact raised by Evans are not fac......
-
Accounts Management Corp. v. Lyman Ranch, 87-291
...the issue of who is obligated by the note becomes a question of fact for the trial court. See Clarks Fork National Bank v. Papp (Mont.1985), 698 P.2d 851, 853, 42 St.Rep. 577, 580. And in resolving this issue, subsection (2)(b) "admits parol evidence in litigation between the immediate part......
-
Rupnow v. City of Polson
...fact" exists. Evans v. Montana Nat'l Guard (Mont.1986), 726 P.2d 1160, 1161, 43 St.Rep. 1930, 1932; Clarks Fork Nat'l Bank v. Papp (Mont.1985), 698 P.2d 851, 853, 42 St.Rep. 577, 579; Cereck v. Albertson's Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 409, 411, 637 P.2d 509, 511. As the moving party, the City of ......