Clary Appliance & Furniture Center, Inc. v. Butler
Decision Date | 06 July 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 52288,No. 3,52288,3 |
Citation | 228 S.E.2d 211,139 Ga.App. 233 |
Parties | CLARY APPLIANCE & FURNITURE CENTER, INC. v. Frank BUTLER |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Jean William Pierce, Washington, for appellant.
Heard, Leverett & Adams, E. Freeman Leverett, Elberton, for appellee.
Plaintiff/appellant filed an action upon an open account alleging defendant was indebted to him in the sum of $3,634.69. Defendant answered and denied that he was indebted to plaintiff in any amount, alleging the amount referred to was owed by one Gayle Roberson, and that credit on the open account was not extended by plaintiff to defendant but to Roberson. The jury returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was overruled by the court. Plaintiff appeals. Held:
1. Defendant Butler orally contracted with Gayle Roberson to construct a house. Upon presentation of the final bill, Roberson contended that the contract price for the house was $38,000.00. Butler testified that the contract price was 'cost plus ten per cent' and $150 per week salary.
Plaintiff submitted the successful bid to install heating and air-conditioning in the house. He testified that he submitted the bid to 'Butler Construction Company' but that Mrs. Roberson selected the units to be installed. Defendant contended that plaintiff had extended credit to the Roberson's and not to him and that plaintiff was aware of his agency. Accordingly, he vouched Roberson into the action under the provisions of Code § 38-624, by serving him a 'Vouchment and Notice of Pendency of Suit.' Roberson did not appear or answer. However, plaintiff subpoenaed him and when the Court asked plaintiff's counsel to '(c)all your witnesses,' counsel called 'Mr. Clary, Mr. Gayle Roberson and Mrs. Roberson.' They were sworn by the court.
Plaintiff presented only the testimony of Mr. Clary and never called either Mr. or Mrs. Roberson to the stand. After the close of the plaintiff's case, defendant called Mr. Roberson 'for the purpose of cross-examination.' Plaintiff objected and stated that he only 'wanted him here in case I needed him, but I have not called him to testify, and until I do he is not entitled to be cross-examined.' The court stated, Roberson was placed on the stand by the defendant and was asked leading questions.
This court held in Masters v. Pardue, 91 .ga.App. 684, 86 S.E.2d 704, that a vouchee is not a party defendant to a law action, and cannot properly be made a party defendant to the record over the objection of the plaintiff. In the instant case, the record reveals no objection by the plaintiff to the vouchment procedure. In Southern Ry. Co. v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 193 Ga. 598, 19 S.E.2d 286, 287, our Supreme Court held
Chief Judge Russell sheds additional light upon the status of a vouchee in Raleigh Ry. etc. Co. v. Western & Atlantic Ry. Co., 6 Ga.App. 616, 622, 65 S.E. 586, 589, in holding that '(i)n order for the principle embodied in (Code § 38-624) to become applicable . . . it must appear that the person vouched as responsible over is no longer to be regarded as a stranger to the action, for the substantial reason that he has the right to appear and defend, and has the same means of defeating recovery as if he were a real party upon the record . . ..'
However, we are bound by the holding of Pardue v. Masters, 211 Ga. 772, 88 S.E.2d 385, which affirmed 91 Ga.App. 684, 86 S.E.2d 704, supra, and held that 'a vouchee is not a party defendant.' When viewed in retrospect, it is unusual that a vouchee has the right to appear and defend, answer the complaint, assert any defense, and is bound by the decision as to liability of the defendant to the plaintiff and the amount of the judgment, but 'is not a party defendant.' Accordingly, the first basis given by the trial court for permitting cross-examination of the vouchee by defendant is incorrect.
2. Code § 38-1706 states, '(l)eading...
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