Clary's Adm'rs v. Clary

• Citation: 24 N.C. 78,2 Ired. 78
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decision Date: 31 December 1841
• Parties: MARY CLARY'S ADMINISTRATORS v. JOHN CLARY.

2 Ired. 78

24 N.C. 78

MARY CLARY'S ADMINISTRATORS

v.JOHN CLARY.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December Term, 1841.

A witness, who has had opportunities of knowing and observing a person whose sanity is impeached, may not only depose to the facts he knows, but may also give his opinion or belief as to his sanity or insanity.

“Improper influence” constitutes no legal objection to the validity of a deed, but only furnishes a ground for the interposition of a Court of Equity. It is otherwise with a Will.

This was an action of Detinue to recover several negroes, tried before his Honor Judge BAILEY, at the Fall Term, 1841, of Rowan Superior Court of Law, when judgment was rendered for the defendant. On the trial the plaintiffs proved that the slaves in controversy did belong to their intestate, Mary Clary, and that the defendant was in possession and detained them. The defendant offered in evidence a paper writing, purporting to be a deed of Mary Clary, giving the negroes to him in trust for himself, his sisters Nancy and Margaret, and a grand-son of the said Mary Clary. The plaintiff insisted that at the time of the execution of the paper writing, Mary Clary was of non-sane memory, and that it was obtained through fraud. Several witnesses were examined on both sides, to show sanity and insanity in Mary Clary, at the date of the paper writing, and several physicians called upon to give their opinion, whether she had a sound mind or otherwise. The plaintiffs offered in evidence the deposition of John Beard. When the plaintiffs' counsel came to the last clause of this deposition, which says, “But deponent was impressed with the belief that as to her mental faculties she was in that state called childish,” and proposed to read it as evidence, the defendant's counsel objected, saying that was the opinion of the deponent, and could not be evidence. The Court rejected the part of Beard's deposition objected to.

The plaintiffs likewise introduced a witness, by whom, he stated, he expected to prove that Nancy, the sister of the defendant, and one of the cestui que trusts, asked the witness to go and exercise some improper influence over Mary Clary in obtaining a deed for the property, but that the witness did not go and did not endeavor to exercise such influence. The Court rejected this evidence as improper.

The Court instructed the Jury that the sole inquiry they had to make was, whether Mary Clary, at the date of the paper writing purporting to be a deed of gift to the defendant, was of sound mind, and whether it was executed by her as her act and deed--that it was not sufficient that she could answer usual and familiar questions, but they must be satisfied that she had a capacity at that time to make a disposition of her property with understanding and reason. The Jury rendered a verdict for the defendant, and judgment being given pursuant thereto, the plaintiffs appealed.

Boyden and Barringer for the plaintiffs .

Badger for the defendant .

GASTON, J.

The first opinion, in the Court below, to which exception has been taken, is the rejection as evidence of the last clause of the deposition of John Beard, wherein the deponent stated “that he was impressed with the belief that, as to her mental faculties, Mary Clary was in the state called childish.” To understand the import of this fact of the deposition, it must be taken in connection with what precedes it. The substance of the entire deposition is, that the witness had no acquaintance with Mary Clary, other than such as resulted from one occurrence; that about the year 1826, eleven years before the execution of the deed in dispute, he visited her at Daniel Clary's house, in consequence of a message from said Daniel, and for the purpose of writing her will; that he received her directions with respect to the disposition of her property, and wrote the will according to these directions; that he did not attest the will, but left it to be attested by others; that at this time she appeared to him to be in good health, but he thought her intellect in the state usually termed childish. The objection to the rejected part of the deposition was, for that it gives the opinion of the witness upon the state of Mary Clary's mind.

It is certainly the general rule that witnesses shall be examined as to facts, whereof they have personal knowledge, and not as to those, in regard to which they have no personal knowledge, but have only formed an opinion or belief. But this rule necessarily admits of exceptions. There are facts, which from their nature exclude all direct positive proof, because they are imperceptible by the senses, and of these no proof can be had except such as is mediate or indirect. No man can testify, as of a fact within his knowledge, to the sanity or insanity of another. Such a question, when it arises, must be determined by other than direct proof. The precise enquiry then is, must the evidence be restricted to the proof of other facts, coming within the knowledge of the witnesses, and from which the Jury may draw an inference of sanity or insanity--or may the judgment and belief of the witnesses, founded on opportunities of personal observation, be also laid before the Jury, to aid them in forming a correct conclusion. We understand that this is a matter, on which different Judges have ruled differently on the circuits, and it is important that a uniform rule should be settled in regard to it. The point was not determined in Crowell v Kirk, 3 Dev. 355. Nor are we aware of any direct and authoritative decision, which supersedes the necessity of recurring to general principles and legal analogies to ascertain what is right.

In the first place, it seems to us that the restriction of the evidence to a simple narration of facts, having or supposed to have a bearing on the question of capacity, would, if practicable, shut out the ordinary means of obtaining truth; and, if freed from this objection, cannot in practice be effectually enforced. The sanity or insanity of an individual may be a matter notorious and without doubt in a neighborhood, and yet few, if any, of the neighbors may be able to lay before the Jury distinct facts, that would enable them to pronounce a decision thereon with reasonable assurance of its truth. If the witness may be permitted to state that he has known the individual for many years; has repeatedly conversed with him and heard others converse with him; that the witness had noticed that in these conversations he was incoherent and silly; that in his habits he was occasionally highly pleased and greatly vexed without a cause; and that in his conduct he was wild, irrational, extravagant, and crazy; what would this be but to declare the judgment or opinion of the witness of what is incoherent or foolish in conversation; what reasonable cause of pleasure or resentment--and what the indicia of sound or disordered intellect? If he may not so testify, but must give the supposed silly or incoherent language, state the degrees and all the accompanying circumstances of highly excited emotion, and specifically set forth the freaks or acts, regarded as irrational, and this without the least intimation of any opinion, which he has formed of their character--where are such witnesses...