Classic Components Supply, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 February 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-1154,88-1154 |
| Citation | 841 F.2d 163 |
| Parties | CLASSIC COMPONENTS SUPPLY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MITSUBISHI ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Michael A. Braun, Braun & Rivkin, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., Craig W. Nelson, Piette, Knoll & Nelson, S.C., Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff-appellant.
David V. Meany, Michael, Best & Friedrich, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant-appellee.
Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
We have a reflexive appeal and request for an injunction pending its resolution. Classic Components Supply filed suit in a Wisconsin court, seeking an injunction to compel Mitsubishi Electronics America to continue using Classic as a distributor. Mitsubishi removed the case to federal court under the diversity jurisdiction and pointed out that Classic had promised by contract to arbitrate disputes of this character. The district court ordered Classic to arbitrate and denied the request for a preliminary injunction, stating that even if Classic had demonstrated the prospect of irreparable injury it hadn't a chance on the merits. See Dederich Corp. v. Eurozyme S.N.C., 839 F.2d 373, (7th Cir.1988). Classic immediately appealed and asked for an injunction pending appeal. Although this request has produced a stack of motions, affidavits, and other papers more than two inches thick, Classic has not satisfied any of the criteria for an injunction pending appeal, which its papers do not acknowledge. We therefore deny the application and order Classic to reimburse Mitsubishi for its outlays in replying to this pointless motion. Fed.R.App.P. 38.
One who seeks an injunction pending appeal must show irreparable injury. Classic's motions papers do not address this subject. The closest it comes is the statement that its
customers have already started to cancel their orders for Mitsubishi products. [Classic's] market development for Mitsubishi products will be totally lost if there is any significant interruption in its Dealership Agreement. This will effect [sic] not only the portion of [Classic's] business represented by the Mitsubishi line, but its entire customer base which Classic has traditionally serviced by holding itself out as a source for a broad range of its customers' needs.
All very well, but this shows only that Classic may suffer injury. Injuries of this sort, common consequences of broken contracts, yield damages. An injury compensable in money is not "irreparable", so an injunction is unavailable. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88-91, 94 S.Ct. 937, 951-953, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974). Classic does not acknowledge the existence, let alone the force, of this principle. Classic therefore has not appealed to the exception: that a terminated supply arrangement may create irreparable injury if the interruption bids fair to propel one firm into bankruptcy and frustrate later attempts to compute or collect damages. E.g., American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 596 (7th Cir.1986); Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir.1984); Signode Corp. v. Weld-Loc Systems, Inc., 700 F.2d 1108, 1111 (7th Cir.1983). Classic does not suggest that the injury it confronts is harder to quantify than the injury in any other contract case. Perhaps Classic abjured the exception because it offered no shelter. Classic distributes the lines of about 65 manufacturers; Mitsubishi's semiconductors accounted for only 1.5% of its sales in 1986 and 3.4% in early 1987; Classic can purchase Mitsubishi products (with Mitsubishi's blessing) from its distributors even if not directly from Mitsubishi.
Because Classic has not reached first base on irreparable injury, we do not consider whether it has a plausible legal claim or whether an injunction would injure Mitsubishi more than it would help Classic. The district court thought Classic a loser on the merits, and although Classic disagrees with that conclusion it does not argue that the district court's assessment was so gravely in error that an appellate court may disturb it. See Lawson Products, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429, 1433, 1436-40 (7th Cir.1986). Classic does not so much as refer to the standard of review on appeal.
Litigants should not lightly seek injunctions pending appeal. Adams v. Walter, 488 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th...
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