Classy Cycles, Inc. v. Bay Cnty.
Decision Date | 28 September 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 1D15–4623.,1D15–4623. |
Citation | 201 So.3d 779 |
Parties | CLASSY CYCLES, INC., Appellant, v. BAY COUNTY, Florida, a political Subdivision of the State of Florida and Panama City Beach, Florida, a municipal corporation, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Paul M. Hawkes and Mark V. Murray, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Jennifer W. Shuler, Bay County Assistant County Attorney, for Appellee Bay County.
J. Cole Davis and Douglas J. Sale of Harrison Sale McCloy, Panama City, for Appellee Panama City Beach.
This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Appellant, Classy Cycles, Inc.'s, motion for summary judgment and resulting final judgment, which denied Appellant's challenges to portions of the City of Panama City Beach and Bay County's (collectively “the local governments”) ordinances related to the rental of certain motor vehicles. Finding that local governments' ability to legislate in this area has been preempted by Florida law, we reverse the trial court's order and judgment, and remand for further proceedings.
Bay County is a non-charter county and therefore has the “power of self-government as is provided by general or special law.” Art. VIII, § 1(f), Fla. Const.1 The Florida Constitution further provides:
The board of county commissioners of a county not operating under a charter may enact, in a manner prescribed by general law, county ordinances not inconsistent with general or special law, but an ordinance in conflict with a municipal ordinance shall not be effective within the municipality to the extent of such conflict.
Id.; see also § 125.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2014).
The City of Panama City Beach is a municipality established by Florida law. Panama City Beach Charter, Art. 1, § 1–1. As such, the Florida Constitution provides that:
Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.
Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const.; see also § 166.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2014).
The powers granted to non-charter counties and municipalities therefore differ, with Panama City Beach having greater power to enact ordinances than Bay County. Because of the doctrine of preemption as discussed below, however, the difference in the power to enact ordinances between municipalities and non-charter counties is immaterial to our decision.
Bay County Ordinance 14–12 amended section 24–91(a) of the Bay County Code, which now provides:
The Bay County Code also makes it unlawful to operate any of the listed rented vehicles without wearing the required vest. § 24–91(d).
Bay County Ordinance 14–07 created section 24–97 of the Bay County Code. That section of code provides in pertinent part that each business renting, leasing, or hiring within the unincorporated area of Bay County a motorcycle, motor scooter, moped, or any other two- or three-wheeled, self-propelled vehicle, shall obtain the following minimum coverage:
The Bay County Code also provides that it is a criminal offense, punishable as a second degree misdemeanor, to not comply with vest and insurance provisions. § 24–99.2.
Panama City Beach Municipal Ordinance 1337, Art. VI § 22–100(a), provides:
The Panama City Beach Code also makes it unlawful to operate the rented vehicle without wearing the required vest. § 22–100(d).
Panama City Beach Municipal Ordinance 1337, Chapter 22, Art. VI § 22–100(a)10, provides:
The Panama City Beach Code also provides that it is a civil infraction, punishable by a civil penalty, to not comply with vest and insurance provisions. § 22–105.5.3
When the litigation commenced, Appellant operated several businesses in Bay County and Panama City Beach which rented motor vehicles subject to the vest and insurance ordinances of the local governments. Appellant sought a declaratory judgment declaring the ordinances exceeded the scope of the authority of the local governments. Appellant also sought damages for lost revenue because, it alleged, its motor scooter rental businesses could not fully operate because the required insurance could not be obtained. All parties moved for summary judgment arguing no disputed material facts existed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the local governments and then entered a final judgment consistent with the summary judgment.
Here Appellant challenges the trial court's decision finding the local governments' ordinances concerning vest and insurance requirements to be a valid exercise of local authority. Appellant argues, as it did below, that the regulation of motor vehicles by local governments is preempted by Florida law, except as specifically allowed, and that none of the exceptions are applicable to the ordinances here.
The Florida Supreme Court has stated: “A local government enactment may be inconsistent with state law if (1) the Legislature ‘has preempted a particular subject area’ or (2) the local enactment conflicts with a state statute.” Sarasota Alliance For Fair Elections, Inc. v. Browning, 28 So.3d 880, 886 (Fla.2010), citing Lowe v. Broward County,
766 So.2d 1199, 1206–07 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).4 The Court in Sarasota Alliance went on to explain the preemption doctrine as follows:
Florida law recognizes two types of preemption: express and implied. Express preemption requires a specific legislative statement; it cannot be implied or inferred. See City of Hollywood v. Mulligan, 934 So.2d 1238, 1243 (Fla.2006) ; Phantom of Clearwater, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 894 So.2d 1011, 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), approved in Phantom of Brevard, Inc. v. Brevard County, 3 So.3d 309 (Fla.2008). Express preemption of a field by the Legislature must be accomplished by clear language stating that intent. Mulligan, 934 So.2d at 1243. In cases where the Legislature expressly or specifically preempts an area, there is no problem with ascertaining what the Legislature intended. Tallahassee Mem'l [v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., 681 So.2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ].
In discussing implied preemption in Sarasota Alliance, the Florida Supreme Court stated:
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