Claudio v. Dean Machine Co., Inc.

• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: LALLY-GREEN, J.
• Citation: Claudio v. Dean Machine Co., Inc., 786 A.2d 224 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)
• Decision Date: 01 August 2001
• Parties: Luis CLAUDIO and Sexta Claudia, IDV. and as H/W, Appellees, v. DEAN MACHINE COMPANY, INC., Burton Industries, American Steel Line, Inc., North American Brass, Inc., and Hannum Electric Company, Appellants.

786 A.2d 224

Luis CLAUDIO and Sexta Claudia, IDV. and as H/W, Appellees, v. DEAN MACHINE COMPANY, INC., Burton Industries, American Steel Line, Inc., North American Brass, Inc., and Hannum Electric Company, Appellants.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 24, 2001.

Filed August 1, 2001.

Reargument Denied September 27, 2001.

Joseph V. Pinto, Philadelphia, for appellants.

John B. Day, Philadelphia, for appellees.

Before JOHNSON, STEVENS, and LALLY-GREEN, JJ.

LALLY-GREEN, J.

¶ 1 Appellant, Dean Machine, Inc. (DMI), appeals from the judgment entered September 19, 2000. We vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial.

¶ 2 The unusual procedural history of the case is as follows.¹ On December 22, 1997, Appellees Luis Claudio and Sexta Claudio filed an action against Dean Machine Company (DMC), as well as other defendants who are no longer parties to the action. Appellees alleged that on January 24, 1996, Luis Claudio was operating a coil slitter machine in the course of his employment when the machine malfunctioned, causing severe injuries to his hand, including amputation of four fingers. Appellees alleged that DMC manufactured, designed, marketed, and sold the machine. Appellees brought causes of action against DMC for negligence, breach of warranty, strict products liability, and loss of consortium.

¶ 3 On February 19, 1998, DMI filed an answer and new matter, alleging that DMI had been "incorrectly designated as Dean Machine Company" in the Complaint. DMI stated that it "never manufactured, designed, marketed, or sold the machine which is the subject of plaintiff's complaint; nor did it ever maintain, repair, or have any connection whatsoever with this machine."² Throughout the litigation, the law firm of Viletto Bosniak and Ross filed pleadings on behalf of both DMI and DMC.

¶ 4 DMI filed a motion for summary judgment on October 4, 1999.³ This motion was denied on October 22, 1999. The motion for summary judgment and the order denying the motion were not made part of the certified record on appeal.

¶ 5 Shortly before trial, DMI filed a motion in limine to preclude Appellees from presenting any evidence against DMI, on the ground that Appellees had signed a stipulation to dismiss DMI from the case. The motion in limine and the stipulation were not made part of the certified record on appeal. The trial court denied this motion on the first day of trial. N.T., 2/18/2000, at 2.

¶ 6 On February 16, 2000, two days prior to trial, Appellees filed a motion to amend the caption to substitute DMI for DMC. While this motion was not made part of the certified record on appeal, it was referenced in the February 18, 2000 trial transcript as follows:

THE COURT: There is a motion to amend the complaint to add as a defendant Dean Machine, Inc., which was filed when? Today, sir?

APPELLEES' COUNSEL: I believe Wednesday, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Wednesday. That's denied as well.

APPELLEES' COUNSEL: But the motion, Your Honor, was to change the caption, the name of the defendant.

THE COURT: Right. That's denied.

N.T., 2/18/2000, at 2.

¶ 7 The case proceeded to trial against DMC on the issue of damages only. N.T., 2/22/00, at 12.⁴ Mark Bosniak, Esq., of Viletto Bosniak and Ross, represented DMC at trial. During the trial, on February 22, 2000, Appellees "moved into evidence" Paragraphs 42-45 of DMI's Answer and New Matter, as well as exhibits attached thereto. Id. at 2-3. Even though this material was originally submitted by DMI to establish that it had no liability for the incident, the court allowed the plaintiffs, Appellees herein, to move this material into evidence to build a record in support of Appellees' previously-denied motion to change the caption. Id. at 5. At DMC's counsel's request, the trial court then admitted the entire Answer and New Matter into evidence. Id. at 4.

¶ 8 On February 2, 2000, the jury entered a verdict for $2,500,000.00 in favor of Appellee Luis Claudio, and a verdict for $150,000.00 in favor of Appellee Sexta Claudio. Both verdicts were rendered against DMC.

¶ 9 On February 24, 2000, Appellees filed two motions: (1) a post-trial motion to amend the caption and mold the verdict to enter a judgment against DMI; and (2) a motion for delay damages. We will set forth the procedural history of each motion separately.

Motion to amend the caption and mold the verdict against DMI

¶ 10 This motion was not made part of the certified record on appeal. The trial court set forth the procedural history of this motion as follows:

Written memoranda were submitted by the parties and, on June 8, 2000, this Court held oral argument. The issue of successor liability was debated and the court granted a continuance of the hearing to allow counsel to present evidence on this issue. Counsel traveled to Rhode Island and deposed Albert Saunders, Jr., Esquire, former counsel to DMC, and also David Maynard, one of the principals of DMI. Oral testimony was again presented to this Court on July 11, 2000.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/19/2000, at 3. None of the evidentiary material referred to in the above passage was made part of the certified record on appeal. On July 19, 2000, the trial court granted Appellees' motion, substituted DMI "as a proper defendant," and molded the verdict to impose liability on DMI.

Motion for delay damages

¶ 11 On February 24, 2000, Appellees filed a motion for delay damages. DMI filed an Answer and New Matter, alleging that the verdict and all delay damages should be reduced as a result of a settlement and release agreement between Appellees and Hannum Electric Company, Inc. (Hannum). On July 19, 2000, the court denied this motion and added delay damages in the amount of $266,899.48.

¶ 12 On July 31, 2000, DMI filed motions for post-trial relief seeking judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), a new trial, or remittitur. DMI again argued the issue of the release. The trial court denied these motions on August 29, 2000. On September 19, 2000, the trial court imposed judgment against DMI in the total amount of $2,916,899.48. This appeal followed.

¶ 13 DMI raises six issues on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred by denying DMI's Motion for Summary Judgment when plaintiffs came forth with no evidence to show DMI could not be liable for a product it had not manufactured, sold, or had anything to do with?

2. Whether the trial court erred by denying the Motion in Limine to exclude any evidence against DMI?

3. Whether the trial court properly received and evaluated new testimonial evidence after the jury verdict on post-trial motions?

4. Whether the trial court properly reversed post-trial its pre-trial ruling denying plaintiffs leave to amend and holding post-trial that DMI was the successor to Dean Machine Company when DMI never manufactured, sold or had anything to do with a "coil slitter"?

5. Whether DMI should be granted judgment in its favor and against plaintiffs notwithstanding the verdict entered by the court below on new testimony submitted after trial, or in the alternative, whether DMI should be granted a new trial.

6. Whether the trial court erred by denying DMI's post-trial motion to give effect to the Griffin Release entered by plaintiffs?

DMI's Brief at 5. For clarity, we have rearranged the order of the questions presented to correspond to the chronological order of the underlying proceedings.

¶ 14 First, DMI argues that the trial court erred when it denied DMI's motion for summary judgment. DMI's Brief at 33-35. As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether the certified record is sufficient to analyze this issue.

¶ 15 "It is the obligation of the appellant to make sure that the record forwarded to an appellate court contains those documents necessary to allow a complete and judicious assessment of the issues raised on appeal." Hrinkevich v. Hrinkevich, 450 Pa.Super. 405, 676 A.2d 237, 240 (1996) (citation omitted). "Under our Rules of Appellate Procedure, those documents which are not part of the `official record' forwarded to this Court are considered to be non-existent.... And, these deficiencies may not be remedied by inclusion in a brief in the form of a reproduced record." D'Ardenne v. Strawbridge & Clothier, Inc., 712 A.2d 318, 326 (Pa.Super.1998) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 557 Pa. 647, 734 A.2d 394 (1998). "It is well settled that an appellate court may consider only those facts which have been duly certified in the record on appeal." Albert v. Albert, 707 A.2d 234, 236 (Pa.Super.1998).

¶ 16 In the instant case, DMI's motion for summary judgment and the trial court's order disposing of this motion were not made part of the certified record. As such, we have no basis on which to determine whether the trial court erred. Because the certified record is insufficient for this Court to analyze the issue, it is waived on appeal.

¶ 17 Second, DMI argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion in limine to exclude any evidence against DMI. DMI's Brief at 35-36. According to the trial court, this motion was based on a stipulation signed by all parties except Hannum, which had settled with Appellees before trial. N.T., 2/18/2000, at 2.⁵ As noted above, neither this motion in limine nor the stipulation was made part of the certified record. As such, we have no basis for analyzing the trial court's decision. Because the certified record is insufficient for this Court to analyze the issue, it is waived on appeal.

¶ 18 Third, DMI argues that the trial court erred by holding a post-trial evidentiary hearing to determine whether DMI was the successor corporation to DMC. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) After trial and upon the written Motion for Post-Trial Relief filed by any party, the court may

(1) order a new trial as to all or any of the issues; or

(2) direct the entry of judgment in favor of any party; or

(3) remove a nonsuit; or

(4) affirm, modify, or change the...