Claughton v. Claughton

• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: OVERTON; SUNDBERG
• Citation: Claughton v. Claughton, 393 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 1980)
• Decision Date: 23 October 1980
• Docket Number: No. 55227,55227
• Parties: Beverly A. CLAUGHTON, Petitioner, v. Edward N. CLAUGHTON, Respondent.

Page 1061

393 So.2d 1061

Beverly A. CLAUGHTON, Petitioner, v. Edward N. CLAUGHTON, Respondent.

No. 55227.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 23, 1980.

Rehearing Denied March 2, 1981.

Mark Hicks of Daniels & Hicks, and Paige & Catlin, Miami, for petitioner.

Marion E. Sibley and Allan M. Glaser of Sibley, Giblin, Levenson & Glaser, Miami Beach, for respondent.

OVERTON, Justice.

This cause is before the Court on petition for certiorari to review the decision of the district court of appeal in Claughton v. Claughton, 361 So.2d 752 (Fla.3d DCA 1978), which conflicts with Seale v. Seale, 350 So.2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (1979), as it existed prior to April 1, 1980.

The issue presented to the district court in an interlocutory appeal was whether the trial court, in entering a dissolution of marriage judgment, may reserve jurisdiction to determine issues relating to alimony and property rights and thereafter make an award of alimony to the wife after she has remarried.

The district court answered the question in the negative, finding no type of alimony could be awarded after remarriage. We quash in part and approve in part.

At the outset, it should be understood that both parties agreed to the use of this split procedure of entering a judgment for dissolution of the marriage, with a reservation of jurisdiction to determine alimony and property interests.

The district court's conclusion was correct insofar as it involved any alimony necessary for the support of the wife. Certainly, temporary alimony payments which had been established by previous court order were terminated by the remarriage. Also barred is any facet of periodic or lump sum alimony which is predicated on the need to support the wife. Carlton v. Carlton, 87 Fla. 460, 100 So. 745 (1924).

We find, however, that remarriage of the wife does not bar consideration of lump sum alimony to the extent it is used to provide the wife with an equitable share of the assets of the parties accumulated during their marriage, as distinguished from her need for support. In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980), we cited Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.1949), as approving lump sum alimony where the wife had "assisted her husband in accumulating property...." We do not determine in the instant case that the wife is necessarily entitled to any lump sum alimony; rather, we hold only that the trial judge in the instant case has jurisdiction to award such lump sum alimony if it is found necessary to "compensate the wife for her contribution to the marriage" in accordance with the standards set forth in Canakaris v. Canakaris; see Brown v. Brown, 300 So.2d 719 (Fla.1st DCA 1974). We emphasize that any award made in this instance would be based on her equitable share of the assets resulting from...