Clausell v. Bayer Corp.
| Decision Date | 31 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | NO. 5:15-CV-50-BO,5:15-CV-50-BO |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | CHRISTY CLAUSELL, Plaintiff, v. BAYER CORPORATION, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Christy Clausell's motion to amend the complaint [DE 20] and defendant Bayer Corporation's motion to dismiss [DE 22], both of which are ripe for ruling. For the following reasons, both motions are granted in part and denied in part.
Defendant Bayer Corporation is the parent company of plaintiff's former employer, Bayer CropScience LP (Bayer Cropscience). Plaintiff was employed at Bayer CropScience's Morrisville, North Carolina, facility from approximately August 2013 to August 2014. Plaintiff filed the instant suit against Bayer Corporation alleging a number of causes of action that all arise out of her employment with and termination from Bayer CropScience. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 20, 2015, and now has moved to amend her amended complaint to add as defendants Bayer CropScience and Bayer AG. [DE 8, 20]. Bayer Corporation has moved to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims. [DE 22].
Plaintiff's motion to amend seeks to add Bayer CropScience LP and Bayer AG as defendants. Bayer AG is a Germany company that is the parent company of Bayer Corporation,while Bayer CropScience is a subsidiary of Bayer Corporation. [DE 14]. Plaintiff's motion states that she "was employed by BayerCropScience, which is a subgroup of Bayer AG," and that all policies and procedures are issued and maintained by Bayer AG, thus Bayer AG and Bayer CropScience are proper defendants. [DE 20]. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint, but states that the second amended complaint will not change the paragraphs of the previously filed original and amended complaints. [Id.].
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served. Fed R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). Otherwise, a party may amend its pleadings by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The decision to allow leave to amend a pleading rests within the discretion of the trial court and should "be freely given when justice so requires." Id.; Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999) (). Leave to amend should be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, when there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or when the amendment would be futile. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006).
Any claims against Bayer AG would be futile. Plaintiff has alleged only that Bayer AG issues and maintains employment policies, but has alleged no facts that would support adding Bayer AG as a defendant to any of plaintiff's claims. None of plaintiff's claims concern the inadequacy of Bayer's policies, although some do concern whether said policies were followed. Accordingly, amendment would be futile because plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim against Bayer AG. See, e.g., Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 166 F.3d 292, 294-95 (4th Cir. 1999) (). Plaintiff's motion to add Bayer CropScience as a defendant, however, would not be futile, as plaintiff admits that Bayer CropScience was, in fact, her employer. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to amend is granted in part, as to Bayer CropScience, and denied in part, as to Bayer AG. Plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint within fourteen days of the date of this order listing both Bayer CropScience and Bayer Corporation as defendants.
Plaintiff's complaint contains roughly a dozen claims arising from her employment and termination from Bayer CropScience. The Court will consider each of these claims as if alleged against both Bayer CropScience and Bayer Corporation (collectively Bayer). Defendant has moved to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted challenges the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). When ruling on the motion, the court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Although complete and detailed factual allegations are not required, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Similarly, a court need not accept as true a plaintiff's "unwarrantedinferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." E. Shore Mkts., Inc., v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd., 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff's first claim is for penalties under Section 502(c)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C § 1102(c). Plaintiff appears to contend that Bayer failed to properly notify her of her rights to continuing health coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) and requests penalties under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 as a result. COBRA requires employers and plan administrators to provide employees and beneficiaries with notice of their right to elect to continue group health plan coverage when there is a triggering event listed in the statute that causes (or will cause) a loss of plan coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 1161(a). COBRA's notification requirements are clear. An employer must notify the administrator of the group health plan within thirty days of termination, and the administrator has fourteen days to notify the employee of her right to continue coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(2), (c). Where a plan administrator fails to properly notify an employee of her right to continue coverage, § 1132(c) provides for civil penalties payable to the employee.
Plaintiff's complaint states that she has received both "no information regarding COBRA" since her termination and "COBRA notices and benefit cards on multiple occasions." [DE 8, p.5]. Piecing together the complaint and plaintiff's response in opposition to the motion to dismiss, it appears that plaintiff still had insurance coverage but had been terminated from employment with Bayer at the time the complaint was filed. Accordingly, plaintiff's allegations fail to demonstrate a violation of the COBRA notification requirements. As plaintiff clearly states that she had insurance coverage at the time she filed the complaint, the notification requirements of COBRA have not been triggered and plaintiff cannot state a claim for a penaltyunder ERISA Section 502(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1).
Plaintiff also appears to assert a claim for short-term disability benefits provided through the Bayer Corporation Disability Plan as well as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff asserts these claims against Matrix Absence Management, rather than either of the defendants named in this suit. Though plaintiff states that her claims are "definitely geared towards Defendant," this does not override the fact that the claims in fact are alleged against Matrix Absence Management alone. [DE 24 at 3]. Because the claims are not asserted against either defendant, they do not state a claim for relief and must be dismissed. See, e.g., Boykin Anchor Co. Inc. v. A T & T Corp., No. 5:10-CV-591-FL, 2011 WL 1456388 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2011).
Moreover, plaintiff has not alleged that she appealed the termination of benefits to the claims administrator for the short term disability plan. ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries "must both pursue and exhaust plan remedies before gaining access to the federal courts." Gayle v. United Parcel Serv., 401 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Hickey v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 43 F.3d 941, 945 (4th Cir. 1995) (). As she has not alleged that she exhausted the short term disability plan's administrative remedies, plaintiff's ERISA claim must be dismissed.1
To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), plaintiff must demonstrate that "(1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonablyforeseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress (often referred to as 'mental anguish'), and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress." Guthrie v. Conroy, 567 S.E.2d 403, 410 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Johnson v. Roark Obstetrics, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990)).
Plaintiff's complaint states that "Defendant's carelessness in 'losing Plaintiff's complaint' created a situation where Plaintiff suffered unnecessary mental and emotional injury," specifically causing her to suffer "with PTSD, anxiety and depression." [DE 8 at 8]. These allegations alone are insufficient to demonstrate that it was reasonably foreseeable that defendant's carelessness in losing a complaint would result in plaintiff's severe emotional distress. See Cherry v. Perdue Farms, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-23-FL, 2010 WL 5437222 at *6 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 27, 2010) (...
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