Clausen v. New York State Dept. of Health

• Decision Date: 31 October 1996
• Citation: 232 A.D.2d 917,648 N.Y.S.2d 842
• Parties: In the Matter of Jerry CLAUSEN, Petitioner, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 842

648 N.Y.S.2d 842

232 A.D.2d 917

In the Matter of Jerry CLAUSEN, Petitioner, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Oct. 31, 1996.

Byrne, Costello and Pickard P.C. (Loretta P. Kilpatrick, of counsel), Syracuse, for petitioner.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney-General (Thomas Sofield, of counsel), New York City, for respondent.

Before MIKOLL, J.P., and MERCURE, PETERS, SPAIN and CARPINELLO, JJ.

MIKOLL, Justice Presiding.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this court pursuant to Public Health Law § 230-c) to review a determination of the Administrative Review Board for Professional Medical Conduct which suspended petitioner's license to practice medicine in New York for three years.

Petitioner, a licensed psychiatrist, was charged with nine specifications of professional misconduct involving the care and treatment of patient A from June 30, 1987 to July 2, 1990 and relating also to his conduct vis-a-vis patient A subsequent to the period when his care of patient A had allegedly ended. The Hearing Committee of the State Board for Professional Medical Conduct (hereinafter Committee) sustained charges against petitioner of negligence on more than one occasion, breach of confidentiality on two occasions and inadequate record keeping. The Committee recommended a stayed suspension of petitioner's license for three years with probation that included continuing education and monitoring of petitioner. A review by the Administrative Review Board for Professional Medical Conduct (hereinafter ARB) sustained the Committee's determination.

Petitioner challenges the determination on the ground that the physician-patient relationship had terminated before any of the acts complained of occurred and that he no longer owed a duty of care to patient A. We disagree with petitioner's contention that a patient-physician relationship no longer existed during the period in question. The factual determination on the issue is within the province of the trier of fact and will not be disturbed if supported by the record (see, Matter of Orozco v. Sobol, 162 A.D.2d 834, 835, 557 N.Y.S.2d 738). Petitioner also challenges the determination on the ground that it is not supported by substantial evidence.

The standard for review here is whether the ARB's determination was arbitrary and capricious, affected by an error of law or constituted an abuse of discretion (see, Matter of Moss v. Chassin, 209 A.D.2d 889, 891, 618 N.Y.S.2d 931, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 805, 627 N.Y.S.2d 322, 650 N.E.2d 1324,cert denied --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 170, 133 L.Ed.2d 111). An administrative action is arbitrary and capricious when it is without a sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts (see, Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 232, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321). Our review is limited to whether the ARB's decision was rationally based.

In that regard, the evidence discloses that patient A, who was treated by petitioner for agoraphobia and panic attacks, developed a romantic interest in petitioner, denominated as a transference phenomenon. The ARB confirmed the Committee's findings that petitioner was negligent in the way he handled patient A's romantic focus on him on several occasions. This included his (1) allowing patient A to remain in physical contact with him upon her initiation of such contact, and (2) that though patient A, by petitioner's own estimation, was suffering from a transference fixation on him, his handling of her exacerbated the problem. Some of the inappropriate actions taken by petitioner were as follows: he continued to attend and monitor her sessions with a new therapist; he continued to call patient A at home for a year after his purported termination of therapy, thus confusing her as to his intentions; he failed to act prudently when he visited patient A in her home in June...