Clauss v. Electronic City
| Decision Date | 15 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 3659,3659 |
| Citation | 93 N.M. 75,1979 NMCA 66,596 P.2d 518 |
| Parties | Robert A. CLAUSS, II, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELECTRONIC CITY, a/k/a Electronics City and John Capo, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Plaintiff, as the personal representative of the estate of Marilyn R. Clark, appeals the termination of workmen's compensation benefits to the estate. The appeal concerns three issues: (1) jurisdiction of the trial court; (2) a lump sum award; and (3) whether the benefits accrue to the estate of decedent.
Allen B. Clark suffered a fatal accidental injury while employed by defendants. His widow, Marilyn R. Clark, on September 21, 1976, was awarded benefits "from March 1, 1974, . . . up to a cumulative total for past and future compensation of 500 weeks at Fifty-Seven Dollars and Fifty Cents ($57.50) per week, for a total Judgment for past and future weekly benefits in the sum of Twenty-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($28,750.00) . . . ." This judgment was affirmed on appeal. Clark v. Electronic City, 90 N.M. 477, 565 P.2d 348 (Ct.App.1977).
Mrs. Clark died on September 13, 1977. It does not appear that there were any eligible surviving dependents (§ 52-1-17, N.M.S.A.1978) legally entitled to support. The estate brought suit for a lump sum payment for the amounts due from June 14, 1977, through September 13, 1977, and for all sums due and owing thereafter. The trial court found for the estate for the amount from June to September. It further found that defendant was discharged from paying any amounts after September 13, 1977.
It is plaintiff's position that the trial court was without jurisdiction to act since there was no appeal from the Judgment on the Mandate which provided for weekly installments of $57.50 for 500 weeks after March 1, 1974. It is plaintiff's contention that the only applicable statute is § 52-1-38 A, N.M.S.A.1978. Subsection A states in part:
In addition to executions for any amount already due in the judgment, executions for amounts to become due in the future shall be issued by the clerk of the court at any time after the time provided in the judgment for the payment thereof, if the workman files his affidavit with the clerk that the same is unpaid and that his disability still continues; provided, however, if application is made for a physical examination of the workman under Section 52-1-51 NMSA 1978, issuance of execution shall await the further order of the court in (on) the premises.
Plaintiff's argument is totally without merit. Because Marilyn had filed an affidavit of non-payment under this section before her death does not limit the authority of the trial court to only act under this section.
Plaintiff's reliance on Fowler v. W. G. Const. Co., 51 N.M. 441, 188 P.2d 160 (1947) for support for his position is misplaced. Fowler holds that the district court Has jurisdiction after the expiration of thirty days to reopen, amend or modify its judgment.
Fowler is consistent with the general scheme of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Sections 52-1-46 and 56, N.M.S.A.1978, both provide for a continuing jurisdiction of the court. See also, Churchill v. City of Albuquerque, 66 N.M. 325, 347 P.2d 752 (1959); Segura v. Jack Adams General Contractor, 64 N.M. 413, 329 P.2d 432 (1958). The trial court had jurisdiction to terminate the award.
Plaintiff contends that the judgment was a lump sum award. This is manifestly without merit. Section 52-1-30, N.M.S.A.1978, provides for compensation to be paid in installments unless it is in the interest of rehabilitation or in the "best interests of the person entitled to compensation." There was no "best interests" hearing, nor was there a present value discount. Plaintiff's argument defies common reasoning as to what is a lump sum settlement or award. See Livingston v. Loffland Brothers Co., 86 N.M. 375, 524 P.2d 991 (Ct.App.1974); Arther V. Western Company of North America, 88 N.M. 157, 538 P.2d 799 (Ct.App.1975).
Plaintiff's position is basically that the benefits became vested in Marilyn and, accordingly, pass to the personal representative as assets of the estate. This is a matter of first impression in New Mexico and is answered by reference to our statutes and the intent evidenced thereby.
Section 52-1-17, supra, defines dependents and what causes benefits to cease:
As used in the Workmen's Compensation Act (52-1-1 to 52-1-69 NMSA 1978), unless the context otherwise requires, the following persons, and they only, shall be deemed dependents and entitled to compensation under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act:
B. the widow or widower, only if living with the deceased at the time of his death, or legally entitled to be supported by him, including a divorced spouse entitled to alimony;
E. questions as to who constitute dependents and the extent of their dependency shall be determined as of the date of the injury, and...
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Bagwell v. Shady Grove Truck Stop
...Homestake Partners, and by the provision for the court's continuing jurisdiction over a compensation award, see Clauss v. Electronic City, 93 N.M. 75, 596 P.2d 518 (Ct.App.1979). THE MOTION FOR Plaintiff has asked for damages on the ground the appeal is frivolous and designed to harass and ......
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Garrison v. Safeway Stores
...next contends that our reading of Section 52-1-17(A) conflicts with NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-46 (Orig.Pamp.) and Clauss v. Electronic City, 93 N.M. 75, 596 P.2d 518 (Ct.App.1979). Using dictionary definitions of "eligible" and "dependents," plaintiff contends that the reasoning of our calend......