Clay County Cotton Co. v. Home Life Ins. Co.

Decision Date26 August 1940
Docket NumberNo. 11581.,11581.
Citation113 F.2d 856
PartiesCLAY COUNTY COTTON CO. v. HOME LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

G. B. Oliver, Jr., of Little Rock, Ark. (C. T. Bloodworth, of Poplar Bluff, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.

Charles D. Frierson, of Jonesboro, Ark., for appellee.

Before WOODROUGH and THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and BELL, District Judge.

BELL, District Judge.

This is an action by appellant against appellee to recover on an insurance policy issued December 26, 1924, on the life of Fred B. Sprague. At the close of the plaintiff's case the court directed a verdict for the defendant, and this appeal is from the judgment entered thereon.

The insured was president of a bank at Corning, Arkansas, and, with three partners, was also a dealer in cotton at that place under the name of the Clay County Cotton Company. It appears that the partners agreed to take $20,000 insurance on the life of each of them and name the business as beneficiary. The insured on November 29, 1924, signed and submitted to the appellee two applications, each for $10,000 life insurance. In the medical examinations, analysis of his urine revealed "numerous pus cells in every field — too numerous to count." Later, he signed an application for $15,000 which was submitted to the company in lieu of the two for $10,000 each. This application was accepted at a premium for forty-eight years of age instead of forty-two, the actual age of the applicant. Each of the three partners of Sprague purchased $20,000 insurance on his life and an annual premium on all the insurance was paid in advance. The Clay County Cotton Company, a partnership, was named the beneficiary in all the policies. Later the partnership was incorporated and the corporation, appellant herein, became the beneficiary.

The insured, on January 30, 1925, applied for the accidental death benefit contract in connection with his policy and, in consideration of an additional annual premium of $18.75, the company agreed to pay (in addition to the amount payable under the policy) the sum of $15,000 on receipt of "due proof of death of the insured and that such death occurred while the said policy and this contract are in full force and effect and resulted solely from bodily injury caused by external means of an accidental or violent nature, and that death occurred within ninety days after such injury and as a direct result thereof, exclusive of all other causes."

The insured, with a cousin, Waller Sprague, left Charleston, Missouri, about eight o'clock a. m. March 15, 1938, in an automobile to inspect a farm some seven miles away. A portion of the farm had been examined and the insured expressed a desire to see the wheat which was not easily accessible by automobile; whereupon, it was concluded to go on horseback. A horse was saddled for decedent by an employee at the farm and led across a wagon tongue. The decedent stepped upon the tongue and then mounted the horse. As he did so the horse made two or three jumps or lunges but did not unseat the decedent. He was thrown severely forward and backward in the saddle and almost thrown off. He rode the horse a mile and a half, during which the horse, according to the testimony of one who accompanied him, "was fractious and jerked Mr. Sprague and shook him up several times."

The decedent and his cousin returned to Charleston for lunch, revisited the farm in the afternoon, later drove to East Prairie, a distance of ten miles, and returned to Charleston about seven p. m. The decedent retired early without having made any complaint of illness or injury. Later in the evening the decedent called his cousin and stated that he was sick. The cousin found him nauseated, vomiting, perspiring freely and suffering a heart attack. A local physician was called, also another physician who had treated him for many years was called from St. Louis. These doctors testified that when they reached decedent he was in shock and a state of general collapse. The decedent told them that he felt fine when he got on the horse but it "jumped or something and he had a severe distress across his chest which lasted about thirty minutes and then left." He became worse and died on the fifth day.

The policy was in force at the time of decedent's death and the claim on the ordinary life feature was paid. The claim on the accidental death contract was rejected and this action for recovery was commenced.

The question presented is whether death resulted solely from bodily injury caused by external means of an accidental or violent nature. As in many cases, the controversy here is whether death resulted from injuries caused by the jumping and lunging of the horse or from a diseased condition of the decedent.

The decedent had been in poor health from twelve to fifteen years prior to his death. The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company issued a policy of $5,000 on his life in August, 1920, and another for $5,000 in February, 1929. The Aetna Life Insurance Company issued him a policy for $10,000 in March, 1921. The Home Life Insurance Company, appellee, issued its policy for $15,000 on December 26, 1924. At the time he applied to the last-named company for insurance the urinalysis revealed a diseased condition of the kidneys and he was then suffering from severe headaches. In October, 1929, his heart was affected. In 1930 the doctor advised removal of the right kidney and periodically for two years irrigated the kidneys by the use of urethral catheters. In March, 1930, he was examined by Dr. Finnegan of St. Louis for the first time, who found hypertension, pylonephritis, myocarditis, arterio sclerosis, a stone in the right kidney, and a diseased gall bladder and appendix. The right kidney was removed in April, 1932, after which the decedent improved in health. The appendix was removed in September, 1934. One doctor found coronary disease in March, 1936, and expressed an opinion that it had been in existence for two or three years. In November, 1933, decedent presented a claim to the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company based on total disability. He sued on this claim in February, 1936, and obtained a judgment retroactive to May, 1934. A similar claim was allowed by the Aetna Insurance Company without contest.

Proof of death to the insurance companies gave the cause of death as uremia with coronary thrombosis a contributing cause. Accident was not mentioned in any of the proofs of death. It was while the claim for insurance on the policy of appellee was in process of settlement that appellant notified the company that a claim would be made on the accidental death contract.

In considering this case, a number of well-recognized principles must be observed: (1) All facts that the plaintiff's evidence reasonably tends to prove, and all inferences that reasonably may be drawn therefrom, must be assumed to have been established. Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 50 S.Ct. 231, 74 L.Ed. 720; Lumbra v. United States, 290 U.S. 551, 54 S.Ct. 272, 78 L.Ed. 492; Columbian National Life Insurance Company v. Comfort, 8 Cir., 84 F. 2d 291; (2) The weight of uncontradicted evidence and the credibility of witnesses are questions for the determination of the jury. Elzig v. Gudwangen, 8 Cir., 91 F.2d 434; (3) The question whether an insured has died as the result of accidental causes is for the jury, provided the question is uncertain either because of a conflict in the evidence or because fair-minded men will honestly draw different conclusions from uncontradicted facts. Gunning v. Cooley, supra; Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U. S. 411, 54 S.Ct. 487, 78 L.Ed. 882; Southern Pacific Company v. Ralston, 10 Cir., 67 F.2d 958; Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Hatten, 8 Cir., 17 F.2d 889; Svenson v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, 8 Cir., 87 F.2d 441; Travelers Insurance Company v. Melick, 8 Cir., 65 F. 178, 27 L.R.A. 629; (4) What caused, or could have caused, the death of the insured was a medical question and a proper subject for expert testimony, the weight of which was for the jury. New York Life Insurance Company v. Doerksen, 10 Cir., 64 F.2d 240; London Guarantee & Accident Company v. Woelfle, 8 Cir., 83 F.2d 325; (5) It is only where the evidence is so overwhelmingly on one side as to preclude an opportunity for reasonable minds to differ that the court should direct a verdict. Gunning v. Cooley, supra; People's Savings Bank v. Bates, 120 U.S. 556, 7 S.Ct. 679, 30 L.Ed. 754; Southern Pacific Company v. Pool, 160 U.S. 438, 16 S.Ct. 338, 40 L.Ed. 485.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that an insurance company is liable on its policy of accident insurance if death resulted when it did on account of an aggravation of a disease by accidental injury, even though death from the disease might have resulted at a later period regardless of the injury, on the theory that if death would not have occurred when it did but for the injury, the accident was the direct, independent and exclusive cause of death at the time. Fidelity & Casualty Company v. Meyer, 106 Ark. 91, 152 S.W. 995, 44 L. R.A.,N.S., 493; Maloney v. Maryland Casualty Company, 113 Ark. 174, 167 S.W. 845; Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Smith, 166 Ark. 403, 266 S.W. 279; Missouri State Life Insurance Company v. Barron, 186 Ark. 46, 52 S.W.2d 733; National Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Shibley, 192 Ark. 53, 90 S.W.2d 766; Prudential Insurance Company v. Croley, Ark., 135 S.W.2d 322.

In the Meyer case, where the foregoing principle was first announced, the insured...

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