Clay v. Batts

• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
• Writing for the Court: TILMAN E. SELF, III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Docket Number: 3:25-cv-00167-TES-CHW
• Decision Date: 02 January 2026
• Citation: Clay v. Batts, 3:25-cv-00167-TES-CHW (M.D. Ga. Jan 02, 2026)
• Parties: BYRON DONNELLE CLAY, Plaintiff, v. AMBER BATTS, et al., Defendants.

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BYRON DONNELLE CLAY, Plaintiff, v. AMBER BATTS, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:25-cv-00167-TES-CHW

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Athens Division

January 2, 2026

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

TILMAN E. SELF, III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pro se Plaintiff Byron Clay, an inmate in the Walton County Jail in Monroe, Georgia, filed a complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis with an initial partial filing fee of $37.97. (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff has paid that fee and his complaint is ripe for preliminary screening. Also pending is Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Protective Transfer and Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 3).

PRELIMINARY SCREENING OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

I. Standard of Review

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) directs courts to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Courts must also screen complaints filed by a plaintiff proceeding IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of review is the same. “Pro se filings are generally held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed.” Carmichael v. United States, 966 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). On preliminary screening, the Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal” theories and “claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (citations omitted). A claim can be dismissed as malicious if it is knowingly duplicative or otherwise amounts to an abuse of the judicial process. Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of duplicative complaint “in light of [prisoner's] history as a prolific serial filer”).

A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations [in a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....” Twombly, 550 U.S at 555 (citations omitted). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176-77 (11^th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of certain claims at preliminary screening because prisoner failed to allege sufficient facts to show a violation of his rights), abrogated on other grounds by Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc).

II. Plaintiff's Allegations

Plaintiff's claims arise from his incarceration at the Walton County Jail. (ECF No. 1 at 7). Plaintiff complains that Defendant Amber Batts did not forward payments of partial filing fees in his federal civil actions when requested to do so and that she was dishonest with him about the status of fee payments in his cases. (Id. at 5-9). Plaintiff further complains that Defendant Cpl. Minor denied him “access to the grievance process.” (Id. at 6, 13-14). Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages and the costs of his lawsuit. (Id. at 10-11).

III. Plaintiff's Claims

A. Claims against Walton County Jail and Walton County Sheriff Office Plaintiff has named “Walton County Jail/ Walton County Sheriff office” as a Defendant. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 3). However, federal courts have long recognized that sheriff's departments, county detention facilities, and police departments are not legal entities subject to suit or liability under § 1983. See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that “sheriff's departments and police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit”); Bunyon v. Burke Cnty., 285 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1328 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (dismissing claim against police department, reasoning that it was not a legal entity subject to suit); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F.Supp. 1368, 1370 (N. D. Ga. 1984) (concluding that the City of Atlanta Police Department is not a proper defendant because it is “merely the vehicle through which the City government fulfills its policing function”). Thus, Plaintiff's claims against the Walton County Sheriff's Office and Walton County Jail must be dismissed because they are not entities subject to suit in a § 1983 action.

B. Access to Courts Claim

Plaintiff complains that Defendant Batts's “intentional or reckless failure to process Plaintiff trust funds payment, to forward partial filing fee to the federal court, and their false statements about what Court required obstructed Plaintiff ability to file and prosecute civil litigation in the federal courts.” (ECF No. 1 at 5).

“Access to the courts is clearly a constitutional right, grounded in the First Amendment, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and/or the Fourteenth Amendment.” Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002)). To state an access to courts claim, an inmate must show that the defendant deterred his “efforts to proceed with a legal claim in a criminal appeal, [post-conviction] matter, or civil rights action seeking to vindicate basic constitutional rights.” Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th Cir. 1998). However, an inmate's right to access the courts is only implicated where there is actual injury suffered “in the pursuit of specific types of nonfrivolous cases: direct or collateral attacks on sentences and challenges to conditions of confinement.” Id. The Supreme Court clarified the requirement of showing an actual injury in order to state a claim of denial of access, stating that “[t]he requirement that an inmate alleging [denial of access to the courts] must show actual injury derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing, .... It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, . . . who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Bass v. Singletary, 143 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-50) (“The doctrine of standing requires that an inmate alleging a violation of the right of access to the courts must show an actual injury .... Thus, the prison officials' actions which allegedly infringed an inmate's right of access to the courts must have frustrated or impeded the inmate's efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim.”)). Lastly, “[t]he allegations about the underlying cause of action must be specific enough to give fair notice to the defendants and must ‘be described well enough to apply the nonfrivolous test and to show that the arguable nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.'” Cunningham v. Dist. Att'y's Off. for Escambia Cnty., 592 F.3d 1237, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416).

Since July 21, 2025, Plaintiff has filed seven § 1983 complaints in this Court that all arise from his incarceration at the Walton County Jail. See (ECF No. 1); Clay v. Stidham, 3:25-cv-114-TES-AGH (filed July 21, 2025); Clay v. Gamble, 3:25-cv-121-TES-AGH (filed July 31, 2025); Clay v. Cooper, 3:25-cv-124-TES-AGH (filed Aug. 8, 2025); Clay v. Minor, 3:25-cv-127-TES-AGH (filed Aug. 14, 2025); Clay v. Pressly, 3:25-cv-144-TES-AGH (filed Sep. 8, 2025); Clay v. Mendez, 3:25-cv-196-TES-AGH (filed Dec. 11, 2025). Plaintiff does not specifically list any of these lawsuits or any other lawsuit in his statement of claim as being the underlying lawsuit of his access to courts claim. See (ECF No. 1 at 7-8). However, when asked on the Court's standard form about exhaustion of administrative remedies, Plaintiff does allege that the “partial filing fee . . . was not paid for cases 3:25-cv-171-TES-AGH in the amount of $41.67 and 3:25-cv-124-TES-AGH in the amount of $50.00.” (Id. at 13). Therefore, the Court concludes that these two lawsuits, 3:25-cv-171-TES-AGH, Clay v. Gamble, and 3:25-cv-124-TES-AGH, Clay v. Cooper, are the civil actions that are the basis for Plaintiff's access to courts claim.

First Cooper is still pending, and Plaintiff has been provided additional time to pay his partial initial filing fee. (ECF No. 6); (ECF No. 16). Thus, Plaintiff's allegation that he has been denied access to the courts in Cooper due to Defendant Batts's failure to forward his partial initial filing fee to this Court for that case is senseless. Moreover, Plaintiff is not even solely ...