Clay v. Conlee

• Decision Date: 12 May 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-1620,86-1620
• Citation: 815 F.2d 1164
• Parties: Andrew CLAY, Appellee, v. Coolidge CONLEE, Individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of St. Francis County, Appellant. St. Francis County Sheriff's Department
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1164

815 F.2d 1164

Andrew CLAY, Appellee, v. Coolidge CONLEE, Individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of St. Francis County, Appellant St. Francis County Sheriff's Department

No. 86-1620.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 14, 1986.

Decided April 1, 1987.

Rehearing Denied May 12, 1987.

Fletcher Long, Jr., Forrest City, Ark., for appellant.

Marva J. Davis, Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.

Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

The victim of a rape identified plaintiff Andrew Clay, a member of the Arkansas State Police, as her assailant. Within a few hours after Clay's arrest, the arresting officers discovered that the victim had identified the wrong man and that Clay was innocent. Clay promptly was released and the charge against him subsequently was dismissed. Clay later filed this action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against Coolidge Conlee, St. Francis County Sheriff, in both his individual and official capacity, alleging that the arresting officers lacked probable cause to arrest him and, therefore, violated his federal constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant Conlee in his individual capacity, but found against him in his official capacity and awarded Clay $60,000 compensatory damages. The District Court denied Conlee's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which Conlee appeals. We hold that as a matter of law there was probable cause to arrest Clay. Thus, there being no violation of Clay's constitutional rights, we reverse the judgment of the District Court.

I

In the early morning hours of December 2, 1983, a 28-year-old woman reported that she had been raped. The St. Francis County Sheriff's Department was notified, and defendant Conlee and one of his officers immediately went to the hospital where the victim had been taken for treatment. After receiving medical treatment, the victim recounted the circumstances surrounding the rape and identified her assailant as Andrew Clay.

The victim stated that earlier that evening she had gone to a party and to a local night club with her friends. As she and her friends were about to leave, the victim saw a man whom she thought she recognized as Andrew Clay in the driver's seat of a nearby car. Because her friends' car was crowded, she asked "Andrew" if he would give her a ride home, to which the man replied, "Okay." Since there was another man in the front passenger seat, the victim sat in the back seat. The male passenger was let out a short time later. The driver then drove to a secluded area on a gravel road, stopped the car, and raped the victim.

The victim walked to a friend's house and reported the rape. She told the officers that the assailant had struck her several times in the face and head with his hands. The victim's physical appearance and medical tests performed at the hospital where she was treated supported her allegations that she had been assaulted and raped. She identified her assailant as Andrew Clay. When questioned further about her identification of Clay as the assailant, the victim stated that she was "absolutely positive" it was him. She told officers that she had gone to high school with Clay and had known him for fifteen years, and that he had shown her his Arkansas State Police identification card. The victim also provided the officers with the names of her friends who were present when she accepted the ride home from the man she thought was Clay.

Based on the clear evidence that the victim had been raped and on her positive identification of Andrew Clay, two officers from the St. Francis County Sheriff's Department applied for an arrest warrant the following morning. It is not clear from the record exactly what factual evidence was presented to the magistrate to establish probable cause, but an affidavit from the victim stating simply that Andrew Clay had raped her was submitted. The warrant was issued between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. on December 2. Pursuant to Sheriff Conlee's instructions, the officers who were to execute the warrant first went to Arkansas State Police headquarters. As a professional courtesy, state police officials had been notified of the charge against Trooper Clay and accompanied the officers when Clay was arrested.

While the officers were en route to state police headquarters, Sheriff Conlee received a telephone call at 10:30 a.m. from a man who refused to identify himself. Though the trial testimony regarding the call was sketchy, it appears that the caller told Conlee that he "had the wrong man," and that an "Alfonso Powell" was the person actually involved in the rape. The caller provided no other information. Shortly thereafter, Conlee received a telephone call from the victim. She informed Conlee that she wanted to drop the charge against Clay because her mother thought that to press the charge would be too embarrassing for the victim and her family. Conlee advised the victim that he had no authority to dismiss a criminal charge. At no time during the conversation did the victim express any doubt about her identification of Clay. Following the conversation with the victim, Conlee unsuccessfully attempted to contact the arresting officers by radio. Apparently the officers were in state police headquarters at the time. Conlee made no other attempts to contact the officers to inform them of the anonymous telephone tip implicating Powell in the rape.

The officers arrived at Clay's house between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m. After being invited inside, the officers advised Clay of the charge against him and of the fact that they had a warrant for his arrest. Clay inquired into the circumstances of the rape and the victim's name, and denied any involvement in the rape. After arriving at the county jail between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m., Clay asked the officers to interview the witnesses who were present when the victim accepted a ride home. The officers did so, and it was then that they learned that it was indeed Alfonso Powell, not Andrew Clay, who had agreed to drive the victim home. Clay was released later that evening between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m., and the rape charge was dismissed on December 5. Alfonso Powell later admitted his involvement. This civil rights action ensued.

II

Conlee's primary contention on appeal is that as a matter of law there was probable cause to arrest Andrew Clay, and, consequently, that Clay was not deprived of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. After reviewing the record, we agree with Conlee that as a matter of law there was probable cause to arrest Clay for rape.

There is no question here of Andrew Clay's innocence. That fact, however, is neither dispositive of nor relevant to the ultimate issue in the case--whether there was probable cause to arrest Clay for rape--since "[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2631, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) ("The validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime; the mere fact that the subject is later acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest."). The Constitution prohibits only arrests that are not based on probable cause. That standard was defined by the Supreme Court in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964):

Whether [an] arrest was constitutionally valid depends ... upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it--whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [person arrested] had committed ... an offense.

Id. at 91, 85 S.Ct. at 225; see also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37, 99 S.Ct. at 2632. Thus, it is the "facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information" at the time of arrest to which we turn.

As noted above, the victim reported that she had been raped by Clay, with whom she had been acquainted for fifteen years. The medical evidence and the victim's appearance supported her allegation that she had been assaulted and raped. Clearly, law enforcement officers are entitled to rely on information supplied by the victim of a crime, absent some indication that the information is not reasonably trustworthy or reliable. Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir.1985) ("[T]he skepticism and careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants, sometimes anonymous, from the criminal milieu, is appropriately relaxed if the informant is an identified victim...."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986); Karr v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir.1985) (police entitled to rely on information from property owner whose identification of arrestee as person who vandalized his property seemed reasonable); Goodson v. City of Atlanta, 763 F.2d 1381, 1386 (11th Cir.1985); Gero v. Henault, 740 F.2d 78, 84 (1st Cir.1984) (arrest precipitated by victim's assertion that she had just seen fugitive sought by police held supported by probable cause), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191, 105 S.Ct. 965, 83 L.Ed.2d 970 (1985); B.C.R. Transport Co. v. Fontaine, 727 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1984) (stating that "probable cause determinations predicated on information furnished by a victim are generally considered to be reliable"); McKinney v. George, 726 F.2d 1183, 1187 (7th Cir.1984); Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057, 1061 (8th Cir.), aff'g, 354 F.Supp. 179, 183 (E.D.Mo.1973) (victim's report of crime gave...