Clay v. State

Decision Date11 April 2012
Docket NumberNo. S11A1956.,S11A1956.
Citation725 S.E.2d 260,290 Ga. 822,12 FCDR 982
PartiesCLAY v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Joseph W. Vigneri, Atlanta, Jason Randall Clark, Brunswick, for appellant.

Jacquelyn Lee Johnson, District Attorney, Jonathan Ralph Miller III, Andrew J. Ekonomou, Assistant District Attorneys, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Mary Beth Westmoreland, Deputy Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

This is an interim appellate review of a case in which the State seeks the death penalty. John David Clay has been indicted for malice murder and false imprisonment in connection with the death of Janice Swain in the early morning hours of March 4, 2007. This Court granted Clay's application for interim review and directed the parties to address whether the trial court erred in its order granting in part and denying in part Clay's motion to exclude his statements to law enforcement officers, in granting Clay's motion to suppress his clothing, in ruling that the evidence of Clay's prior convictions would be admissible under OCGA § 24–9–84.1(b) in the event he testifies at trial, in ruling admissible as similar transaction evidence certain prior acts of Clay, and in denying Clay's motion regarding the State's destruction of blood evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand with direction.

1. Clay challenged the admissibility of four statements made by him to law enforcement officers. The trial court ruled that Clay's first three statements are inadmissible but that his fourth statement is admissible. “The trial court determines the admissibility of a defendant's statement under the preponderance of the evidence standard considering the totality of the circumstances.” (Citation omitted.) Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 176, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008). Although we defer to the trial court's findings of disputed facts, we review de novo the trial court's application of the law to the facts. See Petty v. State, 283 Ga. 268, 269(2), 658 S.E.2d 599 (2008).

The trial court made the following factual findings based upon evidence and testimony presented at combined hearings on Clay's motions to exclude his statements and to suppress his clothing. After Clay was found lying unconscious on Jessica Lane with blood on his clothes at approximately 3:30 a.m. on March 4, 2007, Clay's sister and his friend called 911, which dispatched an ambulance to transport Clay to the hospital emergency room (ER). Glynn County Police Department officers were also dispatched to the scene. At the same time, officers discovered Ms. Swain's body in Room 303 of the Guest Cottages Hotel in Brunswick. Upon learning that Clay had been in Room 303 earlier that day, Investigator Hogue instructed Officer Cupp to go to the hospital, “stand by” with Clay, and obtain a statement from him, if possible. When Officer Cupp arrived at the ER, Clay was still unconscious.

Dr. Jeff Gunderson, who attended Clay in the ER, testified that when Clay arrived at the ER at approximately 4:30 a.m., he was in an unresponsive state and could not be aroused. Even when Dr. Gunderson applied a “sternum rub,” which he described as a deep-pain stimulus, Clay only moaned in response. Clay's toxicology tests indicated that he had consumed benzodiazepines (Valium or Xanax), marijuana, alcohol, and cocaine. At approximately 7:00 a.m., Dr. Gunderson checked Clay and noted that he remained intoxicated and unconscious, but another doctor was able to awaken Clay at approximately 8:00 a.m. Officer Cupp was in the room when Clay awoke, and he and Clay engaged in conversation (Statement 1). When Clay was discharged from the ER at approximately 8:48 a.m., he was transported directly to the Glynn County Police Department, where Investigator Hogue conducted a video-recorded interview of Clay at approximately 11:15 a.m. (Statement 2). Clay was placed in a holding cell for observation of his medical condition at approximately 3:15 p.m., and Investigator Hogue conducted an audio-recorded interview inside this cell (Statement 3). Fifteen days later, Clay gave a final audio-recorded interview while incarcerated at the detention center (Statement 4).

A. Miranda Violations. Clay alleges that all four statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Miranda protections adhere when an individual is (1) formally arrested or (2) restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (Citations omitted.) Tolliver v. State, 273 Ga. 785, 786, 546 S.E.2d 525 (2001). In evaluating this second prong, the test is an objective one, i.e., “an individual is in custody if a reasonable person in the place of the defendant would feel so restrained as to equate to a formal arrest.” Id.

(1) Statement 1. Officer Cupp was the only witness to testify regarding this unrecorded statement, and, according to his testimony, the following transpired. Upon his arrival at the ER, Officer Cupp confirmed Clay's identity with an armed, uniformed patrol officer from the Glynn County Police Department who was “standing by” an unconscious Clay. After releasing the patrol officer, Officer Cupp took photographs of Clay and removed Clay's items of clothing from a pink and white plastic “personal effects” bag on the counter, listed the items on a property receipt form, and placed the individual items into separate bags. Then Officer Cupp “watched” Clay until he regained consciousness. Officer Cupp was in plain clothes, but he was wearing his badge and revolver on his belt. Even though he did not identify himself to Clay as a law enforcement officer, when Clay awakened, he asked Officer Cupp what he was going to be charged with. Officer Cupp asked Clay whether he had done anything to be charged with, and Clay shook his head in the negative. Clay then asked if he would have a bond, Officer Cupp asked if he had done anything that would require that he have a bond, and Clay again shook his head in the negative. Officer Cupp told Clay that he would “need to come to the police department” to speak to the police once he was released from the hospital. Clay asked why, and Officer Cupp told him that the police needed to find out why he was found in the road with “a knot above his eye” and needed to “speak to him about something that happened at the Guest Cottages.”

After Clay and Officer Cupp talked further about Clay's activities on the previous evening, hospital personnel brought discharge papers to Clay. Then Officer Cupp, who had driven an unmarked vehicle to the hospital, immediately called for a transport officer and a patrol vehicle with a cage and child locks to transport Clay to the police department. While waiting on the transport unit, Clay asked Officer Cupp what happened at the Guest Cottages, and the officer told Clay that “someone was dead” there and that the police “need[ed] to find out what he may know or how much involvement he might have had in the death.” Clay told Officer Cupp that he did not kill anyone, and Officer Cupp told Clay that he just needed to tell the truth when he got to the police department. Clay again asked if he were going to be charged, and Officer Cupp told him that “if he had done nothing wrong, he had nothing to worry about.” Clay was transported to the police department at approximately 9:00 a.m. in the patrol vehicle. Officer Cupp testified that he did not give Clay his Miranda warnings, that he never told Clay that he was free to leave, and that Clay never tried to leave or expressed that he wanted to leave.

The State contends that the trial court erred in finding that Clay was in custody when he made Statement 1 and thus that it was obtained in violation of Miranda. Considering the facts that Clay awoke to find a police officer in his treatment room and that that officer avoided Clay's questions regarding whether he was going to be charged, told Clay that he “needed” to come down to the police station to talk with the police, never told Clay that he was not under arrest or that he was free to leave, and called for a patrol vehicle to transport Clay to the police station, we conclude that the trial court was authorized to find that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Clay's position would have perceived that he was in custody at the time he made Statement 1. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that Statement 1 was obtained in violation of Miranda. See McDougal v. State, 277 Ga. 493, 498(1)(A), 591 S.E.2d 788 (2004) (considering the fact that police would make no commitments to the defendant about whether he would be arrested as a factor in favor of custody). Compare Gabriel v. State, 280 Ga. 237, 237–238(2), 626 S.E.2d 491 (2006) (considering the facts that the defendant was asked whether he would go to the sheriff's office and that he was told that he was not under arrest and was free to leave as factors weighing in favor of not finding custody).

(2) Statement 2. The State does not contend that Clay was not in custody at the time of this statement and his remaining statements but, instead, that Clay made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. After his arrival at the police department, Clay was read his Miranda warnings by Investigator Hogue prior to being questioned by him. However, our review of the videotape of Statement 2 1 supports the trial court's findings that Investigator Hogue read the Miranda warnings in such a ‘super-speed’ manner that the warnings likely could not have been identified “as anything more than gibberish” without having a prior familiarity with Miranda. It is axiomatic that a rendering of the Miranda warnings must be intelligible before a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive the rights involved. See State v. Floyd, 306 Ga.App. 402, 405–406, ...

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