Clay v. Tryk

• Citation: 177 Cal.App.3d 119,222 Cal.Rptr. 729
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 03 February 1986
• Parties: Everett CLAY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Daniel TRYK, Director of the Lake County Welfare Department, Defendant and Respondent. AO29922.

Page 729

222 Cal.Rptr. 729

177 Cal.App.3d 119

Everett CLAY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Daniel TRYK, Director of the Lake County Welfare Department, Defendant and Respondent.

AO29922.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Feb. 3, 1986.

[177 Cal.App.3d 121] Stephen R. Nielson, Redwood Legal Assistance, Ukiah, for appellant.

Cameron L. Reeves, County Counsel, Douglas H. Calkins, Deputy County Counsel, Lakeport, for respondent.

SMITH, Associate Justice.

Appellant Everett Clay appeals from a judgment denying a writ of mandamus to compel the award of welfare benefits.

Clay applied for general relief benefits on November 4, 1983. The welfare department found him eligible for some general relief, but denied him housing and utility benefits pursuant to Lake County General Relief Regulation section III, subdivision B, subsection 5. The regulation refuses housing benefits to persons in shared housing arrangements where not all members of the household are entitled to general relief. The welfare department upheld the initial decision after county hearings in January, 1984. On April 17, 1984, the Lake County supervisors amended the regulation to exclude landlord-tenant relationships from the shared housing restriction.

Clay subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The superior court affirmed the decision of the welfare department, holding that there was no landlord-tenant relationship in Clay's situation and thus that Clay was ineligible for benefits. Clay filed a timely notice of appeal December 3, 1984.

The material facts are not in dispute. Clay lived in the mobile home of Mr. and Mrs. Medicas for approximately four and one-half years prior to his application for general relief benefits. Clay had his own bedroom but shared the kitchen, bathroom, and other areas of the home with the Medicases. During those four and one-half years Clay resided at other locations for a total of approximately three months.

Clay's original agreement with the Medicases provided that Clay would perform certain household chores in exchange for room and board from the Medicases. On April 19, 1983 Clay suffered a serious head injury. Since that time Clay has been unable to pay the Medicases for his shelter by performing chores as he did prior to his injury.

The regulation in question here currently reads: "Housing and/or utility payments will not be allowed in 'shared housing' arrangements unless all members of the household meet the County General Relief eligibility standards." "Shared housing" does not include situations where an established or proven landlord-tenant relationship exists.

Applying this regulation to Clay's facts the superior court determined that Clay's relationship to the Medicases was that of a "lodger", i.e. he had a rent obligation, but did not have exclusive possession of the premises he occupied. ¹ The court concluded that this did not qualify as a landlord-tenant relationship for the purposes of the Lake County General Relief Regulation section III, subdivision B, subsection 5. Clay appeals the superior court's construction of "landlord-tenant relationship."

APPEAL

Clay contends on appeal that since he is a lodger and obliged to compensate the Medicases for the value of the premises he occupies, the county abused its discretion by denying him housing relief benefits. Specifically he argues that (1) the Lake County housing and utility relief regulation is inconsistent with Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000 which requires counties to support indigent residents, ² and (2) the narrow interpretation of "landlord-tenant" violates various rules of statutory construction. Lake County responds that the only issue on appeal is whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence and that it has met the above mentioned duty to provide for indigents.

I

Because the issues involved in Clay's appeal are legal, we may independently review the superior court's conclusions of law. (Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 605, 611, 200 Cal.Rptr. 575.) The county maintains that we are bound in this appeal by the substantial evidence standard of review, but they mistakenly assume the issues involved are factual.

Actually Clay makes two contentions on appeal, both of which concern the trial court's legal conclusions. Clay takes issue with the court's legal classification that his arrangements with the Medicases are outside the scope of the landlord-tenant exception to the shared housing exclusion. He does not question the court's specific findings as to the factual nature of the arrangements. Clay's other argument is that the county's interpretation of its regulation does not meet its duty under section 17000 to support indigent persons. This argument is a legal issue of statutory interpretation. Thus, the substantial evidence test is inappropriate and we may independently consider the legal issues here.

II

Lake County restricts housing and utility benefits on the basis of whether an applicant in "shared housing" is in a technically defined "landlord-tenant relationship." Clay argues that the exclusion is inconsistent with section 17000. We agree.

Section 17000 requires counties to support "all incompetent, poor indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease or accident." Under section 17001 ³ counties have "broad discretion to determine eligibility for, the type and amount of, and conditions to be attached to indigent relief." (City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 44, 49, 128 Cal.Rptr. 712.) Some cases have stated that the court cannot interfere with the county's discretion " 'in the absence of a clear showing of fraud or arbitrary or capricious conduct....' " (Adkins v. Leach (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 771, 778-779, 95 Cal.Rptr. 61, quoting Patten v. County of San Diego (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 467, 470, 235 P.2d 217.)

This latitude in administering relief was qualified in Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231. The court emphasized that the county's discretion "can be exercised only within fixed boundaries. In administering General Assistance relief the county acts as an agent of the state. [Citation.] ... [T]he agency's regulations must be consistent, not in conflict with the statute, and reasonably necessary to effectuate its purpose. (Gov.Code, § 11374.)" (Id., at p. 679, 94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231.)

California courts have found regulations not to be within the allowable boundaries when they exclude an entire class of people In its interpretation Lake County creates a situation analogous to those in Mooney and Bernhardt. Applicants must have exclusive possession of their living quarters in addition to paying rent in order to qualify for housing benefits. An entire class of persons, persons who share possession of their shelter, are therefore denied housing benefits even though individually some members of this class have unmet housing needs. The county relies on a "theoretical economic resource," assuming that persons who share legal possession of premises can be supported by their housemates. As in Clay's situation this irrebuttable presumption is not always justified. In fact, unrelated housemates are often unwilling to support one another. Lake County's assumption can actually hinder the goal of efficient public assistance, since it is generally more economical to share housing than to live alone.

                some of whom would be eligible for aid if evaluated individually.  (Mooney v. Pickett, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 679, 94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231.)   These exclusions amount to irrebuttable presumptions that members of the classes are not needy.  In Mooney, the California Supreme Court concluded that welfare regulations which excluded mentally and physically "employable" men from general relief created an impermissible irrebuttable presumption that these men were not in need of assistance, in violation of section 17000.  (Id., at p. 681, 94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231.)   Similarly, a regulation imposing strict eligibility requirements on 18- to 20-year-olds, [177 Cal.App.3d 125] requiring most of this group to live with their parents, was invalidated in Bernhardt v. Board of Supervisors (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 806, 130 Cal.Rptr. 189.   The Bernhardt court reasoned that the county in question relied "upon an economic 'resource' which is theoretical rather than real.  As Mooney tells us with respect to theoretical 'employability,' such reliance is not permitted by sections 17000 and 17001.  (Mooney v. Pickett, supra, 4 Cal.3d 669, at pp. 679-681 [94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231].)"  (Bernhardt, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d 806, 812, 130 Cal.Rptr. 189.)   Both these cases rejected presumptions based upon factors which do not necessarily correlate with actual need. 4
                

The county argues that the Lake County shared housing provision is similar to a provision which was upheld on constitutional grounds in Berkeley v. Alameda Bd. of Supervisors (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 961, 115 Cal.Rptr. 540. In Berkeley the court discussed a regulation that computed the grants of "unrelated general assistance recipients residing in a common household" in the same manner as a "family group." (Id., at p. 964, 115 Cal.Rptr. 540.) Members of family groups received smaller per person allowances than individual recipients. (Id., at pp. 966-968, 115 Cal.Rptr. 540) Although the members of the common households were entitled to less relief than they would have been had each been living alone, the regulation was held to be in accord with due process of law. (Id., at p. 974, 115 Cal.Rptr. 540.) The court explained that the provision did not create an irrebuttable presumption since it did not, "make certain facts conclusive proof of another ultimate fact." (Id., at p. 969, 115 Cal.Rptr. 540.) Rather, the court concluded the regulation was a general determination of need, which is...