Clay v. United States
Decision Date | 28 June 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 783,783 |
Citation | 91 S.Ct. 2068,403 U.S. 698,29 L.Ed.2d 810 |
Parties | Cassius Marsellus CLAY, Jr. also known as Muhammad Ali, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Chauncey Eskridge, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.
Solicitor Gen. Erwin N. Griswold for respondent.
The petitioner was convicted for willful refusal to submit to induction into the Armed Forces. 62 Stat. 622, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(a). (1964 ed., Supp. V). The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.1 We granted certiorari, 400 U.S. 990, 91 S.Ct. 457, 27 L.Ed.2d 438 to consider whether the induction notice was invalid because grounded upon an erroneous denial of the petitioner's claim to be classified as a conscientious objector.
The petitioner's application for classification as a conscientious objector was turned down by his local draft board, and he took an administrative appeal. The State Appeal Board tentatively classified him I—A (eligible for unrestricted military service) and referred his file to the Department of Justice for an advisory recommendation, in accordance with then-applicable procedures. 50 U.S.C.A.App. § 456(j) (1964 ed., Supp. V). The FBI then conducted an 'inquiry' as required by the statute, interviewing some 35 persons, including members of the petitioner's family and many of his friends, neighbors, and business and religious associates.
There followed a hearing on 'the character and good faith of the (petitioner's objections' before a hearing officer appointed by the Department. The hearing officer, a retired judge of many years' experience, 2 heard testimony from the petitioner's mother and father, from one of his attorneys, from a minister of his religion, and from the petitioner himself. He also had the benefit of a full report from the FBI. On the basis of this record the hearing officer concluded that the registrant was sincere in his objection on religious grounds to participation in war in any form, and he recommended that the conscientious objector claim be sustained.3
Notwithstanding this recommendation, the Department of Justice wrote a letter to the Appeal Board, advising it that the petitioner's conscientious objector claim should be denied. Upon receipt of this letter of advice, the Board denied the petitioner's claim without a statement of reasons. After various further proceedings which it is not necessary to recount here, the petitioner was ordered to report for induction. He refused to take the traditional step forward, and this prosecution and conviction followed.
In order to qualify for classification as a conscientious objector, a registrant must satisfy three basic tests. He must show that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168. He must show that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief, as the term has been construed in our decisions. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733; Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308. And he must show that this objection is sincere. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 75 S.Ct. 392, 99 L.Ed. 428. In applying these tests, the Selective Service System must be concerned with the registrant as an individual, not with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious sect, if any, to which he may belong. United States v. Seeger, supra; Gillette v. United States, supra; Williams v. United States, 5 Cir., 216 F.2d 350, 352.
In asking us to affirm the judgment of conviction, the Government argues that there was a 'basis in fact,' cf. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567, for holding that the petitioner is not opposed to 'war in any form,' but is only selectively opposed to certain wars. See Gillette v. United States, supra. Counsel for the petitioner, needless to say, takes the opposite position. The issue is one that need not be resolved in this case. For we have concluded that even if the Government's position on this question is correct, the conviction before us must still be set aside for another quite independent reason.
The petitioner's criminal conviction stemmed from the Selective Service System's denial of his appeal seeking conscientious objector status. That denial, for which no reasons were ever given, was, as we have said, based on a recommendation of the Department of Justice, overruling its hearing officer and advising the Appeal Board that it 'finds that the registrant's conscientious-objector claim is not sustained and recommends to your Board that he be not (so) classified.' This finding was contained in a long letter of explanation, from which it is evident that Selective Service officials were led to believe that the Department had found that the petitioner had failed to satisfy each of the three basic tests for qualification as a conscientious objector.
As to the requirement that a registrant must be opposed to war in any form, the Department letter said that the petitioner's expressed beliefs
As to the requirement that a registrant's opposition must be based upon religious training and belief, the Department letter said:
As to the requirement that a registrant's opposition to war must be sincere, that part of the letter began by stating that There followed several paragraphs reciting the timing and circumstances of the petitioner's conscientious objector claim, and a concluding paragraph seeming to state a rule of law—that
In this Court the Government has now fully conceded that the petitioner's beliefs are based upon 'religious training and belief,' as defined in United States v. Seeger, supra: 4 This concession is clearly correct. For the record shows that the petitioner's beliefs are founded on tenets of the Muslim religion as he understands them. They are surely no less religiously based than those of the three registrants before this Court in Seeger. See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308.
The Government in this Court has also made clear that it no longer questions the sincerity of the petitioner's beliefs.5 This concession is also correct. The Department hearing officer—the only person at the administrative appeal level who carefully examined the petitioner and other witnesses in person and who had the benefit of the full FBI file—found 'that the registrant is sincere in his objection.' The Department of Justice was wrong in advising the Board in terms of a purported rule of law that it should disregard this finding simply because of the circumstances and timing of the petitioner's claim. See Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 103—104, 91 S.Ct. 1319, 1322—1323, 28 L.Ed. 625; United States ex rel. Lehman v. Laird, 4 Cir., 430 F.2d 96, 99; United States v. Abbott, 8 Cir., 425 F.2d 910, 915; United States ex rel. Tobias v. Laird, 4 Cir., 413 F.2d 936, 939—940; Cohen v. Laird, D.C., 315 F.Supp. 1265, 1277—1278.
Since the Appeal Board gave no reasons for its denial of the petitioner's claim, there is absolutely no way of knowing upon which of the three grounds offered in the Department's letter it relied. Yet the Government now acknowledges that two of those grounds were not valid. And, the Government's concession aside, it is indisputably clear, for the reasons stated, that the Department was simply wrong as a matter of law in advising that the petitioner's beliefs were not religiously based and were not sincerely held.
This case, therefore, falls squarely within the four coners of this Court's decision in Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 75 S.Ct. 403, 99 L.Ed. 436. There as here the Court was asked to hold that an error in an advice letter prepared by the Department of Justice did not require reversal of a criminal conviction because there was a ground on which the Appeal Board might properly have denied a conscientious objector classification. This Court refused to consider the...
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